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Chapter 1
Introduction
11
For its complexity, relevance and peculiar structure the electricity industry has
challenged the researchers in a number of fields. Overtime, many policy interventions
have contributed to reshape the electricity industries worldwide, engendering a need
for constant updates in the understanding of this sector’s dynamics. The process of
liberalization, already undertaken in United States and Australia, has been completed
in European Union in 2009 with the approval of the Third Energy Package. Gen-
eration and retail activities have been opened up to competition and spot electricity
markets have been created accordingly. Upstream, the main reform’s goal has been to
boost efficiency by promoting capacity adequacy and technology mix optimality; down-
stream, the introduction of competition has been expected to empower final customers
lured with better economic deals and a broader product/service range. Alongside with
liberalization, the mounting concerns about global warming and climate change have
pushed several Countries to rethink about their use of exhaustible resources, such as
coal, gas and oil. European Union, the frontrunner in the global environmental battle,
has approved in 2009 the Climate and Energy Package which has established compul-
sory targets for limiting greenhouse gas emissions, enhancing investments in renewable
technologies for power generation and improving savings from energy efficiency. Fur-
thermore, a set of publicly financed measures has been put in place to reach the objective
of a 20% share of EU energy consumption covered by renewable production within the
2020 time horizon.
Predicting policies’ impact on power sector’s dynamics is a rather complex task
for a number of reasons among which the difficulty of disentangling the effects of sin-
gle reforms, the pervasive regulatory interventions in a sector considered economically
strategic, and the uncertainty about the technological trajectory. For these reasons,
several competing approaches for economic analysis may be applied and their results
may be fruitfully combined in order to gain a thorough insight into electricity indus-
try. The objective of this thesis is to answer to three questions raised by the waves of
reform using in each case a specific methodology: theoretical industrial organization,
applied industrial organization and micro-econometrics. The three questions may be
synthesized as following:
1. Has retail liberalization achieved its objectives in European Union?
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2. How “traditional” and “renewable” generators compete in a liberalized market?
3. What is the impact on congestion and zonal price differences of increased produc-
tion from renewable intermittent sources in Italy?
The answers to these questions form the object of the three following chapters. As
suggested by the title, if the analysis of competition in electricity markets represents
the final goal of this thesis, each chapter is devoted to a particular aspect of this
issue: the second chapter focuses on retailers, the third on producers and the fourth on
technologies.
The second chapter1 provides a mid-term evaluation of liberalization of electricity
retailing in Europe, taking into account four limitations to policy analysis: different
and often conflicting theoretical points of view, shortage of routinely collected data,
problems in disentangling the effect of retail liberalization from those of other related
reforms and pervasive regulatory interventions. Lacking a common analytical frame-
work to assess the costs and benefits of electricity retail competition, a comprehensive
theory on retail liberalization has been built and then used to test the consistency of
theory and practice in European Union. The analysis of European data on market
structure and dynamics highlights the presence of an oligopolistic supply structure, as
well as a limited level of customer engagement in the market, which in the case of small
consumers is partially justified by the presence of switching costs and informational
complexities. Asymmetries in the rate and speed of cost-pass through make the market
opaque, challenging the sole reliance on “light-hand” regulation to guarantee a sound
market functioning. The situations in which some form of “hard” regulation appear to
be necessary to secure the continuity of supply even after the introduction of competi-
tion have been identified and several implementation solutions are proposed according
to the weight attributed to the objective of supply continuity and customer protection.
In the light of evidences about European markets, the attribution of the Default/Last
Resort service through an auction mechanism seems the best solution to favor both the
development of upstream and downstream competition, without deterring customer
switching.
1A first version of this chapter has been published as Concettini, S. and Creti, A., “Liberalization
of electricity retailing in Europe: what to do next?”, Energy Studies Review, Volume 21, Issue 1, 2014.
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The third chapter2 studies the strategic interactions between two electricity gener-
ators, the first producing with a “traditional” technology and the second employing a
“renewable” technology characterized by the random availability of capacity due to the
intermittency of its power source. The competition between “traditional” and “renew-
able” power producers is examined through a modified version of the Dixit model for
entry deterrence (Dixit, 1980). I propose two alternative settings for the post entry
competition. In the baseline model I employ the Cournot framework and the sub-
game perfect Nash equilibrium in the investment-production game is found through a
two-stage procedure. In the extended model, I adopt the “dominant firm - competi-
tive fringe” setting developed by Carlton and Perloff (2002) and the equilibrium of the
game is assessed in three stages. This extension aims at accounting for price taking
behaviour of “renewable” firm which represents the competitive fringe in real spot elec-
tricity market. The idea behind this extension is that in a stylized model with only
two technologies competing in a spot market, the “traditional” generator sets the price
knowing that it will face a competitive rival while the “renewable” producer receives
the price chosen by marginal “traditional” firm (the dominant firm) despite being com-
petitive in its bid. The analysis suggests that the “renewable” generator exploits merit
order rule to invest and produce as if it were a Stackelberg leader; producer’s prefer-
ences over strategies do not vary with the values of parameters. However, according
to the average value of capacity availability, the market may lead to an equilibrium
which benefits both the “renewable” producer and the consumers. Given that pro-
duction of electricity from the renewable source depends on actual weather conditions,
the analysis of ex-post pay-offs reveals that “renewable” producer’s preferences over
strategies may be reversed for small errors in the forecasting of the true value of the
average capacity availability factor. In this case, the incentives for strategic behaviour
of the “renewable” producer may be even stronger. The main insights of the model
seem to be barely sensitive to changes in the market power of competitors: even when
the “renewable” generator behaves as a competitive fringe in the spot market, it is
able to influence equilibrium outcome to its own advantage through investment choices
although to a smaller degree than in the standard setting. In this extension, contrary
to the baseline model, the ranking of strategies is sensitive to the choice of parameters’
2A first version of this chapter is published as EconomiX Working Paper No. 2014-44.
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values. A numerical example shows that when the average value of capacity availability
increases, the preferred strategy of “renewable” producer becomes that one implying
the largest possible capacity investments.
The fourth chapter3 studies the impact of increasing intermittent renewable gener-
ation on congestion and zonal price differences in Italy. The integration of renewable
power plants, especially those exploiting intermittent power sources such as wind and
sun, represents a challenge for network operators, market participants and regulators
for a number of reasons. First of all, some geographical locations are particularly well
suited for the installation of new capacity due to the abundance of natural resources.
These locations may not coincide with consumption sites and may, on the contrary,
be very far from them. Substantial investments are therefore required to integrate
the new facilities and to ease the process of displacement of electricity from produc-
tion toward consumption sites. Additional investments may be necessary to deal with
increasing intermittent generation directly flowing into the network. Secondly, merit
order rule and priority dispatch for the electricity generated from renewable power
sources have redefined the rules of the game in decentralized spot market: on the one
hand renewable supply has partly crowded out the production from mid-merit power
plants and on the other hand it has intensified the needs for immediately available,
back-up capacity to overcome the intermittency and to guarantee inflows and outflows
balance. The economic literature, which has been especially concerned in analysing
the impact of increasing renewable production on wholesale electricity prices, has em-
phasized the likely reductions on equilibrium prices entailed by renewable supply and
originated from the displacement of higher variable cost production in the merit order
ranking. Nonetheless, when national electricity markets are organized as two or more
inter-connected sub-markets with zonal prices, the final impact on equilibrium prices of
increased generation from renewable sources may result less straightforward than the
existing literature would suggest. As a matter of fact, depending on the location of
supply and demand, the renewable output may multiply the incidence of transmission
congestions or it may relieve congestion occurrence by reducing transportation needs.
This chapter aims at testing the impact of this phenomenon using Italian electricity
market as case study. The Italian Power Exchange is composed of 6 regional sub-
3A first version of this chapter has been written in collaboration with Anna Creti and Faddy Ardian.
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markets which aggregate in macro-zones all the administrative regions. The hourly
electricity price is unique for the whole country when all transmission limits between
sub-markets are respected; otherwise a system of zonal pricing applies. The Northern
zone, whose generation capacity is the largest of the country, has historically been an
exporting zone; as a consequence its zonal prices have been constantly lower than the
rest of Italy. The ambitious support policies for the development of renewable power
sources have generated a significant amount of new investments in solar and wind power
plants: Southern regions have showed the highest growth rate due to the favourable
weather conditions. The analysis of inter-zonal transits resulting from the day-ahead
auction as well as of the series of paired-price differences between neighbouring zones
reveals a changing pattern between importing and exporting regions, with a stronger
role for Central and Southern regions as exporters.
To assess the impact of increasing renewable generation on congestion and zonal
price differences in Italy, I have built a unique database collecting and matching data
with hourly frequency from several sources for the period 2010-2012: GME, the market
operator, which publishes the hourly offers in the day-ahead market together with
equilibrium prices, quantities end inter-zonal transits; GSE, the state-owned company
promoting and supporting renewable energy sources in Italy, which provides information
about renewable capacity and generation; Terna, the network operator, which is in
charge for the estimation of the demand and the available transmission capacities;
REF-E, a consulting group, which has created a list of Italian power plants classified
by technology and geographical location; ICE, the American network of exchanges and
clearing houses for financial and commodity markets. Then two econometric models
performed on five zonal pairings have been estimated: a multinomial logit model, whose
dependent variable has three discrete values capturing both the occurrence of congestion
and its direction, and an OLS model which seeks to quantify the effects of renewable
production on the size of paired-price differences.
The analysis suggests that the effect of increasing renewable generation on conges-
tion remarkably depends on the importing/exporting role played by the zone under
consideration. Indeed, if a region is normally importing electricity from its neighbour,
the effect of a larger local renewable supply is: 1) to decrease the probability of suffer-
ing congestion in entry or 2) to increase the probability of causing a congestion in exit
16
compared to no congestion case. Increasing hydroelectric production in these zones has
a similar effect. In terms of price difference, increasing renewable generation seems to
have a significant impact on the islander zones, decreasing the level of positive price
differences and increasing the level of negative price differences. These results may have
substantial implications for the rationalisation of Italian support policy to renewable
sources.
Beside the results of the analyses which are extensively discussed in each chapter,
it is worthy to mention here that the econometric estimations presented in the fourth
chapter have required the set-up of a unique database tracing all the transactions in the
Italian day-ahead electricity market from 2009 to 2013. The creation of the database
has entailed a significant data-mining effort in order to accede, cross-verify and assemble
information from different sources. It is worth to mention also that the construction of
the database has posed a favourable basis for other ongoing and future researches on
Italian electricity market.
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Chapter 2
Liberalization of electricity retailing
in Europe: what to do next?
19
2.1 Introduction
In any industry the role of retailers is to provide final customers with added-value
services. The types and magnitudes of the costs and benefits of retailing adding-value
activities vary widely across sectors, final customer dimensions and characteristics, peri-
ods, geographical locations and market structures.1 In the electricity industry, retailers
perform two main activities: on the one hand, they provide final customers a com-
plex service by aggregating inputs from all upstream actors (generation, transport and
distribution); on the other hand, they facilitate upstream firms’ sales by finding, arrang-
ing and managing relationships with potential and actual buyers. In the liberalization
process of power sector, retailing and generation have been opened to competition,
whereas grid operation, maintenance and investments have remained under regulatory
oversight. In Europe the opening of retail electricity markets has progressively entitled
eligible customers to freely purchase retail services from a supplier of their choice: this
right was first awarded to industrial consumers with annual consumption above a cer-
tain threshold2 and then to all non-household consumers from the 1st of July, 2004,
followed by all consumers since the 1st of July, 2007.
Before and during the process of liberalization several arguments have been put forth
on the costs and benefits of retail electricity competition. Despite the non negligible
academic and political interest on this topic, there has never been a consensus on the
theoretical framework that should be used to examine retail activities in this type of
market. The lack of a shared vision has challenged the definition of a common set
of indicators for assessing the success or the failure of the reform. Two additional
limitations have discouraged empirical impact analyses: on the one hand, the scarcity
of data on European retail markets which prevents a systematic market oversight; on
the other hand, the difficulty of disentangling the effects of retail liberalization from
those of other related reforms (e.g. liberalization of generation) when using available
data. On top of that, powerful regulatory interventions in this business compound the
evaluation of retail competition’s outcome. Indeed, liberalization goals of improving
1Retailing activities add-value optimizing consumers’ allocations of time; increasing consumer
awareness of product features, price and quality; offering customer assistance; reducing searching,
switching, transportation, transaction and stock-out costs (Joskow, 2000).
2See Directive 96/92/EC.
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efficiency and effectiveness in electricity retailing have been frequently counterbalanced,
both at European and at national level, by the political requirement of ensuring that
no consumers were excluded from trade. This objective has often been translated in
the co-existence of market prices and regulated tariffs, the latter being kept artificially
low with a clear impact on competition’s dynamics.
The aim of this chapter is to provide a mid-term evaluation of liberalization of
electricity retailing in Europe taking into account the mentioned analytic constraints:
different and often conflicting theoretical points of view, shortage of routinely collected
data, problems in isolating the impact of a single reform, pervasive regulatory inter-
ventions. We focus on European Union experience where a common framework on
competition and regulation exists, differently from the US where the extent of liber-
alization results from State level regulation. Our objective is twofold: drawing the
attention to a relevant topic which has been overlooked in recent debates on power
markets and suggesting a set of actions that should be undertaken by policy makers
in order to give electricity retail business a clearer status. In doing so we essentially
compare theory and practice, trying to answering to the question: what to do next?
Our analysis suggest that direct benefits of retail competition have been often over-
stated, particularly for small and residential customers. Final market has proven to
be less dynamic than forecast and new entry in supply more difficult to sustain in the
medium-long run, notably for small, non integrated companies. The disappearance of
captive market seems to have benefited more integrated generators willing to sell their
power to newly attracted customers than pure retailers competing on a retail margin.
At the same time, European regulators seem to have proceeded without truly question-
ing liberalization paradigm, even when some shortcomings have revealed. They have
lacked both the courage to let the market freely work and the strength to take a step
back when it did not.
Our main conclusion is that it seems unlikely that “light-hand regulation” may
fully substitute for “hard regulation”3 in this sector, especially for small and residential
customers. In the light of this limitation, further actions appear to be required to give
a thorough organization to this business able to let expected outcomes of other related
3By “light-hand regulation”, we mean market monitoring and ex-post enforcement, while by “hard
regulation”, we mean ex-ante regulatory interventions.
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reforms (e.g. liberalization of generation) a stronger impact on final customers’ welfare.
In our opinion, the removal of tariffs, although desirable in a long run, does not appear
at present to be the best incentive to boost competition, given possible market power
of providers and difficulties in monitoring the market; on the contrary a Default service
assigned through an auction mechanism may favor both the development of upstream
and downstream competition.
The discussion is organized as follows. Next section summarizes the theory on com-
petition in electricity retailing while the third section provides an overview of European
retail electricity markets. Section 4 discusses market characteristics which may under-
mine the development of a sound retail competition in electricity retailing. The analysis
of Default and Last Resort services and the implementation of protection mechanisms
for “vulnerable customers” is included in the fifth section with some suggestions about
how to improve reform’s outcomes. Some final remarks close.
2.2 Retail electricity competition
The expected impacts of competition on electricity retailing are summarized in Ta-
ble 2.1. Some of the benefits concern efficiency gains, while others are more related
to the aspect of differentiation; the remaining benefits are associated with equipment
innovation. The academic debate on retail competition has generally been of a qualita-
tive nature4 although there have been some econometric attempts aimed at examining
consumer behaviour and at measuring the impact of retail competition on final prices.
2.2.1 Efficiency
Increasing competitive pressure on electricity retailers is likely to improve the efficiency
of retailing. Direct gains have two sources: a more efficient organization of retailing
4The contributions of Borenstein and Holland (2005) and Joskow and Tirole (2006) are, to the best
of our knowledge, the only attempts to formalize models of retail electricity competition. In these
papers, the authors estimate the price distortions arising when competitive retailers are active and
settlement obligations for wholesale power purchases are determined on the basis of load profiles when
final customers do not react to real time prices. For models of retail competition in the gas industry,
see for instance Cremer et al. (2006) and Polo and Scarpa (2011).
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Dimension Expected impact
Efficiency
Direct gains on retail services
Indirect gains on wholesale, transport and
distribution services
Systemic gains (elimination of double
marginalization effect)
Differentiation
New offers and contractual arrangements
Wider range of services (risk-hedging
services, energy management)
Equipment
innovation
Innovative measuring and reading devices
Empowered equipment for quality services
Table 2.1: Expected impacts of retail electricity competition
activities and a larger use of cost-based pricing.5 The first source of efficiency has
proven to be negligible according to the estimates of Joskow (2000) in US, and Ofgem
(2004) and Littlechild (2005) in UK.
Using 1996 data, Joskow estimates the potential savings for the average customer in
United States from switching to a competitive retailer that is responsible for all retailing
services6 and is able to provide them at a 25% discount compared to distributors. He
finds that the average customer’s bill might be reduced by less than 1% or approximately
2 dollars per month if the competitive retailer were to pass all of its cost savings
through to the customer. In the same vein Ofgem, the British energy regulator, roughly
calculates for different payment methods7 the retail margin on which the entrants are
supposed to undercut incumbents. Littlechild provides a downward revision of Ofgem’s
estimates, mainly reflecting larger than forecast costs for credit cover and initial IT and
billing system settlement. The author concludes that the retail margin may be positive
only for direct debit contract, regardless the size of the entrant, while is negative (small
suppliers) or zero (large and medium sized suppliers) for standard credit contracts.
Prepayment contracts may entail negative margins for all types of new entrants.
5Real time pricing is one of the possibilities.
6It should be noted that, even after full unbundling, distributors will continue to be responsible
for, and thus will bear the costs of, some retailing services such as requests to connect, disconnect, or
change the level of service, resolve outages and power quality problems, and interface with competitive
retailers (Joskow, 2000).
7Standard credit, direct debit and prepayment.
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According to Littlechild (2000), however, total efficiency gains may be more sig-
nificant because they originate not only from direct retail operations but also from an
improved upstream procurement.8 Fierce competition for end customers may also place
downward pressure on transmission and distribution costs. Moreover in the long run,
competition reintroduces the proper incentives for dynamic efficiency: with competition
only the best offers from the efficient suppliers can survive and expand at the expense
of unwanted contracts or/and inefficient sellers.
A last source of efficiency, which we may call systemic, has been envisioned in the
elimination of the double marginalization effect (Goulding et al., 1999). This effect
arises as a consequence of the vertical unbundling of supply activities along the value
chain when firms in different segments retain some degree of market power. Economic
theory states that when vertical relations do not exist, firms can exercise their mar-
ket power at all successive stages of the value chain, generating a negative impact on
aggregate firm profits and on consumer welfare.9 From this perspective, retail compe-
tition per se is perceived to be a positive element of liberalization reforms: with retail
competition, the double (retail) margin is eliminated or at least reduced.10
For the supporters of full retail competition, in principle efficiency gains may be
passed through to customers in the form of lower final prices.11 Some authors have
attempted to estimate the impact of reforms such as privatization and liberalization on
final prices and efficiency. See for instance Newbery and Pollitt (1997) on British data,
Steiner (2001) and Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) on OECD Coutries12 and Joskow (2006)
8Littlechild (2000) provides some quantitative estimations of this effect in the United Kingdom,
while recognizing the inherent difficulty of such an exercise.
9The double marginalization problem may also be overcome by reestablishing vertical contractual
relationships between actors (with some sided-effects) or by using special types of contracts, e.g.,
two-part tariffs (Motta, 2004).
10An empirical paper by von Der Fehr and Hansen (2010) reveals that when fierce competition has
been introduced in Norwegian retail electricity market, firms has begun to behave as in a standard
Bertrand setting, which has ensured cost-reflective pricing, even in the presence of a small number of
competitors.
11It is worthy to highlight that a larger use of cost-based pricing to improve efficiency may translate
into higher prices for those customers whose consumption has been subsidized through below-cost
tariffs before liberalization.
12The first paper presents a social cost-benefit analysis, while the others perform regressions using
panel data. Both approaches present specific limitations: cost-benefit analyses require the assessment
of a credible counterfactual; in the regressions, endogeneity issues are likely to arise.
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on US data. Joskow’s paper is the only one that properly accounts for retail compe-
tition. The author compares changes in real electricity prices between 1996 and 2004
for US states that introduced retail competition and for those that have not. He finds
evidence that households in the states where the reform was adopted benefited from
larger reductions in prices (with the exception of Texas), while this trend is not appar-
ent for industrial customers. However, this result cannot be attributed tout court to
retail competition, as in the same period, several other reforms were implemented in the
electricity sector (increased competition in generation, improvements in the regulation
of distribution and transmission services, etc.).
On the downside, several authors agree that opening the market is likely to produce
larger advertising, promotional, transactional, and system duplication (e.g. billing or
customer assistance) costs, while there is no consensus on the final balance between
these costs and the benefits of competition.13 For instance, Littlechild (2000) finds that
in the long term, efficiency gains may offset increased advertising and promotional costs,
whereas Joskow (2000) and Defeuilley (2009) are more skeptical of this prediction.
2.2.2 Differentiation and equipment innovation
Theoretically speaking, retail competition is expected to bring new offers and contrac-
tual arrangements to the market and broaden the range of available services, such as
risk-hedging or energy management. Furthermore, competitive pressures on retailers
may indirectly force other actors, such as distributors or equipment providers, to de-
velop and install new measuring and reading devices and the equipment necessary to
improve service quality.
According to Joskow (2000) and Defeuilley (2009), the potential for product differ-
entiation and developments in the range of value-added services for which small and
residential customers are willing to pay an additional fee appears constrained in the
electricity industry. Empirical evidence in Europe partly contradicts this pessimistic
13Advertising and marketing are useful tools for spreading information about products, prices and
competitors. However, a general mistrust toward electricity retailers, energy brokers and their advertis-
ing campaigns endures, undermining the engagement of consumers and the gains from communication
(OFGEM, 2012b). Consumer attitude has been sometimes exacerbated by misleading advertising cam-
paigns which have been fined worldwide by competition authorities (see for instance the cases of ENI
in Italy and Airtricity in Ireland).
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view on limited scope for product differentiation.14 Even though additional services
such as energy management were primarily demanded by larger customers, competi-
tion in electricity retailing also stimulate the demand for new types of products (mainly
with green and dual fuel options) and innovative contractual arrangements for pricing
(wholesale price plus mark-up contracts, fixed-price contracts, standard variable con-
tracts, time-of-use contracts, and flat contracts) among small and residential customers.
The diffusion of these products remains nonetheless heterogeneous.15
The installation of smart metering and reading devices seems to represent an es-
sential condition for extending the range of products and services offered by electricity
retailers as well as for enabling an active demand side participation. Intelligent equip-
ments may foster the development of contracts with dynamic pricing options and the
adoption of more efficient consumption behaviours; moreover they may simplify the
process of billing and information exchange between retailers and distributors, with a
positive impact on competition dynamics.16 Even so the adoption of this new technol-
ogy seems to have been prompted more by binding legal framework than by competitive
forces. Indeed it is the European Directive 2009/72/EC which has established that 80%
of total consumers should have been equipped with an intelligent metering system by
2020. The decision to roll-out smart metering systems has been subject to a prelimi-
nary economic assessment at national level, which has resulted in a variety of coverage
choices, technical designs and implementation schedules (ERGEG, 2013). At present
only Italy and Sweden have completed their roll-out with a 95% and 100% coverage
respectively17 while Belgium, Czech Republic, Portugal and Lithuania have decided not
to invest at all in smart meter deployment. This situation highlights the lack of agree-
ment on the final balance between costs and benefits of smart meter adoption especially
in the case of small and residential customers (on this debate see for instance Le´autier,
14The analysis of the relationship between the numbers and types of available contracts and the
ability of consumers to seize the better market opportunities by switching supplier is postponed to
section 4.2.
15For a survey of newly introduced products, see for instance Von der Fehr and Hansen (2010) on
the Norwegian market and Littlechild (2002) on British market.
16Littlechild (2005) discusses in details the importance of metering and data communication in the
process of entry. For a recent consultation of stakeholders on this topic see CEER (2014).
17In both cases the distributor is in charge for the roll-out and the investment is financed through
regulated tariffs.
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2014).
2.3 Retail markets in Europe
European Union represents an unique case study for the analysis of electricity retail
liberalization. All Member States have indeed adopted a common legal framework to
open both the wholesale and retail markets to competition. Therefore, if there are
country-specific aspects of retail competition, they reflect different realities in terms of
generation mix, political and strategic objectives, and consumers’ attitudes and aware-
ness vis-a`-vis the market. In this section we provide an overview of European retail
electricity markets and we calculate a few economic indicators of market structure to
test some of the theoretical predictions about liberalization’s outcome.
2.3.1 The supply side
Over the whole 2003-2011 period the total number of electricity retailers has decreased
from about 3379 to about 3242.18 The figures for main retailers, i.e. those accounting
for at least 5% of total national electricity consumption, reveal that in 2011 only one
country, Slovenia, has eight big players, while most of sample Countries show three to
six main retailers. From 2003 to 2011 the total number of main retailers has remained
relatively constant, from about 102 companies in 2003 to 100 companies in 2011.19 A
relevant indicator of market structure is provided by the cumulative market share of
main retailers. The difference between the total market and the cumulative market
share of main retailers indicates the size of the residual market, or the market available
to minor competitors. The cumulative market share of main retailers in 2011 is reported
in Figure 2.1.20
According to the size of the residual market, European countries can be classified
into three groups:
18Source Eurostat.
19The relevant market for retailers is the national market. Detailed data are reported in Figures
A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix A.
20Denmark, Finland and Greece are excluded because of missing data.
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Figure 2.1: Cumulative market share of retailers (%), 2011
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data
• Countries where the market covered by minor retail companies is large, i.e., be-
tween 45% and 60% of the total market: Germany (58%), Norway (55.1%), Italy
(54%) and Sweden (50.4%);
• Countries where smaller retailers cover between 45% and 20% of the total market:
Bulgaria (38.5%), Austria (38%), Romania (33.1 %), Poland (26.3 %), Nether-
lands (26%), Estonia (21.4%), France (21%);
• Countries characterized by a small residual market (below 20%):21 Hungary
(17.3%), Czech Republic (15.4%), Lithuania (15.2%), Slovakia (13.8%), United
Kingdom (12.4%), Spain (11.7%), Belgium (11%), Luxembourg (8.7%), Portugal
(4%), Ireland (3%), Slovenia (2.8%) and Latvia (0.1%).
Although from 2009 to 2011 the cumulative market share of mail retailers has de-
creased in 17 out of 25 Countries,22 the market for “minor competitors” remains below
20% in 14 out of 25 Countries in 2011.
21Cyprus and Malta have one retailer serving all the market.
22The data are reported in Figure A.4 in the Appendix A.
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These figures indicate that European electricity retail markets have an oligopolistic
structure rather than a competitive one. Small and independent retailers have often
experienced unsuccessful entry attempts, horizontal consolidations or acquisitions by
larger and vertically integrated firms. Some of the difficulties faced by small companies
in running a retail business alone have been highlighted in Littlechild (2005): limited
profitability of entry (especially in residential markets) and high cost of credit cover;
excessive regulatory and compliance burdens; scarce quality of data and metering ser-
vices; low liquidity of wholesale markets and large exposure to spot price volatility.
The presence of economies between retail and generation activities has also favored the
integration of upstream and downstream businesses (Pollitt, 2008): if owning a retail
firm has the potential to increase generators’ investments by limiting overall business
risk, the reduction in the number of independent upstream providers amplifies the risk
of foreclosure and facilitates the inflation of retail margin (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2005).
Therefore if on the one hand vertical integration may be detrimental to retail compe-
tition on the other hand its effects on electricity wholesale and, especially, final prices
remain ambiguous (Mansur, 2007; Bushnell et al., 2008; Giulietti et al., 2010).
2.3.2 The demand side
On the demand side, the switching rate of final customers is a commonly used indicator
for the level of buyer commitment in a market: it calculates the number of end users who
decide to change suppliers when retail services are liberalized. The main idea conveyed
by this indicator is that if consumers can easily change service providers when they wish
to, producers are less prone to engage in exploitative behaviors, such as imposing high
final prices or low quality, and hence the market may be considered more competitive.23
Figure 2.2 shows the latest available data on the annual switching rates for house-
hold customers.24 Belgium, Great Britain, Ireland, Spain, Netherlands, Portugal and
23The switching rate does not account for the number of customers who have chosen another contract
offered by their current supplier. This number also represents an indicator for customer awareness
that is not accounted for in official figures which may somehow underestimate customers’ market
participation.
24Switching rates by end user category are reported in the Appendix A (Figures A.5 to A.7). Note
that the figures refer to the period 2008-2009 and the source is the European Commission. Large and
medium-sized firms generally present higher switching rates than households, indicating a more active
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Figure 2.2: Annual switching rate for household consumers (%), 2011/2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on CEER data
Note:* For Belgium the 2012 rate is a weighted average for the Flanders and Brussels regions;
** Data for Netherlands refer to all segments of retail markets;
Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Malta registered zero switchings
Norway present switching rates between 10% and 15%, followed by Czech Republic,
Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Finland and Sweden whose rates range between 5% and 10%.
The remaining 8 Countries have registered rates below the 5% threshold while other
7 Countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Malta) have
registered no switchings. The trend in the indicator is positive overall, with the excep-
tion of a few countries. Interestingly, it is not possible to identify a clear relationship
between household switching rates and saving potentials, given the fact that countries
with larger gains in moving from the incumbent supplier to the cheapest available option
in the market are not systematically characterized by higher switching rates (ACER,
2013). Moreover, only in 6 countries, namely Malta, Cyprus, Ireland, Great Britain,
Northern Ireland and Greece, the energy component25 accounts for more than 50% of
the post-tax price for electricity (Eurostat). When competition may have an impact
participation of larger customers in retail electricity markets.
25The energy component includes the commodity price and the costs for marketing, billing, other
related business costs and a fair margin.
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only on a small share of the total bill, the incentives for customers’ active participation
remain somehow weak.
Three considerations are noteworthy. First, there is no consensus on the level of
the switching rate at which the market can be considered “sufficiently competitive”.
Littlechild (2009) considers a residential customer switching rate of 10% a sufficient
threshold to justify the liberalization of retailing. Therefore, according to the data very
few countries seem to have developed a sufficient level of competition. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the only author providing a basis for comparison with real data.
Second, the difference in switching rates between residential and large customers seems
to indicate that there exists a two-tier market according to the size of final customers.
We address this issue in detail in the next section. Finally, the most recent publicly
available figures, from 2012, reveal that 17 countries in the group of EU-27 Member
States, Norway and Northern Ireland, keep regulated prices for households, while only
12 do so for small and medium enterprises and 5 for large industry. Where tariffs are
available, a large share of residential customers continue to purchase electricity under
regulated conditions;26 moreover the average switching rate in these countries results to
be lower than in full liberalized countries (ACER, 2013). It is worthy to note, however,
that with very few exceptions, the pre-tax price27 of electricity in countries where at
least 90% of residential consumers were on regulated tariffs has been lower than the EU-
27 Member State average in 2012.28 While it is true that regulation and competition are
two sides of the same coin, there is still no general consensus regarding the necessity of
eliminating end-user price regulations to allow the retail market to operate effectively.
We will further explore this topic in the last section.
2.4 Competition with market imperfections
Some authors have claimed that the presence of market imperfections, such as switching
costs, informational complexity and a “consumer preference not to choose”, may have
26For the proportion of SMEs and large industry on regulated tariffs see EC (2011).
27The pre-tax price includes the commodity price, regulated transmission and distribution charges,
and retail components (billing, metering, customer services and a fair margin).
28Only four Countries without price regulation, namely Finland, Slovenia, Czech Republic and
Norway, have pre-tax price below the average (ACER, 2013).
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negatively affect the outcomes of competition in the electricity sector, at least regarding
small and residential customers (Joskow, 2000; Brennan, 2006; Defeuilley, 2009). Oth-
ers have found that the introduction of competition may entail a negative externality,
namely customer’s segmentation (Defeuilley, 2009; von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010).
Furthermore, a last group of authors has highlighted the shortfalls of employing tra-
ditional measures of competition in this sector, such as the rate and the speed of cost
pass trough. In the following paragraphs, we present a summary of the main findings
regarding these issues.
2.4.1 Switching costs
Theoretically speaking, in markets characterized by repeated interactions between buy-
ers and sellers, a consumer who has previously purchased a product from a supplier may
incur costs when switching to a competitor, despite the firms’ products being identical
(Klemperer, 1995). Switching costs arise for the following reasons:
• searching costs to identify offers and the suppliers;
• learning costs to become familiar with the supplier;
• transactional costs to sign and resolve a contract.
Switching costs may be real or perceived and lead to a situation in which “products
that are ex ante homogenous become, after the purchase of one of them, ex post hetero-
geneous” (Klemperer, 1995). These costs prevent customers from changing suppliers
even if they are offered a better priced deal and thus have the same effects on market
dynamics as a barrier to entry. In the electricity industry, where consumers have long-
lasting supply relationships with the incumbent, switching costs may deter complete
consumer mobility, leading to under-switching despite the presence of substantial sav-
ings (Defeuilley, 2009). Moreover, the situation may be exacerbated if the switching
process is delayed or blocked by suppliers without specific reasons.29
Giulietti et al. (2010) analyze the influence of searching and switching costs in the
UK retail electricity market by studying the trend in price convergence between new
29Compare for instance Ofgem (2012a).
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entrants and the incumbent. The authors find that, in line with the general predictions
of competition models with switching costs, even after the entry of new competitors,
incumbents are able to enjoy a consistent price advantage. Moreover, new entrants, as
soon as they are established in the market, tend to exploit the presence of consumer
searching and switching costs: over time, new firms’ incentives to offer lower prices to
gain additional customers are more than offset by the benefits of keeping prices high to
increase margins on previously served customers.
2.4.2 Informational complexities
In some sectors, consumers may also be unwilling to change suppliers because they face
relevant difficulties in evaluating and comparing suppliers’ offers. This might be the
case in the electricity industry, where consumers are generally offered two- or multi-part
tariffs, which reduce their ability to estimate the per-unit price of the product. This
situation might be further complicated if supply contracts contain other advantages that
cannot be straightforwardly translated into electricity price savings (e.g., discounts on
dual fuel contracts). This limitation may imply the following:
• consumers switch to a more expensive supplier (over-switching);
• consumers switch to a cheaper but not the cheapest available supplier (inaccurate
switching).
Errors in consumers’ switching decisions damage their welfare both directly, as they
cannot obtain the maximum surplus provided by existing retailers, and indirectly, by
increasing retailers’ market power due to a weakened relationship between firms’ sales
and surplus provision.
Empirical evidence on electricity sector is provided in Wilson and Waddam-Price
(2010). The authors employ a sample of more than five thousand face-to-face surveys
of UK households, 16% of which has switched suppliers.30 They find that nearly 20%
of households switched to a more expensive supplier, while inaccurate switching led
customers to only obtain half of the gains available on the market. The authors do not
find evidence for misselling causing such effects; rather they suggest that complexity and
30The sample is biased toward low-income customers.
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consumer confusion may cause switching decisions to be less efficient when the number
of options in the market is large. As a consequence, while competition may have a
positive effect on the total gain available on the market, informational complexity may
limit the ability of consumers to appropriate it.
Recently, OFGEM (2012a), the British Regulator, published a package of proposals
designed to eliminate, or at least reduce, informational complexities that constrain
households’ participation in electricity markets. The proposals include a limitation on
the number of tariffs that suppliers can offer and the types of tariffs (only two part-
tariffs are allowed), and impose specific layouts and contents for communications from
suppliers to consumers.
2.4.3 Consumer preference not to choose
In open opposition to the assumptions of the standard economic model, Brennan (2006)
attributes the likely scarce success of competition in retail electricity market to the con-
sumer preference for not making a choice, which can be considered a type of market
failure. While liberalized markets have forced consumers to make informed choices
that in turn presuppose increasing efforts at understanding and comparing contract
conditions and terms of trade, the experience in electricity, and previously in telecom-
munication markets, seems to suggest that consumers in these sectors do not always
consider having additional options from which to choose an advantage. Brennan’s opin-
ion stems from an accurate analysis of the marketing literature which indicates that
consumers generally exhibit a limited propensity to revise their choices or change the
goods and services in their consumption bundles.
2.4.4 Customers’ segmentation
Some authors note that a possible side-effect of introducing competition in the retail
electricity market is the segmentation of active and passive customers (Defeuilley, 2009;
von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010). Consumers are active in a market when they exercise
their freedom of choice by switching suppliers or by renegotiating their contractual
conditions without changing retailer. Differences in customers’ willingness to switch
suppliers or renegotiate contractual arrangements may create the potential for a two-
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tiered retail market. In this case, active consumers who are consistently involved in
market dynamics may benefit from the introduction of competition in retailing because
they can obtain access to deals with prices that tend to be more cost-reflective. The
inactive customers, conversely, may end up paying prices that are above their pre-
liberalization levels, as firms may exploit consumers’ reluctance or inability to switch
to cross-subsidize their entry to the competitive sub-markets. Empirical evidence from
the Norwegian and United Kingdom markets seems to confirm this prediction (OFGEM,
2007; OFGEM 2012b; Von der Fehr and Hansen, 2010).
2.4.5 Speed and rate of cost pass through
The speed and the rate of procurement cost pass through is often used to proxy the level
of competitive pressure faced by suppliers when fixing their price. We would expect that
in a competitive retail market wholesale cost increases and decreases are passed through
customers punctually and symmetrically for positive and negative shocks. Nevertheless,
analyzing UK final bills31 from 2004 to 2010, Ofgem (2011) finds evidence that the speed
and the rate of pass-trough results to be higher and the final price adjustment faster
in periods of growing wholesale prices compared to falling or stable wholesale prices.
As a consequence, downstream competition seems to be tighter when procurement
costs are rising and weaker when costs are falling. The British regulator envisages
two main possible explanations. First, consumer engagement in the market flags in
period of decreasing prices, relaxing competition in the downstream market; second,
the vertically integrated companies tend to balance the profits across business: when
wholesale prices are low a larger retail margin may compensate for the loss in profits
from generation and viceversa. Using data on variable price contracts in Norway from
2000 to 2010, Mirza and Bergland (2012) confirm the presence of an asymmetric speed
in the pass-trough of wholesale shocks. They find a stronger evidence of this behavior
among suppliers which do not charge a fixed fee as the five dominant national level
retailers. The authors claim that these suppliers, albeit apparently cheaper, delay the
pass-trough of wholesale price decrease to earn extra-profits. The asymmetric price
adjustment strategy is seen therefore as a mean for covertly exerting market power.
31The retail price is built using standard regional tariffs.
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2.5 Regulation in competitive retail markets
We claim that some regulatory measures which ensure the continuity of supplies remain
necessary even after the introduction of competition in electricity retailing. It is worth
noting that the need to provide an uninterrupted service may be counterbalanced by the
objective of ensuring a certain level of customer protection, especially in terms of price,
when the market is not yet sufficiently developed. Three situations are at stake. First,
in the aftermath of market opening, customers may decide to switch to a new supplier
or can be passive and do nothing. In the latter case, the continuity of supply can be
guaranteed by assigning passive customers to a so called Default Supplier (DS).32As
competition expands and more consumers participate in the market, demand for the
Default service should fall and nearly disappear in the long run. Default service may be
also employed when competition strives to develop or “light-hand” regulation is difficult
to enforce. Second, customers served by a competitive retailer may face the risk of being
interrupted if the supplier becomes unable to provide the service, for instance because
it is insolvent or bankrupt. In this case, regulators must arrange for the transition of
customers to a temporary supplier, the so called Last Resort Supplier (LRS), which
ensures service continuity. There may be a third group of customers, often called
“vulnerable”, that struggles to obtain a counterpart in the market, notably because
these customers are not profitable. The lack of profitability may depend on customers’
social and economic backgrounds or on the costliness of supply. In the transition to
competitive retail markets, these customers face a serious risk of exclusion.
European legislation fails to thoroughly address these issues, a situation that is mir-
rored in the heterogeneity of national regulations concerning DS, LRS and mechanisms
for “vulnerable” customer protection. The term Default Supplier does not appear in
the Directives, and ERGEG (2009) reports that most European Countries (11 over 27)
do not use this term in their national regulations. When employed, it generally refers
to the provider serving passive and “vulnerable” customers. Conversely, the Supplier of
Last Resort is explicitly mentioned in European Directives as the provider of Universal
Service.33 The majority of European Countries (20 out of 27) use this label to indicate
32An alternative is the immediate disconnection of passive customers, but we do not consider this
hypothesis politically feasible.
33The Directive 2009/72/EC states, “Member States shall ensure that all household customers, and,
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the provider of both “vulnerable” customers and consumers whose retailer exited the
market. According to ACER (2013), the concept of “vulnerable” customers is present
in 18 over 27 countries although with very different interpretations. It is common that
the terms DS and LRS are employed synonymously and that a unique supplier is des-
ignated to ensure the continuity of supply in each of the three cases examined above.
When national regulations do not employ these labels, other forms of interventions are
designed to overcome the three possible situations where a retailer is absent. DS and
LRS are usually selected by the regulator: commonly the incumbent is the DS, while in
the half of the countries it also performs the role of LRS. The length of Default service
provision is not temporarily limited in most countries.
More interestingly for the analysis of competition dynamics, Universal Service pro-
vision frequently coincides with end-user price regulation for small and residential cus-
tomers.34In this case, the justification for end-price regulation seems to rely on the need
to reduce the exploitation of final customers resulting from retailers’ market power af-
ter the introduction of competition (Littlechild, 2000; OFGEM, 2002; ERGEG, 2007)
and thus regulation appears to have similar objectives of DS provision. In our opinion,
European regulation may be substantially improved by targeting each of the situations
described above with a specific intervention, having made clear in advance the objec-
tives that are to be pursued. We shed some light in this debate by discussing possible
interventions and their impact on competition in the next paragraph.
2.5.1 How to improve market functioning?
According to the relative weight placed on the objectives of securing service continuity
and protecting customers from exploitation, and considering several possible providers,
where Member States deem it appropriate, small enterprises, enjoy universal service, that is the right
to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within their territory at reasonable, easily and clearly
comparable, transparent and non-discriminatory prices. To ensure the provision of universal service,
Member States may appoint a supplier of last resort”.
34The French government, for instance, in 2010 passed the NOME law, which prescribes the complete
removal of tariffs for industrial customers beginning in June 2011 and allows residential customers to
choose between signing contracts at market prices or being supplied by the incumbent firm, EDF,
at regulated tariffs through to 2015, when all end-user regulated tariffs will disappear. The law also
entitles competitive retailers to withdraw a share of EDF nuclear generation at a regulated price to
supply final consumers. For further details see Creti et al. (2013).
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a wide array of implementation patterns of DS and LRS are feasible (Table 2.2). In
addition, three procedures are in principle available to assign these services to a retailer:
1. a direct “ex ante” entitlement, typically granted to the incumbent firm;
2. a periodic rotating obligation imposed on competitive suppliers;
3. a bidding process based on the competitive selection of the provider.35
Responsible
subject
Price for
electricity
Price formation Focus
Transmission
system
operator
Imbalance
payment
Real time Supply continuity
Local
distributor
Regulated tariff
or price cap
Historic (cost) Consumer protection
Freely set price Real time Supply continuity
Retailer
All retailers (or
only the
incumbent) offer
a tariff
Historic (cost) Consumer protection
Supplier resulting
from auction
Real time Supply continuity
Table 2.2: Patterns for the organization of Default and Last Resort services
Each intervention creates however market distortions and has a different level of
political and social acceptability, as well as technical feasibility. For instance, when
ensuring the continuity of supply is the only regulatory goal and the market seems to
be quite competitive, network system operator may provide Last Resort services as part
of its balancing activity while the local retailer may freely set the price for the Default
service. Price formation for Last Resort Service occurs in real time: the consumers
pay an imbalance payment, which is generally burdensome, to discourage imbalances
35An empirical application of this measure can be found in Italy, where non-residential customers
who temporarily lack a retailer can benefit from a “safeguard service”, the supply of which is assigned
for a period of two years to the winner of a reverse auction, where the participants offer to provide the
service at a mark up with respect to the wholesale price of electricity.
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from the day-ahed production plan. Conversely, if a regulator wishes to guarantee a
high level of customer protection, Default and Last Resort services may be offered at
a tariff and provided by a retailer or the local distributor. Relevant market distortions
are created when Default and Last resort services are offered at a tariff that does not
reflect its underlying costs (Joskow 2006; EC, 2007): the first is to provide customers
with inaccurate price signals for their withdrawals; the second is that the tariff becomes
the reference price for market contracts, i.e., the so called “price-to-beat”. It is likely
that consumers may be deterred from switching and new entry may be hampered if
tariffs do not reflect the underlying costs. However, there is no consensus regarding
the necessity to withdraw electricity tariffs to allow the market to operate effectively.
For instance, Va´squez et al.(2006) maintain that a permanent, well-calculated tariff
including a shopping credit which is an extra charge over the regulated tariff that
creates a retail margin over which new entrants can compete, achieves the objective of
guaranteeing the supply to all customers without deterring consumer switching. Other
authors such as Joskow (2000) and Littlechild (2000) are more skeptical on the benefits
of including a shopping credit in regulated tariffs.
Evidences from our analysis suggest that, if some form ex-ante regulatory inter-
ventions is still required, the assignation of the Default (and/or Last Resort) service
through an auction mechanism reduces market distortions and may favor both the de-
velopment of upstream and downstream competition, while avoiding the problem of
deterring customer migration to the market since the tariff is cost-reflective.
Finally, the problem of “vulnerable” customers is slightly different and may be better
understood within the Universal Service Obligations (USOs) framework. The primary
argument in favor of USOs has been a concern for full market coverage at reasonable
prices, including more costly market segments such as rural areas. Accordingly, some
obligations have been imposed on network service providers in the form of restrictions
on price discrimination (“non-discrimination”constraint) or obligations to provide the
service regardless a customer’s geographical location (“ubiquity” constraint). Often, the
two constraints have been combined, asking the firms to ensure full market coverage at
a uniform price. Prior to liberalization, vertically integrated monopolies were able to
finance USOs by cross-subsidizing unprofitable and profitable market segments in their
customer portfolio.
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From a theoretical perspective, when competition is introduced in markets with
profitable and unprofitable end users, new entrants only compete with the incumbent for
profitable customers, generating the so-called “cream skimming” phenomenon, which
challenges the incumbent’s ability to finance USOs through cross-subsidies (Laffont and
Tirole, 2000). Several authors (see for instance Anton et al., 2002; Chone´ et al., 2000;
Chone´ et al. 2002; Mirabel and Poudou, 2004) have attempted to assess the welfare
effects and distortionary impacts of different regulatory instruments that governments
may implement to allocate and finance USOs. However, none of these papers question
the economic rationale behind keeping USOs in liberalized markets. In particular, while
the “ubiquity” constraint may continue to be imposed on regulated network operators,
“non-discrimination” constraint is at odds with the concept of competitive markets
with efficient cost-reflective prices.
Panzar (2000) stresses that there is an unavoidable trade-off between competition
and universal service provision in liberalized markets. If there is a need for a universal
service policy, this means that the competitive market cannot deliver socially acceptable
allocations without direct public intervention. We argue that the need for USOs exists
if the transition to competitive retail markets may exclude “vulnerable” or unprofitable
customers from the trade of an essential good such as electricity. However, in line with
ERGEG (2007), we suggest that to avoid the risk of exclusion more targeted and less
distortionary interventions are preferable, such as social tariffs36 or direct transfers to
customers.
2.6 Conclusions
Assessing the impact of electricity retailing liberalization is a rather complex task. We
identified four main limitations to policy analysis: different and often conflicting the-
oretical points of view, shortage of routinely collected data, problems in disentangling
the effect of retail liberalization from those of other related reforms and pervasive reg-
ulatory interventions. Therefore, to provide a mid-term evaluation of the reform, we
firstly built a comprehensive theory on liberalization of electricity retailing and then
36For instance, the duty of serving customers through social tariffs may be allocated to the local
distributor, to all retailers or to the incumbent.
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we used European Union data on market structure and its dynamics to test the consis-
tency of theory and practice. We decided to focus on European Union experience where,
differently from North America, a common framework on competition and regulation
exists.
The analysis of supply has revealed that European retail markets have an oligopolis-
tic structure rather than a competitive one. We identified strong incentives for retailers
to horizontal and vertical integrations. The participation of small customers, cap-
tured by switching rates, appears scarce, although partially justified by the presence
of switching costs and informational complexities which seem to limit the capability of
these consumers to fully exploit market benefits. Asymmetries in the rate and speed of
cost-pass through make the market opaque, challenging the sole reliance on “light-hand”
regulation to guarantee a sound market functioning.
To complete our analysis, we identified also those situations in which some form of
“hard” regulation appear to be necessary to secure the continuity of supply even after
the introduction of competition. The objective of ensuring supply continuity may be
however counterbalanced by the need of protecting customer from exploitation, espe-
cially in terms of price. According to the relative weight attributed to these objectives,
several implementation solutions are presented. In the light of evidences about Euro-
pean markets, we suggested that the removal of tariffs, although desirable in a long
run, does not appear at present to be the best incentive to boost competition, given
possible market power of providers, limited awareness of consumers and difficulties in
monitoring the market; on the contrary a Default/Last Resort service assigned through
an auction mechanism may favor both the development of upstream and downstream
competition, without limiting customer switching if the tariff is cost-reflective.
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Appendix A
Figures
Figure A.1: Number of main retailers, 2011
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data
Note: Denmark is excluded because of missing information
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Figure A.2: Number of main electricity retailers, 2003-2011
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data
Note: Some information about Denmark are missed
Figure A.3: Number of main electricity retailers, 2003-2011
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data
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Figure A.4: Evolution of cumulative market share of main retailers (%), 2009-2011
Source: Authors’ elaboration on Eurostat data
Note: Denmark, Finland and Greece are excluded because of missing information
Figure A.5: Annual switching rate for large industry
by eligible meter points (%), 2008-2009
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data
Note: Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Norway,
Poland, Spain and the Netherlands are excluded because of missing data;
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta and Slovenia have registered zero switchings
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Figure A.6: Annual switching rate for medium sized industry
by eligible meter points (%), 2008-2009
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data
Note: Belgium, Estonia, Finland, France, Great Britain, Hungary, Poland,
Spain and the Netherlands are excluded because of missing data;
Cyprus, Lithuania and Malta have registered zero switchings
Figure A.7: Annual switching rate for small industry and households
by eligible meter points (%), 2008-2009
Source: Authors’ elaboration on European Commission data
Note: Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Poland and Spain are excluded because of missing data;
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta have registered zero switchings
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Chapter 3
Merit order effect and strategic
investments in intermittent
generation technologies
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3.1 Introduction
Overtime a number of policy interventions contributed to reshape electricity industries
worldwide. In European Union the process of liberalization was completed in 2009
with the approval of the Third Energy Package. Generation and retail activities have
been opened up to competition and spot electricity markets have been created accord-
ingly. One of the reform’s goals was to boost sector’s efficiency by increasing capacity
adequacy and achieving technology mix optimality. The impact of liberalization on
production and investments in generation has been extensively analysed within differ-
ent theoretical frameworks of imperfect competition. The literature may be divided in
two main strands: a first strand which investigates bidding behaviours of generators in
spot electricity markets (Green and Newbery, 1992; von der Fehr and Harbord, 1993;
Federico and Rahman, 2003; Fabra et al., 2006); a second one which analyzes the links
between spot market design and incentives to invest in generation capacity (Murphy
and Smeers, 2005; Tishler et al., 2008; Milstein and Tishler, 2009; Fabra et al., 2011).
Alongside with liberalization, European Union has approved in 2009 the Climate
and Energy Package which establishes compulsory targets for limiting greenhouse gas
emissions, enhancing investments in renewable technologies for power generation and
improving savings from energy efficiency. A set of publicly financed measures has
been put in place to reach the objective of a 20% share of EU energy consumption
covered by renewable production within the 2020 time horizon. If strategic behaviours
of competing generators have attracted academic attention, the study of interactions
between “traditional” and “renewable” power producers remains an almost unexplored
field of research (see for instance, Milstein and Tishler, 2011). Nevertheless, competition
in generation seems to be substantially animated by new entrants investing in renewable
technologies given that photovoltaic and wind capacities represented around the 70%
of the 50 GW of new capacity built in European Union between 2010 and 2011 (Terna
S.p.A., 2012).
This chapter aims at filling this gap by proposing a model for competition in gen-
eration which takes into account the particular features of production and trade of
renewable power. Concerning production, the model embeds the randomness which
characterizes power generation from renewable sources such as solar and wind. The
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gap between installed capacity and production possibilities for renewable power plants
is a non negligible economic and security issue: it changes investment preferences and
influences system security.1 Concerning trade, whereas real spot markets are organized
as uniform price auctions in which firms compete in prices, in a stylized model with
a “traditional” and a “renewable” power producers, firms seem rather to compete in
quantities because of merit order rule. The merit order is a way of ranking available
sources in ascending order of their variable costs: the electricity produced at the lowest
variable cost is the first to be brought on line to meet demand, while the one gen-
erated at the highest variable cost is the last. Given that electricity from renewable
sources has zero or negligible variable production costs, it is always the first to be dis-
patched, leaving the residual demand to the higher variable cost producer. Because of
marginal pricing rule, the market price equalizes the bid submitted by the “traditional”
(marginal) producer2 and is granted to all inframarginal units as well.
The model embeds also a commonly adopted policy mechanisms designed to accel-
erate investments in renewable technologies, namely the feed-in tariff scheme.3 In our
setting, the tariff is meant to finance the investment cost per kilowatt-hour which, for
some renewable technologies, is deemed so large so as to determine a null or insufficient
rate of adoption compared to the established target.
The model’s objective is to identify the drivers of “renewable” generators capacity
and production choices. The analysis of the equilibrium reveals that the “renewable”
generator exploits the merit order rule which governs spot electricity markets to invest
and produce as if it were a sort of Stackelberg leader. While producer’s preferences
over strategies seem not to be influenced by the average value of capacity availability,
consumer surplus differs substantially according to it. Given that production of elec-
tricity from the renewable source depends on actual weather conditions, the analysis of
1In Italy for instance the combined photovoltaic and wind capacities represented around 20% of
total capacity in 2012 while their production was a 10% share of total power production in the same
year. In Germany photovoltaic and wind capacities represented more than 30% of total capacity in
2011 while their production was a 10% share of total power production (Terna S.p.A., 2012. See
www.terna.it).
2We neglect those rare cases in which low demand coupled with large supply from renewable power
plants depresses the spot price to zero.
3In general the feed-in tariff rewards the kilowatt-hours produced with renewable technologies by
offering to the producers a fixed purchasing price which is generally higher than the market price. For
a general discussion on support schemes for renewable technologies see Couture and Gagnon (2010).
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ex-post payoffs reveals that “renewable” producer’s preferences over strategies may be
reversed even for small errors in the forecasting of the true value of the average capacity
availability factor when the investment cost in the renewable technology is relatively
low. In this case, the incentives for strategic behavior may be even stronger. The
main insights of the model are barely sensitive to changes in the relative market power
of competitors: even when the “renewable” generator behaves as a competitive fringe
in the spot market, it is able to influence equilibrium outcome to its own advantage
through investment choices although to a smaller degree than in the standard setting.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature. Sec-
tions 3 and 4 are dedicated the baseline model and its resolution. Section 5 presents
the ex-post analysis of strategies. Section 6 extends the baseline model to the case in
which the renewable producer behaves as a competitive fringe. Section 7 concludes.
3.2 Literature review
A strand of literature on competition in liberalized power markets focuses on firms’
short run behaviours (bid strategies in the spot market) while a second strand is con-
cerned with the analysis of long run performances (impact of competition on capacity
investments). Often the models in the latter group constitute an extension of those in
the former; when this is not the case, it is always possible to envisage such a develop-
ment: whatever is the selected setting for the second stage competition, this stage is or
may be preceded by a first one in which firms make investment decisions. This section
summarizes the theoretical models proposed in the literature, provides an overview of
their main results and examine the attractiveness of their application in the study of
competition between “traditional” and “renewable” generators.4
A first approach consists in applying Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) two stage model
in which a Bertrand-Edgeworth price competition is preceded by a quantity decision or
“capacity choice”, yielding the standard Cournot equilibrium outcome. Extensions and
refinements of the basic model include the works of Deneckere and Kovenock (1996),
4We do not consider those papers in which the spot market is perfectly competitive (or regulated)
and the price is fixed to the marginal cost of the last unit called into operation, such as in Meunier
(2010).
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Reynolds and Wilson (2000) and Fabra and de Frutos (2011). According to von der
Fehr and Harbord (1998) the major limit of this approach relates to the fact that firms
are paid on the basis of each own bid, rather than on the one of the last unit called into
operation, as happens in real power markets. On the other hand, this model provides a
formal justification for the elimination of marginal cost bidding strategy in a Bertrand
setting when capacity is constrained.5
A second approach is based on the Supply function model of Klemperer and Meyer
(1989) which has been extended to power markets by Green and Newbery (1992). In this
setting firms compete in supply functions, i.e. by setting combinations of price-quantity
pairs, given the uncertainty of demand. Although the model closely represents the
reality of spot electricity markets where firms’ bids combinations of price and quantity
(though supply functions are not really continuous), its predictive value is very poor
because possible equilibria, when defined, range between the Cournot and the Bertrand
solutions. Given the uncertainty of second stage equilibria, the attractiveness of adding
a first stage with investments is very low.
The third approach consists in modelling competition in the second stage as a sealed
bid, multi-unit auction in which payments to the two competitors are equal to the high-
est accepted bid in the uniform auction format and to own bid in the discriminatory
auction format. The auction is preceded by an investment stage in which firms choose
their capacity prior to bid in the market. The auction approach, developed by Fabra
et al. (2011) extending the works of von der Fehr and Harbord (1993), von der Fehr
and Harbord (1997), Fabra et al. (2006), has been largely appreciated for closely re-
producing real market designs and the nature of competition in spot markets. On the
other hand the model results difficult to manipulate, for instance by adding techno-
logical asymmetries, due to problems of non-uniqueness and non-existence of sub-game
perfect pure-strategy equilibria for some values of the demand. Concerning the results,
in both types of auction bidding at marginal cost is a Nash equilibrium only when the
demand is lower than the capacity of the smaller firm, whereas bidding at price cap is
a Nash equilibrium when the demand is larger than the sum of the two capacities. The
aggregate capacity in both auction formats results to be smaller compared to the first
best’s capacity and its distribution is asymmetric although firms are full symmetric
5This result is similar to auction model’s prediction.
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ex-ante.
The last but most appealing approach for our research purpose assumes that power
generators compete in quantities. Tishler et al. (2008) study the equilibrium in an
oligopolistic two stage game in which firms invest in capacity in the first stage knowing
the probability distribution of future demand and select their production in the second
stage once the demand reveals.6 While the first stage is played once, the second stage
is repeated a number of independent times over the considered temporal horizon. In
the first extension of this model (Milstein and Tishler, 2012) a base-load and a peak-
load technologies characterized by a trade-off between capacity and operation costs
are available. In a second extension (Milstein and Tishler, 2011) firms may invest in
a combined cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plant or in a photovoltaic (PV) plant whose
profitability depends on the probability of daily sunshine. In the first extension the
authors show that the equilibria differs when firms are allowed or not to invest in
both technologies. In particular, when firms can employ both technologies aggregate
industry capacity results to be smaller, the share of base-load technology larger and total
welfare bigger. In the second extension, the authors demonstrate that the uncertainty
of weather conditions reduces the profitability of PV plants and its attractiveness:
only when the PV to CCGT capacity cost ratio declines sharply, the adoption of PV
becomes positive although it remains limited. The latter setting presents however some
limitations: the optimization problem has no closed form solution and must be solved by
numerical methods; moreover, the result on the scarce adoption of renewable technology
at equilibrium is partly biased by the fact that the authors discard the merit order rule
in dispatching.7
In the same vein, Murphy and Smeers (2005) study capacity investments when a
base load and a peak-load providers compete in an open-loop Cournot setting in which
investments and production take simultaneously place and in a closed-loop Cournot
model in which investment decisions are taken in the first stage of the game and pro-
duction levels are chosen in the second stage. The authors show that the total capacity
at equilibrium in the closed-loop setting is equal or larger than the capacity chosen in
6For a theoretical analysis of such games see Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997).
7If on the one hand CCGT investments result to be more profitable than PV investments because
CCGT production does not depend on weather conditions, on the other hand CCGT plants have less
probability to be dispatched and hence to produce.
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the open loop setting: this happens because in the closed loop model the base load
producer has an incentive to invest more in the first stage and to produce more in
the second stage compared to open loop setting, thus distorting in its favour short run
market outcomes.8 Interestingly, both Murphy and Smeers (2005) and Milstein and
Tishler (2012) highlight that base-load investments result to be “strategic” in the sense
that they allow to modify short run competition. In the next paragraphs we present
our model of competition between “renewable” and “traditional” power producers in
which the assumptions of quantity competition and sequential investment-production
decisions are maintained although they may have different interpretations. Moreover,
our setting differs from Milstein and Tishler (2011) because it takes explicitly into ac-
count the relevance of the merit order rule in determining equilibrium investment and
production choices.
3.3 The model
In real spot markets, electricity suppliers submit simultaneously and independently bid
prices at which they are willing to supply their available capacity. The market operator
ranks the bids by merit order defining a supply schedule monotonically increasing in
function of price offers. The firms that are called into operation are all paid the system
marginal price which corresponds to highest accepted bid. We examine competition
between “traditional” and “renewable” power producers using a modified version of the
Dixit model for entry deterrence (Dixit, 1980). This choice stems from the following
reasons.
First of all, because of the merit order rule the power from renewable sources is
always the first to be brought on line in spot electricity markets. This favourable ranking
may be interpreted as a sort of first mover advantage. As in a standard entry deterrence
game the profitability of entry depends on the capacity choices made by the incumbent
in previous stages, in power sector the profitability of investments in “traditional”
technologies rests on the size of the residual demand, which in turn is determined by
the capacity installed by “renewable” producer. In our model the “renewable” power
8This “strategic” effect refers to a decrease in rival’s production (peak-load provider) due an increase
in the market share of firm with smaller marginal costs (base-load provider).
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plant is thus the incumbent and the “traditional” producer is the entrant who behaves
as a follower in the Stackelberg game for capacity investment.
Secondly, the Dixit model is sufficiently flexible to allow for several types of compe-
tition in the post entry game: firms may play in a perfect competitive setting (Spence,
1977); in a Cournot setting (Dixit, 1980; Spulber, 1981; Ware, 1984; Bulow et al.,
1985; Maskin, 1997); in a Stackelberg setting with the entrant as leader (Dixit, 1980)
or follower (Spulber, 1981; Saloner, 1985; Basu and Singh, 1990); in a Bertrand setting
(Allen et al., 2000). Moreover in each setting a certain degree of uncertainty about
demand and/or cost functions may be introduced (Maskin, 1997). In real power mar-
kets firms are supposed to compete in prices. However, in a stylized model with a
“renewable” and a “traditional” power producers firms rather play a quantity game
since the “renewable” power plant can always bid at zero due to its cost advantage
and the “traditional” producer is constantly marginal. We design the post-entry game
as a Cournot competition in the baseline model and as quantity competition between
a dominant firm and a competitive fringe in the extended model, accounting for the
fact that “renewable” producers are price takers in spot markets. Quantity competi-
tion presents the additional advantage that both firms receive the same price as in a
uniform price auction. Finally, this framework easily allows to introduce uncertainty
on the supply side due to the intermittency of production from the renewable power
plant.
We propose two alternative structures for the strategic game. In the baseline model
(two stage game), firms compete in a two stage game with the following timing:
• in the first stage the “renewable” firm chooses its capacity investment which is
irreversible in the sense that capacity already installed cannot be dismissed;
• in the second stage of the game firms compete in quantities: the “traditional”
firm selects simultaneously its capacity investment and its production level9 while
the “renewable” firm may increase its capacity prior to compete for production.
9For the “traditional” firm capacity and production levels will always be identical given that they
are selected simultaneously. Therefore, if in reality capacity investments are already sunk which is
very often the case for CCGT power plant, this stage of the game may be interpreted as the one in
which the “traditional” firm only adjusts its production.
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In the extended model (three stage game), the “renewable” firm is assumed to
behave like a price taker fringe in the spot market. Hence the post-entry game is a
Stackelberg game with the entrant (the “traditional” firm) playing the role of leader.
The timing of the game is the following:
• in the first stage the “renewable” firm chooses its capacity investment which is
irreversible in the sense that capacity already installed cannot be dismissed;
• having observed the capacity chosen by its rival, in the second stage the “tradi-
tional” firm selects its capacity and its production;
• in the third stage, the “renewable” firm chooses its production level.
We analyze the two stage and the three stage games in sections 4 and 5 respectively.
The two stage and three stage games may be interpreted as reproducing two alterna-
tive market designs for “renewable” generators participation in the spot market: on
the one hand the production from several renewable power plants may be aggregated
by a unique entity bidding on behalf of producers;10 on the other hand, the supply of
“renewable” power may be more fragmented and each generator may participate indi-
vidually in the spot market. As we will see, the qualitatively results of the model hold
in both alternative market structures.
3.4 Two stage game
In the baseline model it is assumed that two firms compete in the power market: the
first firm, S, manages a photovoltaic power plant (henceforth PV) and the second
firm, G, operates a combined cycle gas turbine plant (henceforth CCGT). Production
is denoted by qi, i = s, g, and generation capacities by ki, i = s, g. The investment
cost per unit of capacity is Ii > 0, i = s, g. Production gives rise to a variable cost
ci, i = s, g, for production levels below capacity while production above capacity is
infinitely costly. We assume without loss of generality that 0 = cs < cg = c and
10See for instance the case of Gestore Servizi Energetici in Italy, www.gse.it.
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that c + Ig < Is, i.e. firm G has lower average costs.
11 It is further assumed that
the availability of photovoltaic capacity for production depends on weather conditions.
Therefore for each level of installed capacity ks the available capacity is xks, where x is
the realization of a random variable X ∈ [0, 1]. Firms know the continuous distribution
function of the random variable X as well as its expected value, E[x] = x∗. Firms face
a linear inverse demand function, p(Q) = a − bQ, where Q = qs + qg ⊆ (0, xks + kg).
An amount τ is awarded to the producer for each unit of PV capacity built. The tariff
aims at reducing the true investment cost in the renewable technology, Ipv, which is
deemed so high so as to make entry unprofitable (Ipv > a). Therefore the tariff verifies
the following inequality, Ipv − τ = Is < a.12
The structure of the game is the following. In the first stage S chooses its capacity,
ks: the investment is irreversible in the sense that capacity already installed cannot
be dismissed. In the second stage of the game firms compete in quantities: G selects
simultaneously its capacity, kg, and its production level, qg, while S may increase its
capacity prior to compete for production. Note that the quantities of electricity pro-
duced by G and S are strategic substitute, which means that marginal revenue of each
firm is decreasing in rival’s output. This assumption is equivalent to assume that both
firms’ reaction functions are always downward sloping and it is a sufficient condition
to ensure that the established firm will never install excess capacity, i.e. it will never
install in the first stage of the game a capacity which will be left idle in the final stage
(Bulow et al., 1985).
3.4.1 Second stage solutions
The game is solved by backward induction to find the sub-game perfect Nash equilib-
rium. In the last stage of the game G selects production and capacity which maximize
11The concept of average cost may be associated to that of “Levelised Cost of Energy (LEC)”
which is a commonly used instrument to compare costs for unit of electricity generated from different
sources. The LEC is an economic assessment of unit generation costs over the whole lifetime of a power
plant which includes initial investment, operations and maintenance costs, costs of fuel and capital.
According to IEA 2012 Annual Energy Outlook, the dollar cost per megawatt-hour of a conventional
combined cycle plant entering in service in 2017 is 68,6 dollars while for a solar photovoltaic plant is
156,9 dollars (IEA, 2012).
12The role of feed-in tariff here is only to make profitable the adoption of PV technology.
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its expected profit:13
Max
qg ,kg
E[Πg] = E[p(qs, qg)qg − cqg − Igkg] subject to
qg ≤ kg
(3.1)
At the optimum the capacity constraint is binding since G would never invest in a
capacity it cannot use for production. Therefore in each equilibrium we will indicate
only the quantity produced by G, knowing that the capacity is sized accordingly. The
reaction function of G is:
Rg(qs) = qg =
a− bqs − c− Ig
2b
(3.2)
The reaction function of S is a kinked curve, whose equation is the solution to the
following profit maximization problem:
Max
qs
E[Πs] = E[p(qs, qg)qs − C(qs, ks)] where (3.3a)
C(qs, ks) =
{
0 if qs ≤ x∗ks(
Is
x
)
qs otherwise
(3.3b)
The shape of the reaction curve depends on the capacity choices made by firm S in
the previous stage. When in the last stage of the game S selects a production level below
or equal to the available installed capacity, x∗ks, it does not incur in any costs given that
capacity investment has been already paid and production with renewable technologies
is costless. In this case C(qs, ks) = 0. Contrariwise, if the capacity installed in the
previous stage is not sufficient to meet S’s optimal production level in the last stage,
a new investment may be undertaken bearing the associated cost. S’s relevant cost
function in this case is C(qs, ks) =
(
Is
x
)
qs. Note that S’s expected marginal revenues
are decreasing in the quantity of electricity provided by firm G (see Figure 3.1):
E[MRs] = a− 2bqs − bqg (3.4)
13The randomness in G’s profits depends on price’s uncertainty which is turn is caused by the
uncertainty in S’s production level.
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For large quantities of qg, S’s expected marginal revenue curves cross expected
marginal cost at zero (MR1). Similarly for small quantities of qg, S’s expected marginal
revenue curves cross expected marginal cost at Is
x∗ (MR3). In the intermediate case
expected marginal revenue curves cross expected marginal cost curve at the kink (MR2).
0 
x*ks qs 
C(qs, ks ) MR3 
Is/x*
 
MR2 
MR1 
Figure 3.1: Expected marginal revenue and marginal cost curves
It is therefore possible to calculate the thresholds of qg that make firm S to switch
from a cost curve to another, thus changing the relevant reaction function. Let us
define:
• qhg = a−2bx
∗ks
b
as the quantity of qg such that, ∀qg > qhg :
E[MRs(qs, qg)] = 0 (3.5a)
R˜s(qg) = qs =
a− bqg
2b
(3.5b)
• qlg = x
∗(a−2bx∗ks)−Is
bx∗ as the quantity of qg such that, ∀qg < qlg:
E[MRs(qs, qg)] =
Is
x∗
(3.6a)
Rs(qg) = qs =
x∗a− bx∗qg − Is
2bx∗
(3.6b)
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• ∀qg such that qlg < qg < qhg , firm S produces at (available) capacity:
R¯s = qs = x
∗ks (3.7)
Firm S reaction function is the bold line depicted in Figure 3.2. Note that when
relevant marginal costs include investment cost, the reaction function moves inward.
According to the capacity installed in the first period, we may observe three different
Nash equilibria in the last stage of the game (Case A, Case B and Case C). We firstly
calculate each equilibrium in last stage and then we solve backward to find first stage’s
solutions. Finally we compare the payoffs to estimate S’s optimal strategy.
qg
l 
x*ks qs 
Rs (qg) 
qg 
Ȓs (qg) 
Ṝs (qg) 
qg
h 
Figure 3.2: Firm S reaction function
Strategy A: small photovoltaic capacity
If firm S has installed a very small level of capacity in the first stage, it would probably
like to increase it in the last stage. In this case, Nash equilibrium occurs where the
reaction function of firm G crosses the reaction function of firm S in a point on Rs(qg).
The solution of the last stage game is the usual Cournot-Nash equilibrium. Firm
S chooses its optimal quantity as the solution to the following profit maximization
problem:
Max
qs
E[Πs] = E
[
p(qs, qg)qs −
(
Is
x
)
qs
]
(3.8)
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The optimal response is:
Rs(qg) = qs =
x∗a− bx∗qg − Is
2bx∗
(3.9)
Combining S and G reaction functions, we obtain equilibrium quantities, price and
profits:
qAs =
x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is
3bx∗
(3.10a)
qAg =
x∗[a− 2(c+ Ig)] + Is
3bx∗
(3.10b)
pA =
x∗(a+ c+ Ig) + Is
3x∗
(3.10c)
ΠAs =
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
9bx∗2
(3.10d)
ΠAg =
{x∗[a− 2(c+ Ig)] + Is}2
9bx∗2
(3.10e)
The equilibrium is represented in Figure 3.3.
qg
A 
qs 
Rs (qg) 
qg 
Ȓs (qg) 
Rg (qs) 
qs
A 
A 
x*ks 
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium in case A
The standard Cournot Nash equilibrium arises in the second stage of the game if in
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the earlier stage firm S has installed:
kAs 6
qAs
x∗
=
x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is
3bx∗2
(3.11)
Strategy B: large photovoltaic capacity
If firm S has installed a large capacity in the first stage, it presents a cost advantage
relative to G in the last stage competition. In this case, the reaction function of firm S
moves outward toward R˜s(qg). Firm S determines its optimal quantity as the solution
to the following maximization problem:
Max
qs
E[Πs] = E[p(qs, qg)qs] (3.12)
yielding the reaction function:
R˜s(qg) = qs =
a− bqg
2b
(3.13)
Again, combining S and G reaction functions gives the optimal quantities, price and
profits:
qBs =
a+ c+ Ig
3b
(3.14a)
qBg =
a− 2(c+ Ig)
3b
(3.14b)
pB =
a+ c+ Ig
3
(3.14c)
ΠBs =
(a+ c+ Ig)
2
9b
(3.14d)
ΠBg =
[a− 2(c+ Ig)]2
9b
(3.14e)
This equilibrium is represented in Figure 3.4 and arises if firm S has installed in the
earlier stage of the game:
kBs >
qBs
x∗
=
a+ c+ Ig
3bx∗
(3.15)
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Figure 3.4: Equilibrium in case B
Note that ΠBg > 0 if a > 2(c + Ig). If Π
B
g < 0 firm G prefers not to produce, so we
should exclude this opportunity.
Strategy C: intermediate photovoltaic capacity
When S’s capacity size is between the thresholds determining equilibria A and B,
firm S produces at available capacity, qs = x
∗ks, and firm G behaves as a Stackelberg
follower reacting to the quantity produced by its rival. Therefore, G’s reaction function
described in eqs. (2) may be rewritten as:
Rg(ks) = q
C
g =
a− bx∗ks − c− Ig
2b
(3.16)
Equilibrium price and profits in implicit form are:
pC =
a− bx∗ks + c+ Ig
2
(3.17a)
ΠCs =
(
a− bx∗ks + c+ Ig
2
)
x∗ks (3.17b)
ΠCg =
(a− bx∗ks − c− Ig)2
4b
(3.17c)
The equilibrium in case C is represented in Figure 3.5.
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Figure 3.5: Equilibrium in case C
3.4.2 First stage solutions
In order to calculate the explicit pay-off in Case C, the first stage of the game must be
solved. In the first stage firm S chooses ks so as to maximize its expected profits in
case C:
Max
ks
E[Πs] = E[p(xks, qg)xks − Isks] (3.18)
Using the reaction function of G and calculating the FOC of the problem, we get
equilibrium quantities, price and profits:
qCs =
x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is
2bx∗
(3.19a)
qCg =
x∗[a− 3(c+ Ig)] + 2Is
4bx∗
(3.19b)
pC =
x∗(a+ c+ Ig) + 2Is
4x∗
(3.19c)
ΠCs =
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
8bx∗2
(3.19d)
ΠCg =
{x∗[a− 3(c+ Ig)] + 2Is}2
16bx∗2
(3.19e)
This solution arises if S instals in the first stage of the game the following capacity:
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kCs =
x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is
2bx∗2
(3.20)
3.4.3 Optimal strategy selection
Firm S selects its optimal strategy by comparing net profits in each of the three cases
regardless if the investment has been paid in the first or the second stage of the game.
We indicate net profits with a * to distinguish them from gross profits:14
ΠA
∗
s =
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
9bx∗2
(3.21a)
ΠB
∗
s =
(a+ c+ Ig)((a+ c+ Ig)x
∗ − 3Is)
9bx∗
(3.21b)
ΠC
∗
s =
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
8bx∗2
(3.21c)
We remark that firm S prefers to invests more in the first stage of the game rather
than to postpone investments to the second stage. Indeed strategy A is always dom-
inated by strategy C given that the following inequalities is verified for any value of
x∗:
ΠC
∗
s =
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
8bx∗2
>
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
9bx∗2
= ΠA
∗
s (3.22)
On the other hand, strategy C is preferred to strategy B only when the following
inequality holds:
ΠC
∗
s =
[x∗(a+ c+ Ig)− 2Is]2
8bx∗2
>
(a+ c+ Ig)((a+ c+ Ig)x
∗ − 3Is)
9bx∗
= ΠB
∗
s (3.23)
Since both b and x∗ are positive the previous condition reduces to:
[(a+ c+ Ig)x
∗ − 6Is]2 > 0 (3.24)
Strategy C is then preferred to B when:
14Note that ΠAs = Π
A∗
s and Π
C
s = Π
C∗
s
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Case 1: a+ c+ Ig < 6Is ⇒ ∀ x∗ (3.25)
Case 2: a+ c+ Ig ≥ 6Is ⇒ x∗ 6= 6Is
a+ c+ Ig
(3.26)
When parameters’ values are those of Case 1, strategy C is preferred to strategy
B for any value of x∗. This means that, regardless of the average value of capacity
availability, the photovoltaic generator will exploit the merit order rule to invest and
produce as if it were a Stackelberg leader. Notwithstanding, instead of building as much
capacity as it would be needed to compete with zero variable costs, the “renewable”
producer will prefer to be strategic, restrain the output and leave a larger market share
to its competitor because this will result in higher profits. This result is formalized in
Proposition 1.
Proposition 1. Because of merit order rule, the “renewable” producer has a strategic
incentive to increase its optimal capacity and production behaving like a Stackelberg
leader. However, it will not exploit its “first mover advantage” to its maximum because
this may cause the profits to decrease.
Only when parameters’ values are those of Case 2 and the following equality holds:
pB =
2Is
x∗
(3.27)
the two strategies have exactly the same pay-off and S is indifferent between them,
which is clearly a very restrictive case.
Lemma 1. For most of the parameters’ values the average availability of installed
capacity does not change the “renewable” producer’s preferences between strategies.
From consumers’ point of view, however, strategies B and C differ substantially
depending of the value of x∗. Given the monotonicity of demand function it suffices
to calculate which equilibrium guarantees the lowest price to assess when consumers’
are better off. Equilibrium C leads to a higher consumers’ surplus with respect to
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equilibrium B if and only if:
x∗ >
6Is
a+ c+ Ig
(3.28)
This result seems to indicate that there is some room for welfare improving public
interventions. Indeed, if on the one hand the average availability of photovoltaic ca-
pacity depends on technology and cannot be modified, on the other hand the value of
the right hand side of equation (3.28) is increasing in the investment cost of renewable
technology: a policy which reduces such cost increases consumer surplus. We may rep-
resent with the help of a graph the preferences over strategies of firm S and consumers
for different values of x∗ (Figure 3.6). It is worthy to note that if parameters values are
those of Case 1 consumers are never better off with strategy C because the right hand
side of equation (3.28) is larger than 1 which is not possible.
x* 
x* 
0 
0 
1 
1 
x
∗
=
6𝐼𝑠
𝑎 + 𝑐 + 𝐼𝑔
 
x
∗
=
6𝐼𝑠
𝑎 + 𝑐 + 𝐼𝑔
 
C 
C 
C C B = 
Firm S 
Consumers 
B 
Figure 3.6: Preferences over strategies
The solution of Case 1 above arises when the investment cost of photovoltaic capacity
is relatively large. When parameters respect the condition for such equilibrium there is
always a conflict between consumers and firm S interest: the former will always prefer
equilibrium B, while the latter will always play the strategy leading to equilibrium
C. In this case consumers’ loss is inversely related to the value of average capacity
availability, i.e. the larger is x∗ the smaller is the difference between consumer surplus
in equilibria C and B. Conversely, when investing in renewable capacity is relatively
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cheap, there is room for consumers and firm S interests to converge: both may be better
off in equilibrium C if the value of average capacity availability is larger than a certain
threshold. These results are formalized in Proposition 2 and Lemma 2.
Proposition 2. Merit order rule may lead to an equilibrium which benefits both the
“renewable” producer and the consumers.
Lemma 2. A public intervention which reduces investment cost in the “renewable”
technology increases the likelihood of a market outcome in which both the “renewable”
producer and the consumers are better-off.
3.5 Analysis of ex post profits
Investment choices are taken on the basis of the average value of capacity availability,
x∗, while production firm S may be adjusted according to the realized value of x. G can
modify its production as well but it is constrained by the size of its installed capacity.
It may be interesting to calculate the ex-post expected profits of firm S, i.e. the profits
it gains once it has invested in capacities kCs or k
B
s and it produces according to the
real value of x. In both cases the pay-off is:
Πs = (a− bqg − bxks)xks − Isks (3.29)
We may substitute in eq. (3.29) the optimal values of kCs and k
B
s calculated as
functions of x∗ and the optimal quantity of firm G.15 We recall that G produces
the lower quantity between its installed capacity and its optimal production given the
electricity supplied by S:
qB,Cg =
a− bmax (x, x∗)kB,Cs − c− Ig
2b
(3.30)
Calling A = a+ c+ Ig, ex post profits are:
ΠBs [x] = −
A
3bx∗
(
Is +
2Ax2 − 3Axx∗ −Axmax (x, x∗)
6x∗
)
(3.31a)
15All calculations are reported in Appendix B.
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ΠCs [x] = (Ax
∗ − 2Is)2(x− x
∗)(Axx∗ − 2Is(x + x∗)) + x(2Is −Ax∗) max (x, x∗)
8bx∗4
(3.31b)
To calculate their expected value, we firstly use a generic probability density func-
tion, P (x), defined for x ∈ [0, 1]. For a generic function the following condition must
hold:
E[f ] =
∫ 1
0
f(x)P (x)dx (3.32)
Expected profits are then:16
E[ΠB,Cs ] =
∫ 1
0
ΠB,C(x)P (x)dx (3.33a)
E[ΠBs ] = −
AIs
3bx∗
− A
2E[x2]
9bx∗2
+
A2
6b
+
A2M
18bx∗2
(3.33b)
E[ΠCs ] =
IsB
2bx∗2
− AB
4bx∗
− B
2
4bx∗4
E[x2] +
MB2
8bx∗4
(3.33c)
where:
M =
∫ 1
0
xmax (x, x∗)P (x)dx (3.34a)
A = a+ c+ Ig (3.34b)
B = 2Is − Ax∗ (3.34c)
Recalling that E[x] = x∗, we may rewrite the expected profits of strategies B and
C using the definition of variance of a random variable, Var[x] = E[x2] − E[x]2. After
some manipulations we get:
E[ΠB] =
A2
18b
− AIs
3bx∗
+
A2
18bx∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) (3.35a)
E[ΠC ] =
2IsB −B2
4bx∗2
− AB
4bx∗
+
B2
8bx∗4
(M − 2Var[x]) (3.35b)
For strategy C to be ex post superior to strategy B the condition E[ΠB] < E[ΠC ]
must hold. This condition is equivalent to:
A2
18
− AIs
3x∗
+
A2
18x∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) < B
2
8x∗4
(M − 2Var[x]) (3.36)
16Note that we have dropped the subscript s for expositional convenience.
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The inequality can be reduced to:
xˆ2s(s− 1) < 1− 6s+ 5s
2
4s2
(M − 2Var[x]) (3.37)
where
I = 6Is (3.38a)
xˆ =
I
A
(3.38b)
s =
x∗
xˆ
(3.38c)
To get some insights on the effect that the variance of x may have on the ex-post
pay-off of strategies we have to specify a distribution function. We performed some
simulations using a uniform distribution function defined as:
P (x) =

1
2
for x∗ −  ≤ x ≤ x∗ + 
0 otherwise
(3.39)
With this distribution function we have:
M =
2
6
+
x
4
+ x2 (3.40a)
Var[x] =
2
3
(3.40b)
We can finally simplify inequality (3.37) so as to obtain:
xˆ2s <
1
16s2
(5s− 1)(4xˆ2s2 + xˆs− 22) (3.41)
We have performed some simulations for different values of xˆ. The results are
reported in Figures 3.7 to 3.14.
Note that the right-hand sided figures show simulation’s results when the param-
eters Is, a, cg and Ig have values corresponding to Case 1 in the ex-ante analysis, i.e.
relatively large investment cost in renewable technologies, while left-hand sided figures
display simulation’s results for parameters’ values corresponding to Case 2, i.e. rela-
tively small investment cost in renewable technologies. We recall that in the ex ante
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Figure 3.7: xˆ = 1
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Figure 3.8: xˆ = 1.25
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Figure 3.9: xˆ = 0.25
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Figure 3.10: xˆ = 1.5
analysis indifference between strategies B and C is possible only in Case 2 and only for
a specific value of x∗. In our simulation, red areas represent the values of parameters
for which strategy C is still ex-post preferred, whereas purple areas the values for which
strategy B becomes more profitable. We consider that the forecasting of the true value
of the average capacity availability is subject to limited errors, i.e.  = 0.1.
We remark that when investment cost in renewable technology is quite large, strat-
egy B is never preferred either ex-ante or ex-post (Figures 3.8, 3.10, 3.12, 3.14). Con-
versely, when investment cost is relatively low the ex post analysis suggests that strategy
B yields greater profits even for smaller values of x∗ than those estimated in the ex-ante
analysis, thereby increasing the range of parameters’ values for which strategy B is pre-
ferred by the PV generator (Figures 3.9, 3.11, 3.13). For instance, when xˆ = 0.75 (see
Figure 3.13) strategy B is ex-ante preferred if and only if x∗ = 0.75 while the ex-post
analysis reduces the range to 0.675 < x∗ < 0, 75. We formalize these result in Lemma
3 and Proposition 3.
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Figure 3.11: xˆ = 0.5
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Figure 3.12: xˆ = 1.75
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Figure 3.13: xˆ = 0.75
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Figure 3.14: xˆ = 2
Lemma 3. When investment cost is relatively low, “renewable” producer preferences
between strategies may be reversed even for small errors in the forecasting of the true
value of capacity availability factor.
Proposition 3. According to the ex-post analysis of pay-off the strategic effect of spot
market design on investment and production choices of “renewable” producer may be
stronger than what suggested by the ex-ante analysis alone.
3.6 Three stage game
In this section we study the effect on equilibrium outcomes following a change in com-
petition rules in post-investment stage. In particular, we adopt the “dominant firm -
competitive fringe” setting developed by Carlton and Perloff (2002) to model competi-
tion in production between the “traditional” producer which represents the dominant
firm and the “renewable” producer which behaves like a competitive fringe. This exten-
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sion aims at accounting for price taking behavior of “renewable” firm in real spot elec-
tricity markets which are organized as a uniform price auction with all infra-marginal
units receiving the system marginal price, i.e. the price bid by the last unit called into
operation. The electricity from “renewable” plants is generally bid at zero, while the
power from traditional technologies is offered at a positive price which must cover at
least the marginal positive cost of production. Therefore, in a stylized model with only
two technologies competing in a spot market, the “traditional” generator sets the price
knowing that it will face a competitive rival while the “renewable” producer receives
the price chosen by the dominant firm despite being competitive in its bid. The results
of this analysis are extremely relevant because they show that “renewable” generators
are able to influence short run market outcomes with their investment decisions and
thanks to merit order rule although they do not make the price in real spot market.17
Let us call again S the PV power plant and G the CCGT power plant. Produc-
tion levels are denoted by qi > 0, i = s, g and generation capacities by ki, i = s, g.
Investment cost per unit of capacity is Ii > 0, i = s, g. S has a convex production
cost function for output levels below capacity, Fsqs +
cs
2
q2s , with Fs, cs > 0, and linear
investment cost function, Isks. G has linear production and investment cost functions,
Igkg+cgqg, with cg > 0. Production above capacity is infinitely costly for both S and G.
We assume that Fs > Ig + cg, which means that firm G has the lower minimum average
cost. It is further assumed that the availability of PV capacity for production depends
on weather conditions. Therefore for each level of installed capacity ks the available
capacity is xks, where x is the realization of a random variable X ∈ [0, 1]. Firms know
the continuous distribution function of the random variable X as well as its expected
value, E[x] = x∗. Firms face a linear inverse demand function, p(Q) = a − bQ, where
Q = qs + qg ⊆ (0, xks + kg).
The structure of the game is the following. In the first stage firm S chooses its
capacity, ks: the investment is irreversible in the sense that capacity already installed
cannot be dismissed. In the second stage firm G selects simultaneously its capacity, kg,
and its production level, qg, knowing it that it will face a competitive fringe in the spot
market.18 In the third stage, S chooses its production possibly increasing its capacity
17See note 3.
18The same reasoning in footnote 10 applies.
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prior to compete in the market. The game is solved by backward induction.
3.6.1 Third and second stage solutions
In the last stage of the game S chooses its optimal production level knowing that it may
increase its capacity prior to compete in the spot market. As a price taker it sets its
quantity by equating expected market price and expected marginal cost of production:
E[a− bqg − bqs] = E[MC(qs, ks)] where (3.42a)
MC(qs, ks) =
{
Fs + csqs if qs ≤ x∗ks
Is
x
+ Fs + csqs otherwise
(3.42b)
S reaction function is again a kinked curve whose shape depends on the investment
decisions that have been taken in previous stages of the game. When the firm has
already installed sufficient capacity, its costs in the last stage of the game only consist
in production costs thus the first marginal cost curve applies. Conversely, when S’s
optimal choice of qs in the last stage of the game is larger than the available capacity,
i.e. qs > x
∗ks, the firm must sustain also an investment cost to expand the capacity
before producing. In this case the second marginal cost function is the relevant one.
Just like in the two stage game, it is possible to calculate the thresholds f qg that
make the PV producer switching from a reaction curve to another. We remark that the
expected inverse demand function is decreasing in the quantity of electricity provided by
firm G: E[a− bqg− bqs]. We depict these curves for different values of qg in Figure 3.15.
Expected inverse demand curves such as ED1 emerge when the quantity of electricity
produced by G, qg, is quite large. In this case expected inverse demand curves cross
expected marginal cost function Fs + csqs. By the same token, small quantities of qg
are associated to expected inverse demand curves such as ED3 which cross expected
marginal cost function at Fs +
Is
x∗ + csqs. In the intermediate case expected inverse
demand curves cross expected marginal cost curve at the kink. Note that if qg is very
large, i.e. qg >
a−Fs
b
, then qs = 0.
Let us define:
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Figure 3.15: Expected inverse demand curves and marginal cost curves
• qhg = a−(cs+b)x
∗ks−Fs
b
as the quantity of qg such that, ∀qg > qhg :
E[a− bqg − bqs] = E[Fs + csqs] (3.43a)
R˜s(qg) = qs =
a− bqg − Fs
cs + b
(3.43b)
• qlg = x
∗[a−(cs+b)x∗ks−Fs]−Is
bx∗ as the quantity of qg such that, ∀qg < qlg:
E[a− bqg − bqs] = E[Is
x
+ Fs + csqs] (3.44a)
Rs(qg) = qs =
x∗(a− bqg − Fs)− Is
(cs + b)x∗
(3.44b)
• ∀qg such that qlg < qg < qhg , firm S produces at (available) capacity:
R¯s = qs = x
∗ks (3.45)
Firm S reaction function has the same shape as the one depicted in Figure 3.2
with qhg and q
l
g corresponding to the new thresholds. Figures 3.16 to 3.19 show all the
possible equilibria in the last stage of the game according to the value of ks installed
by S in the first stage. We analyze all possible situations to find the subgame perfect
78
Nash equilibrium.
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Figure 3.16: x∗ks ≤ x∗k1
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Figure 3.17: x∗ks = x∗k2
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Figure 3.18: x∗k2 < x∗ks ≤ x∗k3
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Figure 3.19: x∗ks > x∗k3
Cases A and B: very small and small photovoltaic capacity
When S has built a small capacity in the first stage of the game it may decide to
increase it in the last stage. However in this case it should bear a new investment cost.
The optimal quantity of electricity to be produced is selected by equating the expected
inverse demand function and S marginal cost function which includes investment cost:
E[a− bqg − bqs] = E
[
Is
x
+ Fs + csqs
]
(3.46)
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The optimal qs is calculated as a function of qg:
qs =
x∗(a− bqg − Fs)− Is
(cs + b)x∗
(3.47)
In the second stage, firm G sets its optimal capacity and production. In this setting
it behaves as a Stackelberg leader which maximizes its profit over the inverse residual
demand, i.e. the inverse market demand minus the supply of the PV producer. G
chooses its quantity as the solution to the following maximization problem:
Max
qg ,kg
E[Πg] = E[pd(qg)qg − cqg − Igkg] subject to
qg ≤ kg
(3.48)
where:
pd =
acsx
∗ + b[Is + (Fs − csqg)x∗]
(cs + b)x∗
(3.49)
At the optimimum the constraint is binding and G installs and produces the quan-
tity:
kAg = q
A
g =
cs(a− cg − Ig)x∗ + b[Is + (Fs − cg − Ig)x∗]
2bcsx∗
(3.50)
By substituting G’s optimal quantity in equations (3.47) and (3.50), we obtain S’s
optimal quantity and equilibrium price from which we can calculate firms’ profits:
qAs =
cs(Ax
∗ − 2Is)− b(Bx∗ + Is)
2cs(cs + b)x∗
(3.51a)
pA =
csCx
∗ + b(Is +Dx∗)]
2(cs + b)x∗
(3.51b)
ΠAs =
[cs(Ax
∗ − 2Is)− b(Bx∗ + Is)]2
8cs(cs + b)2x∗2
(3.51c)
ΠAg =
[csEx
∗ + b(Bx∗ + Is)]2
4bcs(cs + b)x∗2
(3.51d)
where:
A = a+ cg − 2Fs + Ig = E − 2B > 0
B = Fs − cg − Ig > 0
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C = a+ cg + Ig > 0
D = cg + Ig + Fs > 0
E = a− cg − Ig > 0
This equilibrium corresponds to point A in Figure 3.16 and arises in the third stage
of the game if in the earlier stage firm S has installed:
kAs 6
cs(Ax
∗ − 2Is) + b(Bx∗ − Is)
2cs(cs + b)x∗2
(3.53)
When in the first stage of the game S has invested in a capacity which is larger
than kAs but still smaller than its optimal choice of production, the firm continues
to compete with a reaction function which includes investment cost. In this case the
leadership in production of firm G is somehow constrained because the firm should take
into account that equilibrium A is unattainable. Therefore to find its optimal quantity
and capacity it maximizes its profits over the residual demand as in eq. (3.48): each
time the residual demand will be the difference between the market demand and the
quantity of electricity provided by S, qs = x
∗ks. This equilibrium occurs in a point on
the right portion of the segment A-B in Figures 3.16 and 3.17 (excluding point A).19
If in the earlier stage S has installed the Cournot capacity the tangency point occurs
in B (Figure 3.17) and the optimal response of firm G is to produce exactly Cournot.
In this case, the equilibrium outcome is:
qBs =
Ax∗ − 2Is
(2cs + b)x∗
(3.54a)
qBg =
csEx
∗ + b(Bx∗ + Is)
b(2cs + b)x∗
(3.54b)
pB =
csCx
∗ + b(Is + Fsx∗)
(2cs + b)x∗
(3.54c)
ΠBs =
cs(Ax
∗ − 2Is)2
2(2cs + b)2x∗2
(3.54d)
19The equilibrium is the tangency point between the isoprofit curve of G associated to the highest
profit and S reaction function including investment cost.
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ΠBg =
[csEx
∗ + b(Bx∗ + Is)]2
b(2cs + b)2x∗2
(3.54e)
This equilibrium arises if S has installed in the first stage:
kBs =
Ax∗ − 2Is
(2cs + b)x∗2
(3.55)
Cases C and D: large and very large photovoltaic capacity
If the photovoltaic producer has installed a large capacity in the first stage of the game,
its choice of quantity in the third stage will depend only on production costs. In this
case, firm S chooses its optimal quantity as the solution to the equation:
E[a− bqg − bqs] = E [Fs + csqs] (3.56)
which gives the quantity qs as a function of qg:
qs =
a− bqg − Fs
cs + b
(3.57)
In the second stage of the game the leader in production, firm G, sets its output and
its capacity to maximize profits over the residual demand. The problem is the same as
in eq. (3.48) but in this case the residual demand is equal to:
pd =
bFs + cs(a− bqg)
cs + b
(3.58)
At the optimum G installs and produces:
kDg = q
D
g =
csE + bB
2csb
(3.59)
Again, by substituting G’s optimal quantity in equations (3.56) and (3.57), we
obtain S’s optimal quantity, equilibrium price and profits:
qDs =
csA− bB
2cs(cs + b)
(3.60a)
pD =
csC + bD
2(cs + b)
(3.60b)
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ΠDs =
[csA− bB]2
8cs(cs + b)2
(3.60c)
ΠDg =
[csE + bB]
2
4csb(cs + b)
(3.60d)
This equilibrium is represented as point D in Figure 3.19. By constructing the
isoprofit curve of G passing through the equilibrium point D we see that it meets firm
G reaction function in point C (Figure 3.18). The coordinates of such point are:
qCs =
E
√
cs(cs + b)− csE − bB
b
√
cs(cs + b)
(3.61a)
qCg =
csE + bB
2b
√
cs(cs + b)
(3.61b)
This point ensures to G the same profits of equilibrium D while through the demand
function we can calculate the market price and profits of S:
pC =
bB + csE + 2
√
cs(cs + b)(cg + Ig)
2
√
cs(cs + b)
(3.62)
ΠCs =
{[
cs −
√
cs(cs + b)
]
E + bB
}{[
c2s − cs
√
cs(cs + b)
]
E + b2B + b
[
csH − 2
√
cs(cs + b)B
]}
2b2cs(cs + b)
(3.63)
where:
H = a− 2cg + Fs − 2Ig
Equilibrium D is preferred by CCGT producer when in the first stage S has installed:
ks >
qCs
x∗
=
E
√
cs(cs + b)− csE + bB
x∗b
√
cs(cs + b)
(3.64)
while for ks =
qCs
x∗ firm G prefers the equilibrium at point C.
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Case E: intermediate photovoltaic capacity
When in the third stage of the game firm S produces at available capacity, firm G is
constrained to behave as a Stackelberg follower.20 Gas producer’s reaction function is
the same as the one calculated in the standard setting:
Rg(ks) = q
E
g =
a− bx∗ks − cg − Ig
2b
(3.65)
Equilibrium price and profits in implicit form are:
pE =
a− bx∗ks + cg + Ig
2
(3.66a)
ΠEs =
(
a− bx∗ks + cg + Ig
2
− Fs − csx
∗ks
2
)
x∗ks (3.66b)
ΠEg =
(a− bx∗ks − cg − Ig)2
4b
(3.66c)
3.6.2 First stage solutions
To find an explicit form for the equilibrium in case E, we solve the first stage of the
game in which S defines its optimal capacity ks by maximizing its expected profits:
Max
ks
E[Πs] = E
[
p(xks, qg)xks −
(
Is
x
+ Fs +
csxks
2
)
xks
]
(3.67)
Using the reaction function of G and calculating the FOC of the problem, we get
equilibrium capacity, quantities, price and profits in explicit form:
kEs =
Ax∗ − 2Is
2(cs + b)x∗2
(3.68a)
qEs =
x∗A− 2Is
2(cs + b)x∗
(3.68b)
qEg =
x∗ {b[a− 3(cg + Ig) + 2Fs] + 2csE}+ 2bIs
4b(cs + b)x∗
(3.68c)
20Which means that the first mover advantage in production of firm G is completely lost.
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pE =
x∗[b(a+ cg + Ig + 2Fs) + 2csC] + 2bIs
4(cs + b)x∗
(3.68d)
ΠEs =
[Ax∗ − 2Is]2
8(cs + b)x∗2
(3.68e)
ΠEg =
{x∗ {b[a− 3(cg + Ig) + 2Fs] + 2csE}+ 2bIs}2
16b(cs + b)2x∗2
(3.68f)
3.6.3 Optimal strategy selection
Let us firstly qualitatively discuss the possible outcomes of the game with the help of
Figures 3.16 to 3.19. The graphics reveal that, when the “renewable” generator prefers
to postpone investments and hence presents in the last stage the inner reaction function,
between point A in Figure 3.16 and point B in figure 3.17, it will surely prefers the latter
equilibrium. Hence the strategy leading to equilibrium A is always dominated by the
strategy corresponding to equilibrium B. Likewise, when the “renewable” generator
anticipates investments in the first stage of the game and competes in the last stage
with the outer reaction function, between equilibrium C in Figure 3.18 and equilibrium
D in Figure 3.19 it will always prefer equilibrium at point C. Therefore, although the
PV producer is the follower in the production game, it can eliminate strictly dominated
strategies leading to points such as A and D at the beginning of the game exploiting
its first mover advantage in the investment game. It thus selects its optimal capacity
investment on the segment B-C as it does in the two stage game on the segment A-B.
The strategic incentives depending on merit order rule still hold. The only difference
here is in that the segment B-C is shorter than the segment A-B, which constraints the
set of possible capacity choices.
Analytically, firm S selects its optimal strategy by comparing the net profits from
each of the five cases, regardless if the investment has been paid in the first or the
third stage of the game. As in the baseline model we indicate net profits with a * to
distinguish them from gross profits:21
ΠA
∗
s =
[cs(Ax
∗ − 2Is)− b(Bx∗ + Is)]2
8cs(cs + b)2x∗2
(3.69a)
21Note that ΠAs = Π
A∗
s , Π
B
s = Π
B∗
s and Π
E
s = Π
E∗
s .
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ΠB
∗
s =
cs(Ax
∗ − 2Is)2
2(2cs + b)2x∗2
(3.69b)
Π
C∗
s =
{
(cs + b)
[
cs −
√
cs(cs + b)
]
E + bB
}{[
c2s − cs
√
cs(cs + b)
]
Ex∗ − b
[√
cs(cs + b)Bx
∗ − 2cs(Is + Bx∗)
]}
2b2[cs(cs + b)]
3
2 x∗
(3.69c)
ΠD∗s =
(csA− bB) [(csA− bB)x∗ − 4(cs + b)Is]
8cs(cs + b)2x∗
(3.69d)
ΠE
∗
s =
[Ax∗ − 2Is]2
8(cs + b)x∗2
(3.69e)
Contrary to the baseline case, the ranking of strategies in the extended model de-
pends on the values of parameters. For illustrative purposes, we have calculated the
payoffs of the game as a function of x∗ and we have reported them in Figure 3.20 using
the following parameters’ values:
cs = 0.5 (3.70a)
b = 1 (3.70b)
Is = 1 (3.70c)
Fs = 5 (3.70d)
cg = 1 (3.70e)
Ig = 1 (3.70f)
a = 50 (3.70g)
We remark that the strategy E provides the PV firms with the largest profits when-
ever x∗ has values below 0.9. Strategy B seems to be the second preferred strategy but
only when x∗ < 0.25; indeed after this point strategy C takes over beating even strategy
E for very large values of the average capacity availability (x∗ > 0.9). Strategies A and
D follow, with A always preferred to D for any values of x∗. It is interesting to note
that in our example strategy D requires an average available capacity larger that 0.3
to produce positive pay-offs.
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Figure 3.20: Profits
3.7 Conclusions
We proposed a stylized model for the analysis of investment and production incentives
in decentralized electricity markets when a traditional power generator faces competi-
tion from a producer employing an intermittent technology. Although competition in
generation seems to be substantially animated by new entrants investing in renewable
technologies, the study of interactions between “traditional” and “renewable” power
producers still remains an almost unexplored field of research. Our model is a modified
version of the Dixit model for entry deterrence with Cournot competition in the post
entry stage. This choice stems from two reasons. Firstly, because of merit order rule the
power from renewable sources is always the first to be brought on line in spot electricity
markets. This favorable ranking may be interpreted as a sort of first mover advantage
similar to that one of the incumbent in the Dixit model. Indeed, in power sector the
profitability of investments in “traditional” technologies rests on the size of the residual
demand, which in turn is determined by the capacity installed by “renewable” pro-
ducer. Therefore the “renewable” producer is a sort of incumbent and the “traditional”
producer is the entrant who behaves as a follower in the Stackelberg game for capacity
investment. Secondly, the Dixit model is sufficiently flexible to allow for several types of
competition in the post entry game and in each setting a certain degree of uncertainty
about demand and/or cost functions may be introduced. We have modeled post-entry
stage as a Cournot competition and the uncertainty depends on the availability of PV
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capacity. In real power markets firms are supposed to compete in prices. However, in
a stylized model with a “renewable” and a “traditional” power producers firms rather
play a quantity game since the “renewable” power plant can always bid at zero and the
“traditional” producer is constantly marginal. Quantity competition presents the ad-
ditional advantage that both firms receive the same price as in a uniform price auction
used in real markets.
Our analysis suggests that the “renewable” generator exploits merit order rule to
invest and produce as if it were a Stackelberg leader. While including considerations
about the average availability of installed capacity does not change preferences over
strategies of “renewable” generator for most of the parameters’ values, consumer sur-
plus differs substantially according to it. This result seems to indicate that there is
some room for welfare improving public interventions: indeed, if on the one hand the
average availability of renewable capacity depend on technology and cannot be modi-
fied, on the other hand consumer surplus can be increased (regardless to the strategy
chosen by the firm) by decreasing investment cost in renewable technology. Interest-
ingly, the ex-post analysis of pay-off reveals that profits ranking, and hence preferences
over strategies, may be reversed even for small errors in the forecasting of the average
capacity availability factor and so the incentives for strategic behavior may be stronger.
This result suggests that the only ex-ante analysis of the game may be misleading and
must be always coupled with an ex-post analysis.
An extension of our model has consisted in relaxing the assumptions on market
power and dimension of the PV producer. In the extended model, we adopt the “dom-
inant firm - competitive fringe” setting developed by Carlton and Perloff (2002) in the
post-entry game. This extension aims at accounting for price taking behavior of “re-
newable” firm which represents the competitive fringe in real spot electricity market.
The idea behind this extension is that in a stylized model with only two technologies
competing in a spot market, the “traditional” generator sets the price knowing that it
will face a competitive rival while the “renewable” producer receives the price chosen
by the marginal “traditional” firm despite being competitive in its bid. This extension
transforms the two stage game in a three stage game, in which the PV producer is a
follower (competitive fringe) in the production game and a leader in the investment
game due to the merit order rule. The main insights of the model seem to be barely
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sensitive to changes in the market power of competitors: even when the “renewable”
generator behaves as a competitive fringe in the spot market, it is able to influence
equilibrium outcome to its own advantage through investment choices although to a
smaller degree than in the standard setting. In this extension, contrary to the baseline
model, the ranking of strategies is sensitive to the choice of parameters’ values.
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Appendix B
Analytical calculations
The ex post pay-off of strategies B and C is calculated as:
Πs = (a− bqg − bxks)xks − Isks (B.1)
By substituting in previous equation the optimal values of kCs and k
B
s calculated as
functions of x∗ and the optimal quantity of firm G which is the minimum between its
installed capacity and its optimal production given the electricity supplied by S, we
obtain:
ΠBs =
(
a− b
(
a− bmax(x, x∗)kBs − c− Ig
2b
))
x
(
a + c + Ig
3bx∗
)
−
bx2
(
a + c + Ig
3bx∗
)2
− Is
(
a + c + Ig
3bx∗
) (B.2)
ΠCs =
(
a− b
(
a− bmax(x, x∗)kCs − c− Ig
2b
))
x
(
x∗(a + c + Ig)− 2Is
2bx∗2
)
−
bx2
(
x∗(a + c + Ig)− 2Is
2bx∗2
)2
− Is
(
x∗(a + c + Ig)− 2Is
2bx∗2
) (B.3)
To calculate their expected value, we firstly use a generic probability density func-
tion, P (x), defined for x ∈ [0, 1]. The expected value of a generic function f(x) can be
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rewritten as:
E[f ] =
∫ 1
0
f(x)P (x)dx (B.4)
Expected profits are then:1
E[ΠB,Cs ] =
∫ 1
0
ΠB,C(x)P (x)dx (B.5)
For strategy B we have:
E[ΠBs ] = −
AIs
3bx∗
− A
18bx∗2
∫ 1
0
(2Ax2 − 3Axx∗ −Axmax (x, x∗))P (x)dx =
= − AIs
3bx∗
− A
18bx∗2
(
2A
∫ 1
0
x2P (x)dx− 3Ax∗
∫ 1
0
xP (x)dx−A
∫ 1
0
xmax (x, x∗)P (x)dx
)
=
− AIs
3bx∗
− A
18bx∗2
(
2AE[x2]− 3Ax∗2 −AM
)
where:
M =
∫ 1
0
xmax (x, x∗)P (x)dx (B.6)
Simplifying:
E[ΠBs ] = −
AIs
3bx∗
− A
2E[x2]
9bx∗2
+
A2
6b
+
A2M
18bx∗2
(B.7)
For strategy C, let us firstly rewrite the profits as:
ΠCs =
Is
2bx∗2
(2Is −Ax∗)− (2Is −Ax
∗)2
4bx∗4
x2 +
(2Is −Ax∗)[(2Is −Ax∗) max (x, x∗)− 2Ax∗2]
8bx∗4
x =
=
IsB
2bx∗2
− B
2
4bx∗4
x2 +
B2 max (x, x∗)− 2ABx∗2
8bx∗4
x
where B = 2Is − Ax∗. The expected profits are:
E[ΠCs ] =
IsB
2bx∗2
−
∫ 1
0
(
B2
4bx∗4
x2 +
B2 max (x, x∗)− 2ABx∗2
8bx∗4
x
)
P (x)dx =
=
IsB
2bx∗2
− B
2
4bx∗4
∫ 1
0
x2P (x)dx +
B2
8bx∗4
∫ 1
0
xmax(x, x∗)P (x)dx− AB
4bx∗2
∫ 1
0
xP (x)dx =
1Note that we have dropped the subscript s for expositional convenience.
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Using again the definition of M we obtain:
E[ΠCs ] =
IsB
2bx∗2
− AB
4bx∗
− B
2
4bx∗4
E[x2] +
MB2
8bx∗4
(B.8)
Recalling that E[x] = x∗, we may rewrite the expected profits of strategies B and
C using the definition of variance of a random variable, Var[x] = E[x2] − E[x]2. After
some manipulations we get:
E[ΠB] =
A2
18b
− AIs
3bx∗
+
A2
18bx∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) (B.9a)
E[ΠC ] =
2IsB −B2
4bx∗2
− AB
4bx∗
+
B2
8bx∗4
(M − 2Var[x]) (B.9b)
The condition for E[ΠB] < E[ΠC ] is therefore equivalent to:
A2
18
− AIs
3x∗
+
A2
18x∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) < B
2
8x∗4
(M − 2Var[x]) (B.10)
If we call I = 6Is, the previous inequality becomes:
A2
18
− AI
18x∗
+
A2
18x∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) < (I/3− Ax
∗)2
8x∗4
(M − 2Var[x]) (B.11)
which we simplify by multiplying both sides by 18x
∗2
I2
:
A2x∗2
I2
− Ax
∗
I
+
A2
I2
(M − 2Var[x]) < (1− 3x
∗A/I)2
4x∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) (B.12)
We call xˆ = I
A
in order to reduce the inequality to:
x∗2
xˆ2
− x
∗
xˆ
+
1
xˆ2
(M − 2Var[x]) < (1− 3x
∗/xˆ)2
4x∗2
(M − 2Var[x]) (B.13)
Finally we call s the ratio x∗/xˆ and we rewrite previous condition as:
s(s− 1) <
(
s2 − (1− 3s)
2
4
)
2Var[x]−M
xˆ2
(B.14)
By further simplification we obtain:
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4s(s− 1) < (6s+ 5s2 − 1)2Var[x]−M
xˆ2
(B.15)
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Chapter 4
The effect of intermittent renewable
generation on congestion and zonal
price differences in Italy
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4.1 Introduction and literature review
The interest in alternative energy has sparked in Europe as the climate change problem
emerged. The 2009 Climate and Energy package has motivated European governments
to stimulate renewable energy penetration through supporting schemes in order to meet
the target of a 20% share of EU energy consumption produced from renewable sources
by 2020. According to the more recent figures from Eurostat, a Directorate-General
of the European Commission responsible for statistical information of its member, the
share of renewables in gross final energy consumption has reached 14.1% in the EU-28
in 2012. The integration of renewable power plants, especially those exploiting intermit-
tent power sources such as wind and sun, represents a challenge for network operators,
market participants and regulators for a number of reasons. First of all, some geo-
graphical locations are particularly well suited for the installation of new capacity due
to the abundance of natural resources (e.g. the North for wind and the South for solar
in both Germany and Spain). These locations may not coincide with consumption sites
and may, on the contrary, be very far from them. Substantial investments are there-
fore required to integrate the new facilities and to ease the process of displacement of
electricity from production toward consumption sites. Additional investments may be
necessary to deal with increasing intermittent generation directly flowing into the net-
work: a possible solution are “smart grids” which provide the network operator with an
enhanced real-time control over how the electricity is routed within the grid. Secondly,
merit order rule and priority dispatch for the electricity generated from renewable power
sources have redefined the rules of the game in decentralized spot market: on the one
hand renewable supply has partly crowded out the production from mid-merit power
plants and on the other hand it has intensified the needs for immediately available,
back-up capacity to overcome the intermittency and to guarantee inflows and outflows
balance.
If the engineering literature has focused on the topic of integration of renewables
and optimal network expansion(see for instance Abdullah et al., 2014; Hemdan et al.,
2014; Rathore and Roy, 2014), the economic literature has been especially concerned
in analysing the impact of increasing renewable production on wholesale electricity
prices. Several authors (Cutler et al., 2011; Gelabert et al., 2011; Ketterer, 2014) have
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emphasized the likely reductions on equilibrium prices entailed by renewable supply and
originated from the displacement of higher variable cost production in the merit order
ranking (this phenomenon is referred to as “merit order effect”). Nonetheless, when
national electricity markets are organized as two or more inter-connected sub-markets
with zonal prices, the final impact on equilibrium prices of increased generation from
renewable sources may result less straightforward than the existing literature would
suggest. As a matter of fact, depending on the location of supply and demand, the
renewable output may multiply the incidence of transmission congestions or it may
relieve congestion occurrence by reducing transportation needs.
This chapter aims at testing the impact of this phenomenon using Italian electric-
ity market as case study. For its particular features, Italy serves extremely well our
research purpose. The Italian Power Exchange is composed of 6 regional sub-markets
which aggregate in macro-zones all the administrative regions. The hourly electricity
price is unique for the whole country when all transmission limits between sub-markets
are respected; otherwise a system of zonal pricing applies.1 The Northern zone, whose
generation capacity is the largest of the country, has historically been an exporting zone;
as a consequence its zonal prices have been constantly lower than the rest of Italy. The
ambitious support policies for the development of renewable power sources have gener-
ated a significant amount of new investments in solar and wind power plants: between
2010 and 2012 the combined production of solar and wind has increased at a rate of
105% reaching an average hourly generation of about 5100 MWh in 2012.2 Southern
regions have showed the highest growth rate due to the favourable weather conditions.
While remaining the larger producer, the contribution of the Northern zone to the av-
erage total hourly renewable production has decreased by more than 7% between 2010
and 2012. The analysis of inter-zonal transits resulting from the day-ahead auction
as well as of the series of paired-price differences between neighbouring zones reveals
a changing pattern between importing and exporting regions, with a stronger role for
Central and Southern regions as exporters. The final effect on congestion frequencies
and zonal prices remains however to be empirically tested.
1The zonal prices are selling prices while buyers all pay the National Single Price (PUN) for the
electricity bought in the pool.
2In Appendix C we report a full description of the database employed in the analyses.
99
This chapter aims at contributing to the scant literature on the effect of increas-
ing renewable power production on zonal prices and congestion. Woo et al. (2011)
pioneered the discussion by studying the effect of increasing wind generation on zonal
price differences in Texas ERCOT power market. The analysis stems from the obser-
vation that wind generation is mostly concentrated in the West zone which is scarcely
populated, whereas generation capacity in Houston zone falls short of its zonal load.
The author firstly estimate a three ordered-logit model on three zonal pairs to capture
the effect of total wind generation, zonal loads, nuclear generation and the gas price
at Henry Hub on the probability and the direction of grid congestion. Secondly, they
estimate a log-linear model to quantify the effect of the same variables on positive and
negative zonal price differences. The authors use 15-min market data from January
2007 to May 2010. They show that rising wind supply, nuclear generation, load from
non-West zones and gas price increase the likelihood and the size of strictly positive
paired-price differences between the West and the other zones;3 increasing the load in
the West zone has exactly the opposite effect since it reduces exporting needs.
Up to our knowledge, Sapio (2014) is the only author applying this type of analysis in
Italy to test the effect of larger solar and wind generation on congestion between Sicily
and Southern Italy using a binary dynamic logit model and a vector autoregressive
model on 2012 hourly data. The regressors in the dynamic logit model are lagged
indicator of congestion, demand in Sicily and in the rest of Italy, solar and wind supplies
in Sicily and in the rest of Italy, and indicators of market power for Sicily. The binary
logit model is designed to take into account alternatively the occurrence of congestion
and its direction (congestion from or to Sicily). The likelihood of congestion tout-court
seems to increase with the demand in Sicily and the supply of solar power supply in the
rest of Italy and to decrease with all other regressors (the indicator of market power is
not significant). When directional congestion is analysed the author finds that a rise
in the demand in Sicily and in the supply of solar in the rest of Italy decreases the
likelihood of congestion from Sicily, while a rise in the load in the rest of the peninsula,
in the supply of wind and solar in Sicily and in the indicators on market power have the
opposite effect; the opposite pattern is found for congestion to Sicily. With the VAR
3A strictly positive paired-price difference occurs when the West price is lower than the price in the
other zones and vice-versa, meaning that the congestion is “coming from the West”.
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model the author validates logit results, additionally proving that congestion indices
are characterized by persistence and that they depend on lagged zonal prices but only
in the case of congestion to Sicily.
To assess the impact of increasing renewable generation on congestion and zonal
price differences in Italy, we have built a unique database collecting and matching data
with hourly frequency from several sources for the period 2010-2012: GME, the mar-
ket operator, which publishes the hourly offers in the day-ahead market together with
equilibrium prices, quantities end inter-zonal transits; GSE, the state-owned company
promoting and supporting renewable energy sources in Italy, which provides informa-
tion about renewable capacity and generation; Terna, the network operator, which is
in charge for the estimation of the demand and the available transmission capacities;
REF-E, a consulting group, which has created a list of Italian power plants classi-
fied by technology and geographical location; ICE, the American network of exchanges
and clearing houses for financial and commodity markets. We have estimated then
two econometric models performed on five zonal pairings: a multinomial logit model,
whose dependent variable has three discrete values capturing both the occurrence of
congestion and its direction, and an OLS model which seeks to quantify the effects of
renewable production on the size of paired-price differences. This chapter originally
contributes to previous literature in three ways. Firstly, we enlarge the scope of the
analysis by considering all Italian neighbouring zones in order to verify the consistency
of the empirical models beyond the specificities of each pair; secondly, we employ a
multinomial logit model, instead of a binary model, in order to separately capture the
effect of increasing renewable production on the probability of both directional con-
gestions (to and from) compared to the benchmark situation of no congestion; thirdly,
we consider zonal figures on production and demand instead of aggregated figures to
isolate the contribution of each zone to the occurrence of congestion and to the size of
price difference.
Our analysis suggests that the effect of increasing renewable generation on conges-
tion remarkably depends on the importing/exporting role played by the zone under
consideration. Indeed, if a region is normally importing electricity from its neighbour,
the effect of a larger local renewable supply is to decrease the probability of suffering
congestion in entry or at to increase the probability of causing a congestion in exit
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compared to no congestion case. Increasing hydroelectric production in these zones
has a similar effect. In terms of price difference, increasing renewable generation seems
to have a significant impact in SICI and SARD, decreasing the level of positive price
differences and increasing the level of negative price differences. The opposite effect
seems to be played by renewable production in CNOR but only in CNOR-NORD pair.
The chapter is organized as follows. The next section describes the Italian electricity
market. The third section analyses the evolution of transits across zones, zonal prices
and zonal price differences. The forth section is dedicated to the econometric analysis.
The last section concludes.
4.2 Italian electricity market
The Italian Power Exchange (IPEX) is composed by:
• the Spot Electricity Market (MPE) which consists of three sub-markets:
1. the Day-Ahead Market (MGP - Mercato del giorno prima)
2. the Intra-Day Market (MI - Mercato Infragiornaliero)
3. the Ancillary Services Market (MSD - Mercato dei servizi di dispacciamento)
• the Forward Electricity Market (MTE - Mercato a termine);
• the Platform for physical delivery of financial contracts (CDE) concluded on
IDEX, the financial derivatives segment of Borsa Italiana S.p.A.
GME, the market operator also manages the OTC Registration Platform (PCE) for
registration of forward electricity purchase and sale contracts that have been concluded
off the bidding system. The focus of our analysis will be the MGP, the day-ahead
market. In the Italian day-ahead market electricity market, transactions take place
between the ninth day before the day of physical delivery and the day before the day
of delivery. The sellers submit hourly offers for each generating unit specifying the
quantity and the minimum price at which they are willing to trade their power. The
aggregated supply curve is built according to the merit order which is a way of ranking
all available offers in an ascending order of price. In a symmetrical way, the market
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demand curve is generated through the aggregation of single bids in a descending order
of price.4 The hourly market price is determined by the intersection of the demand and
the supply curves: it is unique when all transmission limits between zones are respected;
otherwise a system of zonal pricing applies.
The geographical market includes 7 foreign virtual zones, 6 geographical zones and
5 poles of limited production (national virtual zones). A stylized representation of the
geographical market with the most relevant links between zones is reported in Figure
4.1. The 20 administrative regions composing the Italian territory are aggregated in
the 6 geographical zones (Table 4.1). The poles of limited production are coupled
with the closest geographical zone to form 6 large Macro-zones: Monfalcone (MFTV)
is associated to North, Brindisi (BRNN), Foggia (FOGN) and Rossano (ROSN) to
South and Priolo (PRGP) to Sicily. The determination of market price follows an
iterative procedure. Firstly, the geographical market is considered as unique: if the
day-ahead production/consumption plan respects all network constraints across zones,
then a single price for the whole Country emerges. On the contrary, if a network
constraint is saturated then the geographical market is divided in two sub-markets, each
one aggregating all the zones above and below the saturated constraint. The market
demand and supply curves are rebuilt for the two sub-markets and two zonal prices
result. In the event of permanence of constraint saturation, the process of sub-setting
the market continues until all constraints are satisfied. The hourly auction is a uniform
price auction which means that all accepted units are entitled to receive the system
marginal price (or prices when dezoning arises because of transmission congestion).5
The national bidders pay on the other hand the National Single Price (PUN) for the
electricity bought in the pool: the PUN is an average of the zonal prices, weighted for
the zonal purchases and net of purchases for pumped-storage units6 and of purchases
4For each day and each offer/bid point, a maximum of 24 bids/offers may be submitted. Three type
of offer/bid exist: simple, consisting of a pair of values indicating the volume of electricity offered/bid in
the market by a market participant and the price for a given hour; multiple, consisting of the division
of an overall volume offered/bid in the market by the same market participant for the same hour;
pre-defined, consisting of simple or multiple offers/bids which are daily submitted to GME (GME).
5The market splitting mechanism used in Italy represents a non-discriminatory implicit auction for
the assignment of transmission rights.
6These generating units are classified as mixed offer points since they are authorized to submit both
supply offers and demand bids into the day-ahead market.
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from foreign zones. The GME publishes all the offers/bids submitted in the market
together with equilibrium prices and quantities with a seven day delay.
France Switzerland 
North 
Austria Slovenia 
Monfalcone 
Centre-North 
Centre-South 
South 
Foggia 
Brindisi 
Greece Rossano 
Sicily Priolo 
Sardinia 
Corse 
Corse AC 
Geographical zones 
Poles of limited production 
Foreign virtual zones 
Figure 4.1: A stylized representation of geographical market
Source: Terna
Zone Regions Zone Code
North Valle D’Aosta, Piemonte, Liguria, Lombardia, NORD
Trentino, Veneto, Friuli Venezia Giulia, Emilia
Centre-North Toscana, Umbria, Marche CNOR
Centre-South Lazio, Abruzzo, Campania CSUD
South Molise, Puglia, Basilicata, Calabria SUD
Sicily Sicilia SICI
Sardinia Sardegna SARD
Table 4.1: Italian geographical zones
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To better gauge the relevance of transmission congestion phenomenon in Italy, we
have reported in Table 4.2 its frequency in 2010, 2011 and 2012. We observe that overall
the grid has been congested for 85.7% of the time. If we look at the changes between
the years, we remark that the congestion frequency has increased by 2.6% between 2010
and 2011 and by another 6.9% between 2011 and 2012. It is worthy to note however
that some links are more often congested than others. We will come back on this point.
No congestion Congestion N
2010 1527 (17.8%) 7065 (82.2%) 8592
2011 1338 (15.6%) 7254 (84.4%) 8592
2012 834 (9.7%) 7758 (90.3%) 8592
Total 3696 (14.3%) 22080 (85.7%) 25776
Table 4.2: Congestion frequency
Source: Authors’ elaboration on GME data
Table 4.3 shows the average number of zonal divisions in the same period. Overall
the average number of sub-market caused by congestion is 2.32. Nonetheless, we may
observe a decreasing trend in the indicator, with a -4.5% between 2010 and 2011 and
-2.6% between 2011 and 2012. Given that the number of congested hours have increased
but the number of zonal divisions has decreased toward 2, we may conclude that there
is a consolidation towards a two sub-market splitting.
Mean Std dev N
2010 2.411778 0.944578 8592
2011 2.302607 0.82683 8592
2012 2.241155 0.669637 8592
2010-2012 2.318513 0.824433 25776
Table 4.3: Zonal divisions
Source: Authors’ elaboration on GME data
4.3 Analysis of physical flows and zonal price series
We present in the next paragraphs the analysis of physical flows across zones, of zonal
prices and of zonal price differences for the the period 2010-2012. When studying the
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flows we consider both geographical zones and poles of limited production, whereas in
the analysis of zonal prices and zonal price differences we reduce our scope to the six
geographical zones, given that most of the time the zonal prices in the poles of limited
production equal the prices in their contiguous geographical zone to which they accrue
to form a Macro-zone.
4.3.1 Interzonal transits
Each day and at least 60 minutes before the close of the sittings of the day-ahead
auction, Terna notifies GME about the information on the maximum transmission
capacity available between all pairs of interconnected zones; these data are published
by GME and used to determine market equilibria in each hour. The average admissible
interzonal transits have remained largely stable between 2010 and 2012 (Table 4.4),
with only two exceptions. From SARD to CSUD the average limit has almost tripled
in three year and from CSUD to SARD it has more than doubled: the reason is that
from March 2011 a new 1000 MW submarine cable (SAPEI) has been put in operation
between the two zones. From MFTV to NORD the average transit has reached its
maximum (10000 MWh) in 2012 due to the reduction in the exports of MFTV which
has left the transmission capacity idle. Similarly, the variance-to-mean ratios (Table
4.5) have remained steady, apart from the link SARD-CSUD, where the ratios have
decreased for both origins but more for flows leaving SARD, and from MFTV to NORD
where the indicator has reached zero in 2011.
The physical flows determined through the day-ahead auction, however, have been
subjected to relevant changes which highlight an evolution in the relationship between
historical exporting and importing zones. The average transits and the variance to
mean ratios are reported in Tables 4.6 and 4.7 respectively. The exporting zones are on
the vertical header of the tables while the importing zones are on the horizontal header.
From NORD to CNOR, the average flow has plunged of about 50% in size between
2010 and 2012, after an increase in 2011. An opposite trend has characterized the
value of the variance-to-mean ratio which has more than doubled between 2010 and
2012 following a decrease in 2011. This result seems to indicate that CNOR, after a
first year of larger reliance on imports from NORD, has become less dependent on its
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From/To CNOR CSUD NORD SARD SICI SUD BRNN FOGN MFTV PRGP ROSN
CNOR
2010 1795 1639
2011 2002 1596
2012 1922 1672
CSUD
2010 2084 213 10000
2011 2186 485 10000
2012 2294 558 10000
NORD
2010 3264 10000
2011 3139 10000
2012 3353 10000
SARD
2010 273
2011 612
2012 882
SICI
2010 10000 196
2011 10000 183
2012 10000 182
SUD
2010 3883 10000 10000 10000
2011 3878 10000 10000 10000
2012 3717 10000 10000 10000
BRNN
2010 4969
2011 4984
2012 4605
FOGN
2010 1877
2011 1884
2012 1888
MFTV
2010 1726
2011 1730
2012 10000
PRGP
2010 802
2011 795
2012 794
ROSN
2010 164 2035
2011 159 2060
2012 167 2082
Table 4.4: Admissible interzonal transits (Mean), 2010-2012 (MWh)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on GME data
neighbour. The flows from MFTV to NORD have progressively decreased to reach 0
in 2012, while the the variance-to-mean ratio has increased in 2011, before touching 0
in 2012 too. These values reveal that NORD has become auto sufficient, reducing its
importing needs from MFTV.
The flows from CSUD to CNOR have slightly decreased in 2011 to increase to about
the 55% of their initial value in 2012. This result seems to indicate a consolitation in
the role of CNOR as importer from CSUD. The variance-to-mean ratio has also slightly
increased in 2011 to fall beyond its initial value in 2012. From CSUD to SARD, the
average transit, after a substantial increase in 2011, has almost halved in 2012, whereas
the variance-to-mean ratio has more than tripled in 2012 compared to 2010, after an
initial reduction in 2011. This figure highlights an empowerment of SARD at the
expenses of imports from CSUD.
On average the transits from SUD to CSUD have progressively decreased of about
7.8% between 2010 and 2011 and of about 5.6% between 2011 and 2012. CSUD contin-
ues to import from SUD but its reliance on import has reduced. The variance-to-mean
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From/To CNOR CSUD NORD SARD SICI SUD BRNN FOGN MFTV PRGP ROSN
CNOR
2010 0.281 0.365
2011 0.210 0.382
2012 0.247 0.355
CSUD
2010 0.202 0.755 0.000
2011 0.139 0.372 0.000
2012 0.137 0.412 0.000
NORD
2010 0.186 0.000
2011 0.222 0.000
2012 0.155 0.000
SARD
2010 0.667
2011 0.473
2012 0.284
SICI
2010 0.000 0.384
2011 0.000 0.460
2012 0.000 0.409
SUD
2010 0.106 0.000 0.000 0.000
2011 0.116 0.000 0.000 0.000
2012 0.186 0.000 0.000 0.000
BRNN
2010 0.129
2011 0.133
2012 0.246
FOGN
2010 0.194
2011 0.201
2012 0.206
MFTV
2010 0.040
2011 0.000
2012 0.000
PRGP
2010 0.049
2011 0.073
2012 0.078
ROSN
2010 0.587 0.158
2011 0.633 0.152
2012 0.566 0.118
Table 4.5: Admissible interzonal transits (Variance-to-Mean Ratio), 2010-2012 (MWh)
Source: Authors’ elaboration on GME data
From/To CNOR CSUD NORD SARD SICI SUD
CSUD
2010 510 102
2011 460 299
2012 791 66
NORD
2010 939
2011 1120
2012 443
MFTV
2010 682
2011 550
2012 0
SUD
2010 3104
2011 2861
2012 2698
BRNN
2010 3418
2011 3200
2012 2663
FOGN
2010 633
2011 725
2012 624
ROSN
2010 76 911
2011 79 674
2012 112 714
PRGP
2010 489
2011 440
2012 438
Table 4.6: Interzonal transits resulting from the day-ahead auction (Mean), 2010-2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on GME data
ratio has constantly increased of about 30% in the three year period. The average
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flows from the poles of limited production BRNN and ROSN to the zone SUD have
steadly decreased between 2010 and 2012 with an overall reduction rate of 22% and
20% respectively. The flows from FOGN to SUD have increased between 2010 and 2011
to decrease again to almost their initial levels in 2012. The variance-to-mean ratios in
the three year period have rosen of about 35% for ROSN and 45% for BRNN, but has
remained substantially constant for FOGN. These figures highlight a weaker reliance of
SUD on imports from its neighbouring poles of limited production.
Finally, the average flows from ROSN to SICI have progressively increased between
2010 and 2012 at an overall rate of almost 50%, while imports from PRGP to SICI
have decreased of about 10%. In the three year period, the variance-to-mean ratio has
increased of about 10% for PRGP and has decreased of about 20% for ROSN. This
result seems to indicate that the role of exporter of PRGP for SICI has flagged in favor
of ROSN.
From/To CNOR CSUD NORD SARD SICI SUD
CSUD
2010 1.834 1.500
2011 1.938 0.629
2012 1.268 5.389
NORD
2010 1.272
2011 0.942
2012 2.731
MFTV
2010 0.397
2011 0.523
2012 0.000
SUD
2010 0.243
2011 0.277
2012 0.314
BRNN
2010 0.166
2011 0.204
2012 0.241
FOGN
2010 0.543
2011 0.500
2012 0.532
ROSN
2010 1.425 0.617
2011 1.486 0.697
2012 1.090 0.831
PRGP
2010 0.467
2011 0.450
2012 0.528
Table 4.7: Interzonal transits resulting from the day-ahead auction
(Variance-to-Mean Ratio), 2012
Source: Authors’ elaboration on GME data
4.3.2 Zonal prices
The series of hourly zonal prices from 2010 to 2012 are shown in Figures 4.2 and 4.3.
Table 4.8 below reports the descriptive statistics for the series.
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Figure 4.2: Series of zonal prices, 2010-2012
Figure 4.3: Series of zonal prices, 2010-2012
The figures reveal an increasing trend of all zonal prices starting in 2011 and ending
in the middle of 2012 where the series seem to start following a decreasing pattern.
Summary statistics confirm this result, with all zones showing a rising average price
over the three year period with the more significant increases registered between 2010
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and 2011. The Sicilian zonal price has the highest average value for the whole period
(92.899 AC/MWh), followed by SARD (78.369 AC/MWh), CNOR (69.149 AC/MWh),
CSUD (68.933 AC/MWh), NORD (68.710 AC/MWh) and SUD (66.158 AC/MWh). In
percentage term, the zonal price in SICI is about 32% larger than the average zonal
price calculated with the remaining 5 zones. This figure is 7% for SARD.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
pNORD
2010-2012 68.710 19.062 10 224 25776
2010 61.984 17.64 10 189.01 8592
2011 70.161 15.692 10 165.07 8592
2012 73.985 21.392 13 224 8592
pCNOR
2010-2012 69.149 19.892 5 224 25776
2010 62.477 18.203 10 189.01 8592
2011 71.168 17.61 10 174 8592
2012 73.801 21.805 5 224 8592
pCSUD
2010-2012 68.933 20.477 5 224 25776
2010 62.703 19.766 10 161.01 8592
2011 71.019 17.838 10 178 8592
2012 73.078 22.109 5 224 8592
pSARD
2010-2012 78.369 37.557 0 450 25776
2010 73.816 34.866 10 241 8592
2011 80.265 31.785 10 300 8592
2012 81.025 44.438 0 450 8592
pSUD
2010-2012 66.158 18.721 0 212 25776
2010 59.107 16.946 10 161.01 8592
2011 69.172 15.987 10 178 8592
2012 70.196 20.824 0 212 8592
pSICI
2010-2012 92.899 46.246 0 3000 25776
2010 90.038 47.878 10 257 8592
2011 93.374 41.471 10 190 8592
2012 95.284 48.891 0 3000 8592
Table 4.8: Summary statistics for zonal prices
Notwithstanding, it is the NORD zone which has experienced the largest increase in
prices in percentage terms (19% from 2010 to 2012), closely followed by SUD (18.7%),
CNOR (18.1%) and CSUD (16.5%). SARD and SICI present more stable zonal prices
with a 9% and a 5% increase respectively. The series of zonal prices in SICI and
SARD are characterized by spikes reaching 3000 AC/MWh (price cap) and 450 AC/MWh
respectively in 2012. In the other zones the largest spikes have been registered in the
same year although with a weaker intensity. At the same time, SICI, SARD and SUD
are the only zones whose price have touched the zero floor in 2012 while NORD presents
always the highest minimun price (10 AC/MWh in 2010 and 2011 and 13 AC/MWh in
2012).
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4.3.3 Zonal price differences
By studying the series of zonal price differences, we expect to detect a lasting positive
price difference between importing and exporting neighbouring regions. We report the
series of paired-price differences for the three year period 2010-2012 (Figure 4.4) for the
following pairs: CNOR-NORD; CNOR-CSUD; SARD-CSUD; CSUD-SUD; SICI-SUD.
It is worthy to note that for the period 2010-2012 the zonal prices of SUD and ROSN
have differed for less that the 2% of the time, while the zonal price differences between
SICI-SUD and SICI-ROSN have followed very similar patterns. This result allows us
to consider as zonal pair SICI-SUD that are formally non contiguous zones instead of
the two pairs SICI-ROSN and SUD-ROSN.
We report in Table 4.9 the descriptive statistics for the same series. On average
for the three year period the largest price difference has occurred between SICI and
SUD (26.74 AC/MWh), followed by SARD-CSUD (9.436 AC/MWh) and CSUD-SUD
(2.775 AC/MWh) while between CNOR-NORD and CNOR-CSUD the price difference
has remained on average below 0.5 AC/MWh. Between CNOR-NORD an increase in the
average price difference between 2010 and 2011 has been followed by a sharp reduction
between 2011 and 2012 which has determined a switch from a positive average difference
to a negative average difference. This result seems to confirm that after a first year
characterized by a larger reliance on import from NORD, the zone CNOR has largely
reduced its importing needs in 2012.
In CNOR-CSUD pair the price difference has shown an increasing trend across
the three year, revealing a consolidation in the importing role of CNOR from CSUD,
whereas the opposite is true for the pair SARD-CSUD, confirming a decreasing reliance
of SARD on imports from CSUD. Between CSUD-SUD we observe firstly a reduction in
the average price difference between 2010 and 2011 and then an increase between 2011
and 2012, which however does not fully compensate the initial reduction. This trend
suggests that while CSUD continues importing from SUD, its reliance on imports from
SUD has been subjected to a downward pressure. Finally and interestingly enough, the
trend characterizing the paired-price differences between SICI and SUD has been very
similar to the one of CSUD-SUD pair, whereas according to the analysis of transits the
imports of SICI from the peninsula have constantly increased during the considered
period.
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Figure 4.4: Series of zonal price differences, 2010-2012
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
CNOR-NORD
2010-2012 0.439 5.131 -65 90 25776
2010 0.493 4.811 -65 89.39 8592
2011 1.007 6.45 -9.029 90 8592
2012 -0.184 3.678 -41.51 73.09 8592
CNOR-CSUD
2010-2012 0.215 5.604 -101.17 88.010 25776
2010 -0.226 7.822 -101.17 57 8592
2011 0.149 2.89 -83.16 51.36 8592
2012 0.723 4.922 -54.66 88.010 8592
SARD-CSUD
2010-2012 9.436 29.509 -100.17 358 25776
2010 11.113 26.736 -100.17 176.5 8592
2011 9.247 25.477 -7.98 236 8592
2012 7.947 35.265 -80.64 358 8592
CSUD-SUD
2010-2012 2.775 9.215 0 129.98 25776
2010 3.596 10.281 0 92.040 8592
2011 1.846 7.158 0 94.99 8592
2012 2.883 9.814 0 129.98 8592
SICI-SUD
2010-2012 26.74 39.367 -75.98 2908.71 25776
2010 30.931 40.807 -50.95 189.38 8592
2011 24.202 34.819 -75.98 134.5 8592
2012 25.088 41.777 -72.75 2908.71 8592
Table 4.9: Summary statistics for paired-price differences
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Table 4.10 and 4.11 represent a closer look at the summary statistics for strictly
positive and strictly negative paired price differences respectively.7
Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev.
CNOR-NORD
2010-2012 16.322 7.96 0.01 90 19.87
2010 17.259 9.255 0.01 89.39 19.597
2011 15.996 7.1 0.01 90 20.464
2012 15.488 7.635 0.03 73.09 17.263
CNOR-CSUD
2010-2012 10.714 7.07 0.01 88.01 11.029
2010 11.583 9.59 0.03 57 9.8795
2011 7.3372 3.625 0.02 51.36 10.864
2012 11.296 7.8004 0.01 88.01 11.663
SARD-CSUD
2010-2012 44.941 26.51 0.01 358 47.922
2010 40.063 31.1 0.01 176.5 34.311
2011 31.926 20.18 0.02 236 38.946
2012 115.14 140.25 0.01 358 63.958
CSUD-SUD
2010-2012 15.212 9.97 0.01 129.98 16.625
2010 15.78 10.935 0.01 92.04 16.481
2011 11.908 7 0.02 94.99 14.519
2012 17.542 12.495 0.01 129.98 18.141
SICI-SUD
2010-2012 41.272 30.37 0.01 2908.7 39.078
2010 50.991 39.01 0.01 189.38 37.985
2011 39.521 25.92 0.01 134.5 32.337
2012 34.636 30.02 0.01 2908.7 43.576
Table 4.10: Summary statistic for strictly positive paired price differences
On average in the three year period SARD-CSUD pair has registered the highest
price difference (44.941 AC/MWh) while CNOR-CSUD pair has registered the lowest one
(-24,438 AC/MWh). By looking at the yearly average values, we remark that CNOR-
NORD, CNOR-CSUD and SICI-SUD pairs have reached their highest price difference
in 2010 (17.259 AC/MWh, 11.583 AC/MWh and 50.991 AC/MWh respectively), whereas
for the pairs SARD-CSUD and CSUD-SUD the largest yearly average price difference
has been reached in 2012 (115.14 AC/MWh AND 17;542 AC/MWh respectively). The
pairs CNOR-NORD and SICI-SUD have been characterized by a decreasing trend in
the average positive price difference, while all the remaining pairs have experienced
firstly a decrease in the average value of positive price difference between 2010 and
2011, followed by a subsequent increase between 2011 and 2012. Moreover in the pairs
SARD-CSUD and CSUD-SUD the final average values have outweighed the original
values.
7The pair CSUD-SUD is never characterized by a negative price difference so we omit it.
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Variable Mean Median Minimum Maximum Std.Dev.
CNOR-NORD
2010-2012 -10.263 -6.88 -65 -0.01 10.075
2010 -9.6334 -6.2 -65 -0.04 10.601
2011 -3.53 -3.07 -9.03 -0.05 2.7632
2012 -10.615 -7.55 -41.51 -0.01 10.06
CNOR-CSUD
2010-2012 -24.438 -13.925 -101.17 -0.02 24.373
2010 -29.592 -17.65 -101.17 -0.02 26.287
2011 -29.036 -14.86 -83.16 -0.5 29.291
2012 -12.294 -8.965 -54.66 -0.05 11.749
SARD-CSUD
2010-2012 -21.867 -15.5 -100.17 -0.02 20.243
2010 -19.103 -11.665 -100.17 -0.02 20.7
2011 -2.845 -1.88 -7.98 -1.35 2.5555
2012 -26.467 -21.8 -80.64 -0.17 18.813
SICI-SUD
2010-2012 -16.995 -11.4 -75.98 -0.01 15.258
2010 -17.784 -16.5 -50.95 -0.01 12.324
2011 -19.597 -10.975 -75.98 -0.01 18.282
2012 -13.101 -9.005 -72.75 -0.01 13.362
Table 4.11: Summary statistic for strictly negative paired price differences
Concerning the negative price differences, we may observe that the lowest average
difference has been reached in CNOR-CSUD in 2010, in SICI-SUD in 2011 and in
SARD-CSUD and CNOR-NORD in 2012. Across the three years the pairs SARD-
CSUD and CNOR-NORD present the same trend: a decrease in the negative price
difference between 2010 and 2011 and a subsequent increase between 2011 and 2012,
surpassing the initial average values. Between CNOR and CSUD we remark that the
average negative price difference has decreased across the years but more markedly
between 2011 and 2012. Finally in SICI-SUD pair we remark that after a rise in the
average negative price difference between 2010 and 2011, the 2012 has been marked by
a reduction in the average negative price difference below its initial value.
4.4 Empirical strategy
The objective of the chapter is to assess the impact of increasing renewable generation
on congestion and zonal price differences in Italy. In order to study this phenomenon,
we have built a unique database collecting and matching hourly data from four sources:
• GME, the market operator
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• GSE, the state-owned company promoting and supporting renewable energy sources
in Italy
• Terna, the network operator
• REF-E, a consulting group specialized in energy markets
The empirical strategy consists in estimating two econometric models performed on
five zonal pairs using observations from a three year period (2010-2012). The five zonal
pairs are:
1. CNOR-NORD
2. CNOR-CSUD
3. SARD-CSUD
4. CSUD-SUD
5. SICI-SUD
The two econometric models that we estimate are a multinomial logit model and
an OLS model.
4.4.1 Multinomial logit model
For each zonal pair (ZONE1-ZONE2) the dependent variable in the multinomial logit
model, y, may assume three values:8
• y = −1 when the zonal price in ZONE1 is lower than zonal price in ZONE2:
in this case we say that there is “congestion from” ZONE1 or a “negative price
difference”;
• y = 0 when the zonal prices in ZONE1 and ZONE2 are equal, e.g. there is “no
congestion” and hence no price difference;
8Some zonal pairs are characterized by the occurence of only two outcomes; in these cases we
estimate a logit model with a binary dependent variable.
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• y = 1 when the zonal price in ZONE1 exceeds the zonal price in ZONE2: in this
case we say that there is “congestion to” ZONE1 or a “positive price difference”.
We report the statistics for the dependent variable in all zonal pairs in Table 4.12.
2010 % 2011 % 2012 % Overall %
CNOR-NORD
-1 58 0.68% 10 0.12% 295 3,43% 363 1.41%
0 8256 96.09% 8039 93.56% 8197 95,40% 24492 95.02%
1 278 3.24% 543 6.32% 100 1.16% 921 3.57%
CNOR-CSUD
-1 262 3.05% 18 0.21% 118 1.37% 398 1.54%
0 7828 91.11% 8328 96.93% 7796 90.74% 23952 92.92%
1 502 5.84% 246 2.86% 678 7.89% 1426 5.53%
SARD-CSUD
-1 270 3.14% 6 0.07% 187 2.18% 463 1.80 %
0 5810 67.62% 6097 70.96% 7769 90.42% 19676 76.33%
1 2512 29.24% 2489 28.97% 636 7.40% 5637 21.87%
CSUD-SUD
-1 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
0 6634 77.21% 7260 84.50% 7180 83.57% 21074 81.76%
1 1958 22.79% 1332 15.50% 1412 16.43% 4702 18.24%
SICI-SUD
-1 795 9.25% 860 10.01% 736 8.57% 2391 9.28%
0 2302 26.79% 2044 23.79% 1354 15.76% 5700 22.11%
1 5495 63.95% 5688 66.20% 6502 75.68% 17685 68.61%
Table 4.12: Hours and percentage of congestion in zonal pairs
On average, the zonal prices of the neighbouring zones paired for the three year
period differ about 26% of the time; however, the average hides important differences
across pairs: if on the one hand we may observe that in CNOR-NORD pair the zonal
prices differ less than 5% of the time, on the other hand in SICI-SUD pair the prices
decouple more than 70% of the time. In general we remark an increasing rate of
congestion when moving toward the South and the Islands.
By comparing yearly statistics, we may detect some interesting changes. Between
CNOR and NORD, the hours of no congestion have slightly decreased from 2010 to
2012 after an initial larger decrease between 2010 and 2011 partially compensated by
an increase between 2011 and 2012; the hours of negative price difference have firstly
decreased in 2011 and then they have increased again to reach five times their initial
value in 2012. The percentage of hours with a positive price difference has almost
doubled from 2010 to 2011 to decrease to less than half of its initial value in 2012.
These figures suggest a weaker role for NORD as exporter, a stronger role for CNOR
as exporter and an increase of congestion occurrence in the three year period.
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Between CNOR and CSUD, the hours of negative price differences have decreased
over the three year period but more markedly between 2010 and 2011 (they have in-
creased again between 2011 and 2012). The hours of positive price difference have firstly
decreased in 2011 to rise again beyond their initial values in 2012. The hours of no con-
gestion have increased between 2010 and 2011 and they have decreased again to less
than their initial value in 2012. By comparing 2010 and 2012 figures, we remark that
overall the congestion occurrence has increased and the role of CNOR as importer from
CSUD has been consolidated. For the pair SARD and CSUD we observe a progressive
increase in the percentage of hours without congestion over the three year period. The
hours with negative price difference have decreased significantly between 2010 and 2011
to increase again in 2012 but never reaching their initial value. Positive price differ-
ences have instead progressively decreased with a significant reduction between 2011
and 2012. These figures suggest a rising independence of both SARD and CSUD.
In the pair CSUD-SUD, we remark that over the three years the hours without
congestion have increased, taking off from the hours of positive price difference. This
effect, already in place between 2010 and 2011, is diluted in 2012, where we observe a
small increase in hours with congestion and simultaneously a decrease in non congested
hours. Overall, the role of CSUD as importer from SUD dims between 2010 and 2012.
Finally between SICI and SUD the data show that the occurrence of a negative price
difference has decreased over the three year period after an increase between 2010 and
2011. The hours of positive price differences have progressively increased over the
three years, while the opposite trend has characterized the number of hours without
congestion. We may therefore conclude that the occurrence of congestion has increased
overall and that the role of SICI as importer has been consolidated. To sum up we
observe the the congestions have decreased for the pairs SARD-CSUD and CSUD-SUD
while they have increased for CNOR-NORD, CNOR-CSUD and SICI-SUD.
Our first empirical approach consists in estimating the following equations for each
zonal pair:
log
Pr(y = 1)
Pr(y = 0)
= α1 + ρ1Y +
∑
r
βrXr + γ1G+ κ1C + θ1O (4.1a)
118
log
Pr(y = −1)
Pr(y = 0)
= α2 + ρ2Y +
∑
r
βrXr + γ2G+ κ2CO + θ2O (4.1b)
where:
• α is the intercept
• Y are dummy variables year (which are present only in multiple year estimations)
• Xr is the matrix of regressors, whose number depends on the geographical position
of the pair, and includes:
– RES generation in the pairing zones and in adjacent zones
– Hydro generation in the pairing zones and in adjacent zones
– Forecasted demand in the pairing zones and in adjacent zones
• G and C and O are the vectors of natural gas, CO 2 and oil prices.
Zonal renewable and hydroelectric generation series are built by combining GME
bids and REF-E database on unit reference numbers.9 The zonal forecasted demand is
published on GME website. To build natural gas price series we use the daily month-
ahead future natural gas price traded at ICE. The series of prices for the CO 2 is
constructed by employing the front contract for Phase II EUA prices traded at ECX.
For oil price series we use the quotation of Brent crude future (B1) traded at ICE. For
all these three series during no-trading days an average between the previous and the
following trading day quotations is used. All variables have been converted into euros
using the European Central Bank exchange rate. Next section presents the graphic
representation of the regressors and their summary statistics.
9The series are built by considering the whole Macro-zone production.
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics of the independent variables
Renewable production
The zonal production from renewable power plants is shown in Figure 4.5, followed by
the descriptive statistics of the series (Table 4.13).
Figure 4.5: Series of zonal renewable generation, 2010-2012
Between 2010 and 2012 the total quantity of electricity produced from renewable
sources has increased at rate of 105%; the rise in total production has been particularly
accentuated between 2011 and 2012 with a yearly growth rate of 63%. Across regions,
SARD has led in terms of penetration growth rate, with a three year rate of 158%,
followed by SUD with 152%, CSUD (126%), CNOR (116%) SICI (112%) and NORD
(76%). All regions have registered the largest increase between 2011 and 2012: the
leading region has been SARD (128%), followed by CNOR (99.9%), SUD (81.8%),
CSUD (73.3%), SICI (71%) and NORD (45%). Between 2010 and 2011, on the contrary,
has been SUD to register the highest adoption rate with a 38.8% yearly increase, closely
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followed by CSUD (30.9%), SICI (24%), NORD (21%), SARD (12.9%) and CNOR
(9.9%).
In terms of absolute quantities, in the three year period the NORD region has gen-
erated the largest average hourly quantity of electricity from RES (1760.403 MWh),
while the second and the third producers, SUD and CSUD have recorded an average
production of 687.316 MWh and 402.395 MWh, which are far lower figures (e.g. NORD
production is 2.5 times SUD production). SARD shows the lowest average RES pro-
duction with 142.927 MWh, preceeded by CNOR (255.514 MWh) and SICI (314.156
MWh). NORD and SUD have reached their peak production in 2012 with 6107.37
MWh and 3642.153 MWh respectively. The ranking of regions on the basis of hourly
production has remained stable across the three years.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
ren NORD
2010-2012 1760.403 856.920 738.341 6107.375 25776
2010 1330.309 257.094 738.341 2073.231 8592
2011 1610.29 456.888 780.200 3286.242 8592
2012 2340.61 1176.454 1032.64 6107.375 8592
ren CNOR
2010-2012 255.514 233.671 69.149 1514.11 25776
2010 178.292 48.167 80.676 342.886 8592
2011 196.101 112.951 69.149 631.88 8592
2012 392.149 347.241 94.735 1514.11 8592
ren CSUD
2010-2012 402.395 286.38 130.024 2330.159 25776
2010 263.644 60.976 142.265 545.585 8592
2011 345.231 125.319 163.18 920.586 8592
2012 598.312 407.095 130.024 2330.159 8592
ren SARD
2010-2012 142.927 141.626 5.758 1108.639 25776
2010 91.033 65.381 5.758 306.612 8592
2011 102.831 77.446 7.413 470.744 8592
2012 234.916 192.723 7.907 1108.639 8592
ren SUD
2010-2012 687.316 509.383 155.29 3642.153 25776
2010 419.635 126.786 188.439 931.571 8592
2011 582.688 260.35 156.487 1726.779 8592
2012 1059.625 688.024 155.29 3642.153 8592
ren SICI
2010-2012 314.156 227.576 32.862 1765.286 25776
2010 215.75 92.622 38.004 603.999 8592
2011 268.213 140.248 32.862 915.469 8592
2012 458.506 307.41 44.307 1765.286 8592
renewable all
2010-2012 3581.992 2085.195 1445.965 14562.555 25776
2010 2498.664 452.737 1445.965 3952.206 8592
2011 3126.673 1004.305 1548.11 7120.804 8592
2012 5120.638 2843.018 1781.142 14562.555 8592
Table 4.13: Summary statistics for zonal renewable generation (MWh)
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Hydroelectric production
In Italy, lacking technologies such as nuclear, the base load production has been his-
torically provided by hydroelectric power plants, mostly located in the North regions
because of the favourable proximity to the Alps. The zonal production from hydroelec-
tric power plants is shown in Figure 4.6, followed by the descriptive statistics of the
series (Table 4.14). By looking at the graphs it is not easy to detect a trend in hydro
production as clear as in RES production case. However, the descriptive statistics pro-
vide us more with more insights: total hourly average production has decreased at a
rate of 21.18% in the three year period, with the larger decrease registered between 2010
and 2011 (12.78%). Apart from SICI which has increased its production at an overall
rate of 27%, all the other regions have suffered big reductions in hydro production be-
tween 2010 and 2012: CNOR (-50.6%), SARD (49.9%), SUD (-48.37%), CSUD (-43%),
NORD (-13.3%). Between 2010 and 2011 SUD, CNOR, SICI and CSUD production
have shrunk: -39.05%, 29,35% 26,62% and -26.11% respectively. SARD and NORD
have suffered relatively small reductions: -2.7% and 7.6%. Then between 2011 and
2012 the slow down has continued for SUD, CNOR and CSUD (-15.29%, -30%, -23.9%
respectively), and also SARD and NORD have experienced more significant reductions
(-51% and -6.17%). SICI instead has recovered a 77% of the production.
It is worthy to note that in terms of quantities NORD remains the biggest hydro
producer with average hourly production in the three year period of 2942.65 MWh,
which is more than ten times the average production of the second region, CSUD (277.33
MWh). The other regions present smaller figures: CNOR (223.5 MWH), SUD (184.52
MWh), SARD (31.76 MWh) and SICI (10.21 MWh). The ranking of regions on the
basis of hourly hidro production has remained stable across the three years. NORD has
reached its peak production in 2010 with 6956.016 MWh. When we compare hydro and
RES production we observe that on the three year period the average total production
from the two sources is very closed: 3581.992 MWh for RES and 3669.996 for hydro.
However if we take the average yearly production we remark that while in 2010 hydro
production was almost the double of RES production (4138.699 MWh versus 2498.644
MWh), in 2012 this figure is reversed with renewable power plants generating 5120.638
MWh against the 3261.837 MWh produced by hydro power plants.
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Figure 4.6: Series of zonal hydroelectric generation, 2010-2012
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Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
hydro NORD
2010-2012 2942.656 1385.673 399.749 6956.016 25776
2010 3163.865 1487.59 488.118 6956.016 8592
2011 2922.248 1284.809 522.103 6230.866 8592
2012 2741.857 1344.387 399.749 6252.015 8592
hydro CNOR
2010-2012 223.5 163.493 5.339 695.289 25776
2010 304.798 157.85 20.31 695.289 8592
2011 215.318 155.74 5.495 654.736 8592
2012 150.383 137.841 5.339 671.835 8592
hydro CSUD
2010-2012 277.336 139.103 69.198 702.75 25776
2010 361.553 145.004 102.321 702.75 8592
2011 267.151 131.56 71.649 652.152 8592
2012 203.305 83.913 69.198 552.723 8592
hydro SARD
2010-2012 31.761 34.539 0 135.696 25776
2010 37.687 37.274 0 130.871 8592
2011 38.718 34.992 0 135.696 8592
2012 18.877 26.754 0 128.78 8592
hydro SUD
2010-2012 184.524 169.862 0 801.127 25776
2010 260.421 198.676 5.796 801.127 8592
2011 158.715 149.107 4.968 715.373 8592
2012 134.437 126.192 0 645.763 8592
hydro SICI
2010-2012 10.218 12.173 0 75.299 25776
2010 10.375 12.029 0 57.699 8592
2011 7.301 9.935 0 63.079 8592
2012 12.98 13.602 0 75.299 8592
hydro all
2010-2012 3669.996 1567.905 577.013 8447.365 25776
2010 4138.699 1616.692 1097.931 8447.365 8592
2011 3609.451 1460.818 744.564 7363.584 8592
2012 3261.837 1495.955 577.013 7595.113 8592
Table 4.14: Summary statistics for zonal hydroelectric generation (MWh)
Forecasted demand
Terna provides GME with the information on the predicted load which is used by
market participant as reference in order to adjust their production plans and their bids.
We report in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 the zonal forecasted demand for the period 2010-2012,
followed by the descriptive statistics of the series (Table 4.15). In the graph some
seasonal trends appears, although they may be different for each group of zones: we
observe indeed that in NORD and CNOR the predicted demand decreased in the middle
of the year, while it increase in CSUD, SUD and SICI. This difference is probably due
to the fact that the regions in the last group attract tourists during the summer while
firms which are mostly located in the Nothern regions close during the same period. In
all zones, however, the forecasted demand increases at the end and at the beginning of
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the year. These patterns are less visible for SARD.
Figure 4.7: Forecasted demand, 2010-2012
Figure 4.8: Forecasted demand, 2010-2012
The descriptive statistics provide us with further insights. NORD, CNOR, CSUD
and SUD have a steadily decreasing demand in the three year period. Between 2010
and 2011, the contraction accounts for -3.32% of demand for NORD, -1.07% for CNOR,
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-1% for CSUD and -0.30% for SUD. The shrinkage continues in the same zones between
2011 to 2012 with stronger intensity: NORD (-4.6%), CNOR (-7.3%), CSUD (-4.1%)
and SUD (-2.1%). In the three year period CNOR has suffered the largest contraction in
the demand (-8.29%), followed by NORD (-7.80%), CSUD (-5.05%) and SUD (-2.42%).
In SICI we may observe a reduction in the forecasted demand of -0.14% between
2010 and 2011 and a subsequent increase in 2012 of 1.48%. SARD shows the opposite
trend with a rise in the average predicted demand of 14.76% in 2011 and a contraction
in 2012 of -6.6%. Overall in the three year period only SARD and SICI have seen an
increase in the demand (7.19% and 1.34% respectively).
In terms of absolute quantity, in the three year period NORD has registered the
highest average demand (18747.5 MWh) with a big gap of more than 13 GWh with
respect to the second region, CSUD (5600.8 MWh). CNOR (3795.48 MWh), SUD
(2899.04 MWh), SICI (2247.93 MWh) and SARD (1433.2 MWh) follows. The ranking
of regions on the basis of average predicted demand has remained constant across the
three years. NORD has reached its peak demand in 2010 with 28573.2 MWh.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
fNORD
2010-2012 18747.568 4362.114 9443.464 28573.215 25776
2010 19469.215 4493.24 10314.038 28573.215 8592
2011 18821.911 4278.465 9646.082 27976.039 8592
2012 17951.579 4175.409 9443.464 28239.637 8592
fCNOR
2010-2012 3795.487 847.664 2046.885 6005.372 25776
2010 3917.717 882.289 2095.178 6005.372 8592
2011 3875.98 831.541 2126.124 5830.472 8592
2012 3592.765 789.525 2046.885 5486.787 8592
fCSUD
2010-2012 5600.87 1168.256 3286.27 8584.362 25776
2010 5716.149 1199.497 3416.053 8584.362 8592
2011 5658.896 1157.099 3384.79 8439.956 8592
2012 5427.563 1127.128 3286.27 8258.148 8592
fSARD
2010-2012 1433.245 252.507 765.725 2255.65 25776
2010 1335.557 168.806 923.834 1758.995 8592
2011 1532.634 204.129 1024.194 2037.167 8592
2012 1431.545 318.912 765.725 2255.65 8592
fSUD
2010-2012 2899.042 552.537 1487.29 4520.993 25776
2010 2925.548 541.947 1781.872 4337.012 8592
2011 2916.702 517.454 1742.382 4520.993 8592
2012 2854.876 592.901 1487.29 4446.044 8592
fSICI
2010-2012 2247.933 426.721 1344.612 3445.039 25776
2010 2239.011 429.365 1368.105 3266.204 8592
2011 2235.867 426.343 1369.312 3266.267 8592
2012 2268.92 423.705 1344.612 3445.039 8592
Table 4.15: Summary statistics for zonal forecasted demand (MWh)
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Gas, CO 2 and Oil prices
Figure 4.9 reports the series of gas, CO 2 and oil prices, followed by their descriptive
statistics (Table 4.16) from 2010 to 2012.10 The main rationale behind taking into
account gas, CO 2 and oil prices in the analysis of congestion is that power production
in Italy is dominated by thermal technologies mostly using gas and oil (whereas coal
appears in negligible proportion).
Figure 4.9: Series of Gas, CO 2 and Oil prices, 2010-2012
The average gas price has significantly decreased in 2011 (-33%) to increase again in
2012 (74%). For the three year period, gas price shows an increasing trend of 16.51%.
The average price is 63.27 AC/thm, the highest spike occurring in the beginning of 2010
and reaching 129.6 AC/thm while the lowest price is experienced in 2011 (21.28 AC/thm).
Between 2010 to 2011 the average price of CO 2 has also decreased by 3% to increase
again in 2012 by 14%. Overall, the price increase has been of 9.52%. The average price
10The data are shown with hourly frequency although source data have daily frequency. We believe
that the adjustment of power production is not instantaneous, hence the settlement price of the day
is used for all 24 hour.
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in the observed years is 20.824 AC/ton. CO 2 has hit its record high in 2010 (32.25AC/ton)
and its record low in 2011 (12.25 AC/ton).
Contrariwise to gas and CO 2, oil price shows a consistently rising trend between
2010 and 2012. In these three years the price has increased by 42.37%. Between 2010
and 2011, oil price has recorded a significant rise (30.60%) and has continued to increase
at a lower rate (9.02%). The average price of oil has reached 75.45 AC/bbl, with a peak
of 96.38 AC/bbl in 2012 and a minimum of 50.462 AC/bbl in 2010.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Gas
2010-2012 63.27 20.602 21.286 129.617 25776
2010 67.045 16.558 45.042 129.617 8592
2011 44.648 17.414 21.286 82.756 8592
2012 78.117 10.7 60.332 107.883 8592
CO2
2010-2012 20.824 3.76 12.25 32.25 25776
2010 20.446 4.034 15.05 32.25 8592
2011 19.632 3.045 12.25 25.15 8592
2012 22.393 3.585 13.72 29.33 8592
Oil
2010-2012 75.451 11.662 50.462 96.387 25776
2010 60.689 4.321 50.462 71.877 8592
2011 79.259 3.711 69.984 88.233 8592
2012 86.406 4.814 70.447 96.387 8592
Table 4.16: Summary statistics for Gas, CO 2 and Oil prices
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4.4.3 Results of multinomial logit model
For each zonal pair we have estimated two models:
1. A two year model for 2010 and 2011 with a year dummy variable for 2010 to be
combined with a yearly model for 2012 (henceforth First Model or FM);
2. A three year model with year dummy variables for 2010 and 2011 (henceforth
Second Model or SM).
We have summarized the results in Table 4.17 and 4.18 with significant level of
10%, while the detailed estimations are reported in the Appendix D. When a sign is
in brackets it means that while a regressor seems to be significant the value of its
coefficient is extremely low. The pseudo R2 is between 0.17 and 0.44 for the first model
and 0.22 and 0.30 for the second model; all commonly used measures of goodness of fit
are included in the Appendix D as well.
Strictly positive price difference
In general for positive price differences (y = 1) we observe that in all pairs (ZONE1-
ZONE2), except for CNOR-CSUD pair, the coefficient associated to renewable gen-
eration has a negative sign when it is significant. Given that we are estimating a
multinomial logit model, this result indicates that a larger renewable generation in
ZONE1 is associated with a decrease in the relative log odds of ZONE1 suffering a
congestion caused by ZONE2 with respect to no congestion. This result may be ex-
plained by the fact that increasing local supply in ZONE1 decreases the importing flows
from ZONE2 which are causing congestion. In parallel, we remark that increasing the
supply of renewables in ZONE2 has exactly the opposite effect, that is increasing the
production in the exporting zone increases the log odds of having congestion to ZONE1
compared to no congestion. Rising renewable production in adjacent zones increases
the congestion to ZONE1 in CNOR-CSUD and SICI-SUD, while it relieves congestion
in CNOR-NORD pair. In SARD-CSUD, it seems that increasing the production in
CNOR relieves the congestion while the opposite is true for RES production in SUD.
The evidence is mixed in CSUD-SUD pair. The effect of increasing production in ad-
jacent zones is heterogeneous probably because it depends on the role played by these
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zones with respect to the pairing regions, e.g. if they are in turn importing or exporting
zones, and on their geographical location; so for instance in CNOR-NORD pair, increas-
ing the production of renewables in CSUD decreases the probability of congestion to
CNOR caused by flows coming from the NORD because more flows are coming from
CSUD; at the opposite in SICI-SUD pair increasing RES generation in CSUD increase
the probability of congestion to SICI because the production in SUD is then mostly
diverted to SICI.
Increasing hydroelectric generation in ZONE1 decreases the log-odds of having con-
gestion to ZONE1 in CNOR-NORD, CSUD-SUD and SICI-SUD pairs; here the effect
of larger hydroelectric production is similar to the one of renewables, that is a larger
local production decreases importing needs and incoming flows determining congestion.
However, in CNOR-CSUD and SARD-CSUD pairs a larger hydroelectric production
seem to increase congestion in entry. Similarly to renewables, rising hydroelectric pro-
duction in adjacent zones may have different impact: the coefficients are positive in
CNOR-NORD, CSUD-SUD and SICI-SUD for all adjacent zones; they are also positive
for hydro production in SUD in both CNOR-CSUD and SARD-CSUD pairs. They
are on the contrary negative for NORD and CNOR production in CNOR-CSUD and
SARD-CSUD pairs respectively, while the evidence is mixed for hydro generation in
SARD in the pair CNOR-CSUD.
As expected, rising the forecasted demand in ZONE1 has a positive impact on
congestion to ZONE1 in all pairs, whereas rising the demand in ZONE2 has the opposite
effect (when this is not the case the positive coefficients are negligible). The demand in
adjacent zones seems to positively contribute to the increase in the log-odds of having
congestion to ZONE1 relative to no congestion; the only exception is the demand in
SARD for CNOR-CSUD pair in the FM and in 2012 for CSUD-SUD pair, probably
because in these cases increasing the demand in SARD has contributed in diverting the
flows from the congested line. The effects of gas, CO 2 and oil prices on directional
congestion to ZONE1 are mixed given that they tend to depend on the pair and on the
year. In most cases their coefficients are positive and significant but this is not always
true, so we are not able to draw some strong conclusions on this point.
Concerning the year dummies, let us analyse the result on the SM, which are con-
firmed by the coefficients on the intercept and the year dummy of the FM. Here, we may
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find three different evolution patterns. In CNOR-NORD, SARD-CSUD and CSUD-
SUD we observe that 2010 and 2011 observations lie above 2012 observations, with the
coefficient on the year dummy associated to 2011 being smaller than the one associated
to 2010; it seems therefore that the relative log odds of being in a situation of congestion
to ZONE1 with respect to the situation of no congestion increase when moving from
2012 to another year, this effect being larger for 2010. We may conclude hence that for
these zonal pairs the impact of the regressors on directional congestion to ZONE1 tend
to fade out in the three year period. In CNOR-CSUD we observe instead that a positive
intercept is coupled with a positive year dummy for 2010 and a negative year dummy
for 2011, indicating that after a softer impact in 2011, the effects of the regressors on
congestion have strengthened in 2012. Finally in SICI-SUD pair the coefficients on the
intercept and on year dummies indicate a progressive consolidation of the previously
analysed effects of the independent variables on congestion to SICI.
Strictly negative price difference
In the case of congestion from ZONE1, (y = −1), and again with the exception of
CNOR-CSUD pair, we observe that the coefficient associated to renewable generation
has a positive sign and is almost always significant. This result indicates therefore
that a larger renewable generation in ZONE1 is associated with an increase, relative
to no congestion, in the log odds of ZONE1 causing a congestion toward ZONE2:
increasing local supply in ZONE1 increases the exporting flows to ZONE2 which are
causing congestion in exit. In a symmetrical way, we remark that increasing the supply
of renewables in ZONE2 has exactly the opposite effect, i.e. it decreases the log odds
of having congestion from ZONE1 compared to no congestion in all pairs, CNOR-
CSUD included. Rising renewable production in adjacent zones increases the log odds
of congestion from ZONE1 relative to no congestion in CNOR-NORD, SARD-CSUD
and in CNOR-CSUD but, for this last pair, only in the case of production in NORD
while the production in SARD does not seem to be significant. However, it seems
that increasing renewable production in SUD for CNOR-CSUD pair and in CSUD for
SICI-SUD pair relieves the congestion. Increasing hydroelectric generation in ZONE1
seems to increase the log odds of creating congestion from ZONE1 in all pairs, while
the opposite is true for hydroelectric production in ZONE2. The only exception is in
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CNOR-NORD pair in SM but still the coefficient here is extremely low. The signs of
coefficients associated to hydroelectric generation in adjacent zones seem to be pretty
stable in CNOR-NORD and SICI-SUD pairs (negative) and for hydroelectric production
in SUD for SARD-CSUD pair (positive). In the other cases, the impact appears to be
dependent on the year and on the selected model.
In line with expectations, rising the forecasted demand in ZONE1 has a negative
impact on the log odds of congestion from ZONE1 compared to no congestion in CNOR-
NORD and SICI-SUD pairs, whereas the opposite effect is caused by a larger demand in
ZONE2 in the same pairs. Nevertheless, in CNOR-CSUD and SARD-CSUD pairs both
ZONE1 and ZONE2 forecasted demands have a positive (CNOR-CSUD) and negative
(SARD-CSUD) effect on the relative log odds of congestion from ZONE1. Overall,
the demand in adjacent zones seems to negatively contribute to the log-odds of having
congestion from ZONE1 relative to no congestion in CNOR-NORD and CNOR-CSUD
for what concerns the demand in NORD and in SARD. However, the regressors have
also positive sign in SARD-CSUD pair and in CNOR-CSUD pair for what concerns the
demand in SUD. The evidence in SICI-SUD pair is not conclusive. Increasing gas price
seems to reduce the relative log odds of congestion from SARD in SARD-CSUD pair,
while in other pairs the results of the estimations are mixed; CO 2 coefficient is overall
positive in all pairs but there might be some yearly exceptions; oil price has a positive
coefficient in CNOR-NORD and CNOR-CSUD pairs, while in the other two pairs is
not possible to draw strong conclusions.
The year dummies have the same behaviour in CNOR-NORD and CNOR-CSUD
pairs in both models. In these pairs, we observe that in the second model a nega-
tive intercept in 2012 is coupled with a positive year dummy for 2010 and a negative
year dummy for 2011, indicating that after a softer impact in 2011, the effects of the
regressors on congestion have strengthened in 2012. The same applies to the pair
SARD-CSUD altough the intercept in 2012 is positive. This behaviour is confirmed in
the FM. Only in SICI-SUD we remark that a positive intercept in associated with a
negative coefficient for both 2010 and 2011, whereas the value of the coefficient is larger
for 2010. This result seems to indicate there there has been over the years a progressive
consolidation of the above discussed effects of the independent variables on congestion
from SICI.
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4.4.4 Linear Regression
The second empirical approach is to use an OLS model for each paired zone (ZONE1-
ZONE2) where the dependent variable is the level of zonal price difference between
ZONE1 and ZONE2. The dependent variables are divided in two groups:
• Positive differences (Eur/Mwh), yp, when there is “congestion to” ZONE1
• Negative differences (Eur/Mwh), yn, when there is “congestion from” ZONE1
The descriptive statistics of the dependent variables have already been discussed
(see Tables 4.10 and 4.11). The linear regression can be written as follow:
yp = α3 + η3P + ω3W + ρ3Y + +
∑
r
βrXr + γ3G+ κ3C + θ3O (4.2a)
yn = α4 + η4P + ω4W + ρ3Y +
∑
r
βrXr + γ4G+ κ4C + θ4O (4.2b)
where:
• yp is the strictly positive zonal price difference and yn is the strictly negative zonal
price difference
• α is the intercept
• P , W , and Y 11 are dummy variables for peak hours, week days and year
• Xr is the matrix of regressors, whose number depends on the geographical position
of the pair, and includes:
– RES generation in the pairing zones and in adjacent zones
– Hydro generation in the pairing zones and in adjacent zones
– Forecasted demand in the pairing zones and in adjacent zones
• Natural gas, CO 2 and oil prices
11Dummy variables for year are present only in multiple year estimations.
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All variables are in log (except for the dummies). As shown in the equation above,
dummy variables for peak hours and weekdays are introduced for two reasons. Firstly,
unlike in multinomial logit model, these dummies are important to de-trend the depen-
dent variables since prices in peak hours tend to be higher than off-peak, whereas price
in the weekdays are more predictable compared to weekend. Secondly, after some trials
with and without dummy variables, the model with the dummy variables have shown
better statistics performance (R2, AIC and BIC).
4.4.5 Results of linear regression
As in the previous section 4.4.3, for each zonal pair we have estimated two models:
1. A two year model for 2010 and 2011 with a year dummy variable for 2010 to be
combined with a yearly model for 2012 (FM);
2. A three year model with yearly dummy variables for 2010 and 2011 (SM).
Strictly positive price difference
The results of linear estimations for strictly positive price difference are summarized in
Table 4.19 with significance level of 10%, while the detailed estimations are reported in
the Appendix E. The regressions provide quite good performance. In terms pf R2, first
model display values between 0.08 and 0.45 while the figure is between 0.10 and 0.42 for
second model. Finally, our ARCH test result provide no evidence of heteroskedasticity
in the residuals.
In the case of strictly positive price difference, we observe that increasing renewable
production in ZONE1 for SICI-SUD and SARD-CSUD pairs decreases the positive
price gap, given that, due to limited interzonal transit and very low hydro production,
an increase in renewable production in SICI and SARD will significantly decrease the
equilibrium zonal price in these zones. The opposite effect seems to be generated
when the renewable supply increases in CNOR in both CNOR-NORD and CNOR-
CSUD pairs. The evidence is mixed for CSUD renewable generation in CSUD-SUD
pair: in FM estimations, the variable has a negative sign in the two year regression
and a positive sign in 2012 regression, while it is not significant in SM specification.
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Rising renewable production in ZONE2 increases the price difference in SARD-CSUD
and CNOR-CSUD pairs, while the opposite is true in CNOR-NORD pair. A larger
production in ZONE2 does not appear to have a significant effect in CSUD-SUD and
SICI-SUD pairs. Increasing RES production in adjacent zones has negative effect in
CNOR-NORD and SARD-CSUD pairs, while it is mostly insignificant in CNOR-CSUD
pair. A larger production of renewable in adjacent zones seems to have instead a positive
effect in CSUD-SUD and SICI-SUD pairs.
A larger hydro production in ZONE1 seems to trigger larger positive price gaps in
most of the pairs: CNOR-NORD, CNOR-CSUD, SARD-CSUD and CSUD-SUD. SICI-
SUD is the only exception where rising hydro production shrinks the price difference.
Increasing hydro production in ZONE2 seems to increase the positive price difference in
CNOR-NORD, CSUD-SUD and SICI-SUD, while the opposite is true in CNOR-CSUD
and SARD-CSUD. A larger hydro generation in adjacent zones seems to decrease the
price gap in CNOR-NORD and in SARD-CSUD, whereas it seems to trigger larger
price gaps in CNOR-CSUD (with some exceptions in 2012) and SICI-SUD pairs. The
evidence is mixed in CSUD-SUD pair.
A larger predicted demand in ZONE1 seems to increase the positive price difference
in CNOR-CSUD pair while the evidence is mixed in other pairs. Increasing the demand
in ZONE2 seems to display negative effects in three pairs: CNOR-CSUD, SARD-CSUD
and CSUD-SUD (here with the exception of 2010-2011 estimation). A larger demand
in ZONE2 seems however to widen the price gap in CNOR-NORD and SICI-SUD pairs.
Increasing the predicted load in adjacent zones has an overall positive effect on price
gap, although not all adjacent zones seem to be significant in each pair.
In all observed pairs with the exception of CNOR-CSUD pair the coefficient on
weekdays is significant and negative, meaning that the positive price gaps tend to shrink
during the week. The dummy variable for peak hours is overall insignificant, with the
exception of CSUD-SUD pair where it appears to be negative and significant. Finally,
the year dummies seems to be not significant in CNOR-NORD pair in both model
specifications. For the other pairs we observe that in the SM the coefficients for 2010
and 2011 are overall negative, indicating an increasing trend in positive price differences
in 2012 (the reference year). In the FM, however, the coefficient on the dummy variable
for 2010 has a positive sign in CNOR-CSUD, SARD-CSUD and CSUD-SUD, indicating
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a decreasing trend in positive price difference between 2010 and 2011, while the opposite
is true for SICI-SUD pair.12
Gas prices are mostly non-significant in determining positive price difference level.
The coefficient is significant and positive in CNOR-CSUD in 2012 and it is significant
in SICI-SUD pair but the signs show mixed results. CO 2 price coefficient is also not
significant in CNOR-NORD and CSUD-SUD pairs, while it is positive in SARD-CSUD
pair and negative in CNOR-CSUD pair. Again the results are mixed for SICI-SUD
pair. Finally, oil prices seem to have a positive impact on price difference in CNOR-
NORD, SARD-CSUD (with the exception of 2012) and CSUD-SUD pairs. However,
oil prices seem to decrease the positive price difference in SICI-SUD pair while they are
not significant in CNOR-CSUD pair.
Strictly negative price difference
The results of linear estimations for strictly negative price difference are summarized in
Table 4.20 with significance level of 10%, while the detailed estimations are reported in
the Appendix E. The regressions show very good performance: in terms pf R2, the first
model displays values between 0.23 and 0.54 while the figure is between 0.19 and 0.47
for the second model. The ARCH test provides some evidence of heteroskedasticity in
the residuals for 2012 regression in SARD-CSUD, CNOR-CSUD, and CNOR-NORD
pairs where we have fewer observations.
Increasing renewable production in ZONE1 seems to increase the negative price
difference in SICI-SUD and SARD-CSUD pairs (with the exception of 2010-2011 es-
timation in SARD-CSUD pair). In CNOR-NORD pair, however, a larger renewable
production in ZONE1 seems to reduce the negative price gap, whereas the variable is
non-significant in CNOR-CSUD pair. Rising renewable production in ZONE2 seems
to increase the negative price gap in CNOR-NORD pair, while the evidence is mixed
in SICI-SUD pair. The variable is overall not significant in all remaining pairs. In
CNOR-NORD pair increasing the renewable generation from CSUD seems to increase
the negative price gap, while the opposite effect is played in SICI-SUD pair, where a
larger renewable generation in CSUD seems to reduce the negative price difference. In
12These result are confirmed by the statistics on positive price difference with the exception of
SICI-SUD pair, see Table 4.10.
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CNOR-CSUD pair, increasing renewable generation from SUD and SARD seems to
decrease the price gap, whereas a larger renewable production from NORD tends to
widen the negative price gap. As for SARD-CSUD pair, increasing renewable produc-
tion from SUD tends to reduce the gap, whereas a larger renewable generation from
CNOR shows an opposite behavior.
In hydro generation, rising production from ZONE1 seems to have an overall in-
significant effect. On the contrary, a larger hydro production from ZONE2 seems to
reduce the negative the price gaps in CNOR-CSUD, SARD-CSUD and SICI-SUD (with
the exception of 2012) pairs. For what concerns the production in adjacent zones, a
larger generation in SUD for CNOR-CSUD and SARD-CSUD pairs widens the negative
price difference, while the opposite role is played by hydro production in CSUD for the
pair SICI-SUD. In the other cases, the indicator is not significant.
The coefficients on forecasted load in ZONE1 show that increasing the value of this
variable tends to decrease the negative price difference in SARD-CSUD and SICI-SUD
with some evidence of the same behavior in CNOR-CSUD pair. In the other cases
the variable does not seem to be significant. Rising demand in ZONE2 decreases the
negative price gap in CNOR-NORD pair while the regressions are inconclusive for the
other cases. The regressions provide evidence of larger negative price gap determined
by the increase in forecasted demand in CSUD for SICI-SUD pair, while in the other
cases the evidence is mixed.
The role of weekdays is non relevant in CNOR-NORD and SARD-CSUD pairs,
while it seems to decrease the negative price gap in CNOR-CSUD pair. The evidence
is mixed for SICI-SUD where the coefficient is both positive and negative depending on
the year. The coefficient of the dummy variable for peak hours is positive in CNOR-
CSUD and SARD-CSUD, indicating a shrinking effect on the negative price differences.
In the other pairs, it is not possible to draw strong conclusions on this point, either
because the variable is not significant or because it changes sign according to the chosen
specification. Finally, the year dummy variables are mostly non significant with the
exception of SICI-SUD pair where the dummies have a negative sign, indicating a
reduction in the negative price gap in 2012 which is the reference year.13
CNOR-NORD is the only pair in which gas price seems to play a strong role in
13This result is confirmed by the statistics on negative price difference, see Table 4.11.
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increasing negative price difference, while in the other pairs the evidence is mixed.
CO 2 prices tend to reduce negative price difference in SARD-CSUD and SICI-SUD
with an opposite impact in 2012. Finally, oil price seems to widening the negative
price gap in CNOR-CSUD and SARD-CSUD, whereas it is non-significant in the other
regressions.
4.5 Conclusions
We may sum up our results as following. In general for all ZONE1-ZONE2 pairs,
and notably with the exception of CNOR-CSUD, the multinomial logit model provides
evidence that increasing renewable production in ZONE1 decreases the probability of
congestion in entry and increases the probability of congestion in exit compared to the
baseline situation of no congestion. In a symmetric way (with the exception of CNOR-
CSUD pair but only in the case of positive price difference), increasing the supply of
renewables in ZONE2 has exactly the opposite effect, that it increases the probabil-
ity of congestion to ZONE1 and decreases the probability of congestion from ZONE1
compared to the no congestion case. The effect of increasing renewable production in
adjacent zones is heterogeneous probably because it depends on the role played by these
zones with respect to the pairing regions, e.g. if they are in turn importing or export-
ing zones, and on their geographical location. In the case of congestion to ZONE1, the
effect of increasing hydroelectric generation in ZONE1 appears to be similar to the one
of increasing renewable in CNOR-NORD, CSUD-SUD and SICI-SUD pairs, while the
effect of rising hydro production in ZONE2 is heterogeneous depending on the pair.
In the case of congestion from ZONE1, however, increasing hydroelectric generation in
ZONE1 seems to increase the probability of congestion in all pairs, while the opposite
is true for hydroelectric production in ZONE2. Similarly to renewables, rising hydro-
electric production in adjacent zones may have different impact according to the year
and the pair.
Overall, rising the forecasted demand in ZONE1 has a positive impact on congestion
to ZONE1 in all pairs, whereas rising the demand in ZONE2 has the opposite effect.
In the case of congestion from ZONE1, rising the forecasted demand in ZONE1 has a
negative impact on the probability of congestion only in CNOR-NORD and SICI-SUD
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pairs, whereas the opposite effect is caused by a larger demand in ZONE2 in the same
pairs. The demand in adjacent zones seems to positively contribute to congestion to
ZONE1 and to negatively contribute to congestion from ZONE1, with some exceptions.
The effects of gas, CO 2 and oil prices on directional congestion both to and from
ZONE1 are mixed given that they tend to depend on the pair and on the year, so we
are not able to draw some strong conclusions on this point. Yearly dummies are mostly
significant showing that there are important changes across years.
Linear estimation results are less conclusive as follows. The estimations reveal that
increasing renewable generation in ZONE1 reduces the level of positive price gaps and
increases the level of negative price differences in SICI and SARD. Increasing the pre-
dicted demand in ZONE1 seems to reduce the negative price difference in SICI-SUD
and SARD-CSUD pairs, while in the case of positive price difference the estimations
are not significant for the same pairs. Increasing renewable production in CNOR seems
to increase the positive price difference and to decrease the negative price difference in
the pairs CNOR-NORD, while in the pair CNOR-CSUD the results of the estimations
are inconclusive. A larger renewable production in ZONE2 increases the positive price
difference in CNOR-CSUD and SARD-CSUD pairs, while it increases the negative price
difference in CNOR-NORD pair. Still in CNOR-NORD pair a larger renewable produc-
tion in NORD triggers a smaller positive price difference. A larger hydro production in
ZONE1 seems to increase the positive price difference in all pairs with the exception of
SICI-SUD, while the effect of increasing hydro production in ZONE2 and in adjacent
zones may vary widely according to the pair. As for the other regressors, we remark
that the dummy on weekdays tends to be significant and negative in the case of positive
price difference, indicating that the level of positive price difference is lower during the
week.
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Appendix C
Dataset
We have constructed an hourly dataset from January 1, 2010 at 1st delivery period
(00:00 -01:00) to December 31, 2012 at 24th delivery period (23:00 - 00:00) totalling
25776 observations for dependent and independent variables. Some observations have
been excluded in order to have weekly and hourly consistent series. Notably, we have
excluded the 25th delivery period and 12th week every year when there is daylight
saving time in Italy. Additionally, we have excluded the observations from February
29, 2012 in order to maintain the same number of observation days in each year: 358.
As a result, our dataset consists of 8592 yearly observations. The dataset employed in
the empirical analysis has been constructed using three main sources: GME, Italian
market operator, REF-E, a consulting group specialized in energy markets, and ICE,
the Intercontinental Exchange which is the network of exchanges and clearing houses
for financial and commodity markets. The series of zonal prices, interzonal transits
and forecasted demands have been downloaded from GME website. The series of the
dependent variables have been constructed using the same rough data. Renewable and
hydro production series have been built by matching two sources: GME and REF-E
databases. By matching GME information on the accepted offers in the day-ahead
auction with the list of Italian power plants classified by technology and supplied by
REF-E we have extracted two series of hourly renewable quantities: a first one which
considers only the production from relevant units (solar and wind power plants with
capacity larger than 100 MW); a second one which aggregates the quantity from rele-
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vant and non relevant units.1 We have then compared the yearly production resulting
from our extractions to those published by GSE, the state-owned company promoting
and supporting renewable energy sources in Italy. The result are reported in Table C.1,
where GME R.U. is standing for Relevant Units and GME A.U. is for All Units. Inter-
estingly, GSE figures seem to be somehow in between our two series. To be conservative
in our estimations, we have decided to work with the quantity series of relevant units.
Year GME (R.U.) GME (A.U.) GSE
2010 5675411 21856001 11032000
2011 7319418 27371081 20652000
2012 10806853 44880419 32269000
Table C.1: Yearly generation from intermittent renewable sources (MWh)
To extract the hydro quantity we have followed the same procedure. In order to
capture the effect of location, all these series have been segmented by Macro-zone:
NORD, CNOR, CSUD, SARD, SUD and SICI. Gas, CO 2 and oil price series are built
using ICE database with daily observations. The nominal values have been transformed
in euros using European Central Bank Exchange rate. Missing observations caused by
no-trading days are approximated by averaging two prices between no trading days. It
is important to note that the daily price is adopted to hourly frequency.
The econometric exercise has been performed with several model specifications.
Following the literature (see Woo et al., 2011), hour dummies have been introduced
at the beginning. However, it seemed that these dummies tend to over-fit the results
making other independent variables insignificant. Peak and weak dummies are kept
in the linear regressions since zonal prices tend to be higher in peak hours and more
predictable in weekdays. Concerning the time spam, we have tried at first to run
separate yearly regressions but we have finally decided to prefer two year or three year
regressions in order to have a larger number of observations for the dependent variables.
1It is worthy to note that the non relevant power plants are geographically aggregated by dispatching
points and are assigned a single Unit Reference Number to be used in the day-ahead auction. Therefore
in the case of bids associated to this type of Unit Reference Number is impossible to distinguish the
exact power source.
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Appendix D
Multinomial logit tables
D.1 CNOR-NORD
First model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren CNOR 0.005 (0.008)
ren NORD -0.004∗∗ (0.002)
ren CSUD 0.007∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro CNOR 0.003∗ (0.001)
hydro NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.001 (0.002)
fCNOR -0.001 (0.002)
fNORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.001∗∗ (0.001)
Gas 0.024∗ (0.013)
CO2 -0.323∗∗∗ (0.071)
Oil 0.019 (0.045)
year1 2.337∗∗∗ (0.757)
Intercept -3.625 (4.073)
Equation 3 : 1
ren CNOR 0.001 (0.001)
ren NORD 0.000 (0.000)
ren CSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CNOR -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro NORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.013∗∗∗ (0.003)
CO2 0.099∗∗∗ (0.015)
Oil 0.092∗∗∗ (0.012)
year1 0.800∗∗∗ (0.256)
Intercept -18.045∗∗∗ (1.085)
N 17184
Log-likelihood -3047.485
χ2(26) 1382.276
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Log − LikInterceptOnly : −3738.623 Log − LikFullModel : −3047.485
D(17156) : 6094.969 LR(26) : 1382.276
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.185 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.177
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.077 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.219
CountR2 : 0.948 AdjCountR2 : 0.004
AIC : 0.358 AIC ∗ n : 6150.969
BIC : −161205.78 BIC′ : −1128.731
BICusedbyStata : 6368.018 AICusedbyStata : 6150.969
Table D.1: Estimations for CNOR-NORD with year dummy, 2010-2011
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren CNOR 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro NORD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.005∗∗∗ (0.002)
fCNOR -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.001∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.028∗∗∗ (0.008)
CO2 0.199∗∗∗ (0.032)
Oil 0.055∗∗∗ (0.017)
Intercept -8.231∗∗∗ (1.894)
Equation 3 : 1
ren CNOR -0.023∗∗∗ (0.005)
ren NORD 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren CSUD -0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CNOR 0.000 (0.002)
hydro NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.003 (0.002)
fCNOR 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
fNORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.154∗∗∗ (0.018)
CO2 -0.306∗∗∗ (0.050)
Oil -0.093∗∗ (0.039)
Intercept -12.611∗∗∗ (3.465)
N 8592
Log-likelihood -1294.145
χ2(24) 1063.2
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −1825.745 Log − LikFullModel : −1294.145
D(8566) : 2588.29 LR(24) : 1063.2
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.291 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.277
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.116 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.336
CountR2 : 0.954 AdjCountR2 : 0.005
AIC : 0.307 AIC ∗ n : 2640.29
BIC : −75007.564 BIC′ : −845.794
BICusedbyStata : 2823.814 AICusedbyStata : 2640.29
Table D.2: Estimations for CNOR-NORD, 2012
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Second model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren CNOR 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro NORD 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCNOR -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.003 (0.006)
CO2 0.078∗∗∗ (0.020)
Oil 0.049∗∗∗ (0.014)
year1 1.006∗∗ (0.418)
year2 -1.191∗∗∗ (0.411)
Intercept -7.938∗∗∗ (1.449)
Equation 3 : 1
ren CNOR -0.001 (0.001)
ren NORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CNOR -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro NORD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.015∗∗∗ (0.003)
CO2 0.045∗∗∗ (0.014)
Oil 0.079∗∗∗ (0.010)
year1 2.783∗∗∗ (0.307)
year2 2.282∗∗∗ (0.168)
Intercept -18.712∗∗∗ (1.052)
N 25776
Log-likelihood -4532.867
χ2(28) 2669.07
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −5867.402 Log − LikFullModel : −4532.867
D(25746) : 9065.734 LR(28) : 2669.07
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.227 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.222
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.098 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.269
CountR2 : 0.95 AdjCountR2 : 0.001
AIC : 0.354 AIC ∗ n : 9125.734
BIC : −252441.51 BIC′ : −2384.668
BICusedbyStata : 9370.45 AICusedbyStata : 9125.734
Table D.3: Estimations for CNOR-NORD with year dummies, 2010-2012
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D.2 CNOR-CSUD
First model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren CNOR 0.002 (0.004)
ren CSUD -0.011∗∗∗ (0.003)
ren SUD 0.001 (0.001)
ren NORD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SARD 0.002 (0.001)
hydro CNOR -0.001 (0.001)
hydro CSUD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.012∗∗∗ (0.003)
fCNOR 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCSUD 0.000 (0.001)
fSUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
fNORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD -0.005∗∗∗ (0.002)
Gas -0.016 (0.010)
CO2 0.123∗∗∗ (0.031)
Oil 0.214∗∗∗ (0.033)
year1 7.842∗∗∗ (0.725)
Intercept -26.173∗∗∗ (3.222)
Equation 3 : 1
ren CNOR 0.005∗∗∗ (0.002)
ren CSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren NORD 0.000 (0.000)
ren SARD 0.001 (0.001)
hydro CNOR 0.001∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.001∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.001 (0.002)
fCNOR -0.001 (0.000)
fCSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.001∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD -0.002∗∗ (0.001)
Gas 0.002 (0.004)
CO2 -0.227∗∗∗ (0.017)
Oil -0.020 (0.013)
year1 1.025∗∗∗ (0.251)
Intercept 3.300∗∗∗ (1.092)
N 17184
Log-likelihood -2957.1
χ2(38) 3073.485
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Log − LikInterceptOnly : −4493.84 Log − LikFullModel : −2957.1
D(17144) : 5914.201 LR(38) : 3073.485
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.342 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.333
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.164 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.402
CountR2 : 0.945 AdjCountR2 : 0.088
AIC : 0.349 AIC ∗ n : 5994.201
BIC : −161270 BIC′ : −2702.92
BICusedbyStata : 6304.27 AICusedbyStata : 5994.201
Table D.4: Estimations for CNOR-CSUD with year dummy, 2010-2011
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren CNOR -0.010∗ (0.005)
ren CSUD -0.004∗∗ (0.002)
ren SUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren NORD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SARD -0.001 (0.001)
hydro CNOR 0.006∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro CSUD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.003)
hydro SUD -0.006∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro NORD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD -0.026∗∗∗ (0.008)
fCNOR 0.000 (0.001)
fCSUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSUD -0.001 (0.001)
fNORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD -0.003∗ (0.001)
Gas -0.040 (0.027)
CO2 -0.303∗∗∗ (0.098)
Oil 0.136∗ (0.070)
Intercept -8.604 (6.757)
Equation 3 : 1
ren CNOR 0.000 (0.001)
ren CSUD 0.001∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren NORD 0.000 (0.000)
ren SARD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.001∗ (0.001)
hydro CSUD -0.008∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro NORD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD -0.013∗∗∗ (0.004)
fCNOR 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD -0.001∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.050∗∗∗ (0.008)
CO2 -0.168∗∗∗ (0.026)
Oil 0.067∗∗∗ (0.017)
Intercept 1.083 (1.492)
N 8592
Log-likelihood -1958.672
χ2(36) 2053.947
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Log − LikInterceptOnly : −2985.65 Log − LikFullModel : −1958.67
D(8554) : 3917.344 LR(36) : 2053.947
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.344 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.331
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.213 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.424
CountR2 : 0.92 AdjCountR2 : 0.139
AIC : 0.465 AIC ∗ n : 3993.344
BIC : −73569.8 BIC′ : −1727.84
BICusedbyStata : 4261.571 AICusedbyStata : 3993.344
Table D.5: Estimations for CNOR-CSUD, 2012
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Second model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren CNOR -0.003 (0.002)
ren CSUD -0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SUD -0.001∗ (0.001)
ren NORD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SARD 0.000 (0.001)
hydro CNOR 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CSUD -0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.000 (0.003)
fCNOR 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
Gas -0.043∗∗∗ (0.006)
CO2 -0.013 (0.022)
Oil 0.070∗∗∗ (0.020)
year1 2.928∗∗∗ (0.614)
year2 -1.462∗∗∗ (0.485)
Intercept -5.708∗∗∗ (1.999)
Equation 3 : 1
ren CNOR 0.000 (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.001 (0.000)
ren SUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren NORD 0.000 (0.000)
ren SARD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro NORD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.003∗∗ (0.001)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fNORD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD 0.000 (0.000)
Gas -0.004 (0.003)
CO2 -0.195∗∗∗ (0.012)
Oil 0.005 (0.009)
year1 0.414∗ (0.243)
year2 -1.217∗∗∗ (0.184)
Intercept 2.460∗∗∗ (0.824)
N 25776
Log-likelihood -5232.792
χ2(40) 4625.417
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
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Log − LikInterceptOnly : −7545.5 Log − LikFullModel : −5232.79
D(25734) : 10465.58 LR(40) : 4625.417
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.307 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.301
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.164 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.371
CountR2 : 0.933 AdjCountR2 : 0.055
AIC : 0.409 AIC ∗ n : 10549.58
BIC : −250920 BIC′ : −4219.13
BICusedbyStata : 10892.19 AICusedbyStata : 10549.58
Table D.6: Estimations for CNOR-CSUD with year dummies, 2010-2012
156
D.3 SARD-CSUD
First model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren SARD 0.009∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren CSUD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.003)
ren SUD 0.000 (0.001)
ren CNOR 0.014∗∗∗ (0.003)
hydro SARD 0.024∗∗∗ (0.004)
hydro CSUD -0.018∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro SUD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CNOR -0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSARD -0.002 (0.002)
fCSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.033∗∗∗ (0.009)
CO2 0.120∗∗∗ (0.033)
Oil 0.346∗∗∗ (0.040)
year1 12.407∗∗∗ (1.099)
Intercept -30.579∗∗∗ (3.744)
Equation 3 : 1
ren SARD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.000 (0.001)
ren SUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CNOR -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.000 (0.001)
hydro CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CNOR -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.013∗∗∗ (0.002)
CO2 0.070∗∗∗ (0.006)
Oil 0.042∗∗∗ (0.005)
year1 1.648∗∗∗ (0.112)
Intercept -11.072∗∗∗ (0.505)
N 17184
Log-likelihood -9655.742
χ2(32) 4051.109
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −11681.3 Log − LikFullModel : −9655.74
D(17150) : 19311.48 LR(32) : 4051.109
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.173 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.17
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.21 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.283
CountR2 : 0.726 AdjCountR2 : 0.106
AIC : 1.128 AIC ∗ n : 19379.48
BIC : −147931 BIC′ : −3739.05
BICusedbyStata : 19643.04 AICusedbyStata : 19379.48
Table D.7: Estimations for SARD-CSUD with year dummy, 2010-2011
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren SARD 0.011∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren CSUD 0.000 (0.001)
ren SUD 0.000 (0.000)
ren CNOR 0.000 (0.001)
hydro SARD 0.004 (0.007)
hydro CSUD -0.008∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro SUD 0.002 (0.001)
hydro CNOR 0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSARD -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSUD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCNOR 0.000 (0.000)
Gas -0.103∗∗∗ (0.017)
CO2 0.508∗∗∗ (0.070)
Oil -0.261∗∗∗ (0.033)
Intercept 16.018∗∗∗ (3.444)
Equation 3 : 1
ren SARD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren CSUD 0.001∗ (0.001)
ren SUD 0.000 (0.000)
ren CNOR -0.001 (0.001)
hydro SARD 0.029∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro CSUD -0.001 (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CNOR -0.006∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSARD 0.008∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCSUD -0.005∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.005∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.001 (0.012)
CO2 -0.017 (0.041)
Oil -0.052∗∗∗ (0.014)
Intercept -4.893∗∗ (2.210)
N 8592
Log-likelihood -1762.43
χ2(30) 2782.65
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −3153.76 Log − LikFullModel : −1762.43
D(8560) : 3524.859 LR(30) : 2782.65
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.441 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.431
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.277 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.532
CountR2 : 0.92 AdjCountR2 : 0.169
AIC : 0.418 AIC ∗ n : 3588.859
BIC : −74016.6 BIC′ : −2510.89
BICusedbyStata : 3814.734 AICusedbyStata : 3588.859
Table D.8: Estimations for SARD-CSUD, 2012
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Second model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren SARD 0.009∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SUD 0.001∗∗ (0.000)
ren CNOR 0.001∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SARD 0.007∗∗ (0.003)
hydro CSUD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CNOR -0.001 (0.001)
fSARD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCSUD -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.005∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.065∗∗∗ (0.006)
CO2 0.022 (0.022)
Oil -0.065∗∗∗ (0.019)
year1 2.457∗∗∗ (0.570)
year2 -1.996∗∗∗ (0.560)
Intercept 4.769∗∗∗ (1.808)
Equation 3 : 1
ren SARD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.000 (0.000)
ren SUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CNOR -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CNOR -0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.016∗∗∗ (0.001)
CO2 0.077∗∗∗ (0.006)
Oil 0.018∗∗∗ (0.005)
year1 2.501∗∗∗ (0.148)
year2 1.046∗∗∗ (0.089)
Intercept -10.498∗∗∗ (0.498)
N 25776
Log-likelihood -11920.83
χ2(34) 7644.667
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −15743.2 Log − LikFullModel : −11920.8
D(25740) : 23841.66 LR(34) : 7644.667
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.243 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.241
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.257 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 : 0.364
CountR2 : 0.786 AdjCountR2 : 0.097
AIC : 0.928 AIC ∗ n : 23913.66
BIC : −237605 BIC′ : −7299.32
BICusedbyStata : 24207.32 AICusedbyStata : 23913.66
Table D.9: Estimations for SARD-CSUD with year dummies, 2010-2012
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D.4 CSUD-SUD
First model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : 1
ren CSUD -0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SUD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CNOR 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
ren SARD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro SUD 0.000∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.001 (0.001)
fCSUD 0.000 (0.000)
fSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD 0.003∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.000 (0.002)
CO2 -0.015∗ (0.008)
Oil -0.005 (0.007)
year1 1.132∗∗∗ (0.136)
Intercept -9.656∗∗∗ (0.630)
N 17184
Log-likelihood -5587.436
χ2(16) 5608.018
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −8391.45 Log − LikFullModel : −5587.44
D(17167) : 11174.87 LR(16) : 5608.018
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.334 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.332
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.278 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.447
CountR2 : 0.853 AdjCountR2 : 0.232
AIC : 0.652 AIC ∗ n : 11208.87
BIC : −156233 BIC′ : −5451.99
BICusedbyStata : 11340.65 AICusedbyStata : 11208.87
Table D.10: Estimations for CSUD-SUD with year dummy, 2010-2011
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : 1
ren CSUD 0.000 (0.000)
ren SUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CNOR -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SARD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SUD -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.000 (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.002 (0.002)
fCSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.047∗∗∗ (0.006)
CO2 0.249∗∗∗ (0.021)
Oil 0.070∗∗∗ (0.008)
Intercept -15.178∗∗∗ (1.090)
N 8592
Log-likelihood -2680.627
χ2(15) 2316.475
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −3838.87 Log − LikFullModel : −2680.63
D(8576) : 5361.255 LR(15) : 2316.475
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.302 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.298
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.236 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.4
CountR2 : 0.874 AdjCountR2 : 0.232
AIC : 0.628 AIC ∗ n : 5393.255
BIC : −72325.2 BIC′ : −2180.6
BICusedbyStata : 5506.192 AICusedbyStata : 5393.255
Table D.11: Estimations for CSUD-SUD, 2012
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Second model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 2 : 1
ren CSUD 0.000 (0.000)
ren SUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CNOR 0.000 (0.000)
ren SARD 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SUD 0.000∗ (0.000)
hydro CNOR 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SARD 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
fCSUD 0.000 (0.000)
fSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCNOR 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSARD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.003∗ (0.002)
CO2 0.044∗∗∗ (0.007)
Oil 0.045∗∗∗ (0.005)
year1 2.311∗∗∗ (0.150)
year2 0.722∗∗∗ (0.088)
Intercept -13.941∗∗∗ (0.528)
N 25776
Log-likelihood -8761.379
χ2(17) 6966.5
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −12244.6 Log − LikFullModel : −8761.38
D(25758) : 17522.76 LR(17) : 6966.5
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.284 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.283
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.237 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.386
CountR2 : 0.847 AdjCountR2 : 0.159
AIC : 0.681 AIC ∗ n : 17558.76
BIC : −244106 BIC′ : −6793.83
BICusedbyStata : 17705.59 AICusedbyStata : 17558.76
Table D.12: Estimations for CSUD-SUD with year dummies, 2010-2012
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D.5 SICI-SUD
First model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren SICI 0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SICI 0.005 (0.003)
hydro SUD -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.000 (0.000)
fSICI -0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.001 (0.002)
CO2 0.008 (0.010)
Oil -0.007 (0.009)
year1 -0.143 (0.162)
Intercept 0.542 (0.794)
Equation 3 : 1
ren SICI -0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD 0.000 (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
hydro SICI -0.020∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro SUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSICI 0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.008∗∗∗ (0.002)
CO2 0.046∗∗∗ (0.008)
Oil -0.026∗∗∗ (0.007)
year1 -0.537∗∗∗ (0.133)
Intercept -8.134∗∗∗ (0.627)
N 17184
Log-likelihood -9457.026
χ2(26) 10389.102
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −14651.6 Log − LikFullModel : −9457.03
D(17156) : 18914.05 LR(26) : 10389.1
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.355 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.353
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.454 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 : 0.554
CountR2 : 0.78 AdjCountR2 : 0.369
AIC : 1.104 AIC ∗ n : 18970.05
BIC : −148387 BIC′ : −10135.6
BICusedbyStata : 19187.1 AICusedbyStata : 18970.05
Table D.13: Estimations for SICI-SUD with year dummy, 2010-2011
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Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren SICI 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro SICI 0.017∗∗∗ (0.003)
hydro SUD 0.001 (0.001)
hydro CSUD -0.010∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSICI 0.000 (0.001)
fSUD 0.000 (0.000)
fCSUD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas -0.044∗∗∗ (0.007)
CO2 0.101∗∗∗ (0.021)
Oil -0.040∗∗∗ (0.011)
Intercept 6.365∗∗∗ (1.402)
Equation 3 : 1
ren SICI -0.005∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SICI -0.006∗∗ (0.003)
hydro SUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.005∗∗∗ (0.001)
fSICI 0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.000 (0.000)
fCSUD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.039∗∗∗ (0.005)
CO2 -0.062∗∗∗ (0.015)
Oil 0.034∗∗∗ (0.008)
Intercept -10.052∗∗∗ (1.005)
N 8592
Log-likelihood -4401.538
χ2(24) 3442.407
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −6122.74 Log − LikFullModel : −4401.54
D(8566) : 8803.076 LR(24) : 3442.407
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.281 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.277
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.33 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke)R2 : 0.435
CountR2 : 0.792 AdjCountR2 : 0.144
AIC : 1.031 AIC ∗ n : 8855.076
BIC : −68792.8 BIC′ : −3225
BICusedbyStata : 9038.599 AICusedbyStata : 8855.076
Table D.14: Estimations for SICI-SUD, 2012
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Second model
Variable Coefficient (Std. Err.)
Equation 1 : -1
ren SICI 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SICI 0.011∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro SUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro CSUD -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSICI -0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.000 (0.002)
CO2 0.039∗∗∗ (0.008)
Oil -0.010 (0.007)
year1 -0.529∗∗∗ (0.198)
year2 -0.234∗∗ (0.110)
Intercept 0.904 (0.687)
Equation 3 : 1
ren SICI -0.005∗∗∗ (0.000)
ren SUD 0.000∗∗ (0.000)
ren CSUD 0.001∗∗∗ (0.000)
hydro SICI -0.016∗∗∗ (0.002)
hydro SUD 0.000 (0.000)
hydro CSUD 0.002∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSICI 0.004∗∗∗ (0.000)
fSUD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
fCSUD 0.000∗∗∗ (0.000)
Gas 0.007∗∗∗ (0.001)
CO2 0.006 (0.006)
Oil 0.018∗∗∗ (0.005)
year1 -1.473∗∗∗ (0.150)
year2 -1.131∗∗∗ (0.087)
Intercept -8.819∗∗∗ (0.518)
N 25776
Log-likelihood -14388.139
χ2(28) 13121.216
Significance levels : ∗ : 10% ∗∗ : 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ : 1%
Log − LikInterceptOnly : −20948.7 Log − LikFullModel : −14388.1
D(25746) : 28776.28 LR(28) : 13121.22
Prob > LR : 0
McFadden′sR2 : 0.313 McFadden′sAdjR2 : 0.312
ML(Cox− Snell)R2 : 0.399 Cragg − Uhler(Nagelkerke) R2 : 0.497
CountR2 : 0.775 AdjCountR2 : 0.284
AIC : 1.119 AIC ∗ n : 28836.28
BIC : −232731 BIC′ : −12836.8
BICusedbyStata : 29081 AICusedbyStata : 28836.28
Table D.15: Estimations for SICI-SUD with year dummies, 2010-2012
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Appendix E
OLS tables
E.1 CNOR-NORD
First Model
2010-2011 CNORNORD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const -56.9175 21.1447 *** 28.1496 48.4495
FabCSUD 0.004707 0.002423 * 0.001536 0.010317
FabNORD 0.002797 0.000955 *** -0.00345 0.002606
FabCNOR -0.01276 0.007259 * 0.019376 0.020598
Gas 0.037515 0.064881 -0.01693 0.224496
CO2 0.243637 0.28976 -2.29703 1.02484 **
HydCNOR 0.047883 0.008844 *** -0.0031 0.02013
HydCSUD -0.02518 0.009807 ** 0.039631 0.026334
HydNORD 0.002409 0.001109 ** -0.0028 0.004535
RenCNOR 0.111169 0.020058 *** -0.04735 0.097967
RenCSUD -0.02206 0.012687 * -0.02958 0.028408
RenNORD -0.02669 0.004346 *** -0.03218 0.021038
Year1 1.21508 5.01669 6.91931 9.71847
Peak 2.92393 1.91453 4.44236 7.02353
Weekdays -2.83767 2.6541 2.89371 5.033
Oil 0.639333 0.22358 *** 0.471883 0.573479
Adjusted R-squared 0.175119 0.167204
P-value(F) 1.42E-28 0.045332
Akaike criterion 7120.676 508.3758
Hannan-Quinn 7149.594 522.4468
Sum squared resid 270180 4390.321
R-squared 0.190208 0.353651
Log-likelihood -3544.34 -238.188
Schwarz criterion 7196.045 543.888
Table E.1: Linear Estimation CNOR-NORD, 2010-2011
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2012 CNORNORD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const -18.3239 69.5945 16.2331 21.9817
FabCSUD -0.01116 0.008717 -0.00421 0.002815
FabNORD -0.00319 0.002982 0.002784 0.000893 ***
FabCNOR 0.036651 0.018946 * -0.00834 0.005743
Gas 0.31953 0.268935 -0.24787 0.07866 ***
CO2 -0.3746 0.835856 -0.09739 0.294756
HydCNOR 0.039578 0.026293 -0.02523 0.009473 ***
HydCSUD 0.060231 0.046755 -0.00697 0.01606
HydNORD -0.00116 0.003054 -0.00041 0.000948
RenCNOR -0.08142 0.116303 0.019315 0.006532 ***
RenCSUD -0.02696 0.016153 * -0.00781 0.003355 **
RenNORD -0.00813 0.022857 -0.0028 0.001421 **
Peak -1.60307 5.67552 -0.19138 3.10412
Weekdays -2.91097 11.5051 0.202435 1.72944
Oil 0.171601 0.655018 0.054692 0.21144
Adjusted R-squared 0.257583 0.191842
P-value(F) 0.000189 2.54E-10
Akaike criterion 837.4635 2151.017
Hannan-Quinn 853.2788 2173.162
Sum squared resid 18805.93 22902.16
R-squared 0.362572 0.230325
Log-likelihood -403.732 -1060.51
Schwarz criterion 876.541 2206.322
Table E.2: Linear Estimation CNOR-CSUD, 2012
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Second Model
2010-2012 CNORNORD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const -59.1179 20.7809 *** -6.36321 16.197
FabCSUD 0.002246 0.002229 0.000512 0.002165
FabNORD 0.001757 0.000856 ** 0.001349 0.000571 **
FabCNOR -0.00262 0.006145 -0.00542 0.004382
Gas -0.01021 0.053735 -0.13466 0.058033 **
CO2 0.037513 0.257179 -0.14959 0.22922
HydCNOR 0.0485 0.008131 *** -0.02996 0.007731 ***
HydCSUD -0.02392 0.009093 *** 0.013971 0.010714
HydNORD 0.000896 0.000873 9.71E-05 0.000828
RenCNOR 0.098999 0.017975 *** 0.016885 0.006093 ***
RenCSUD -0.01927 0.008925 ** -0.01016 0.00315 ***
RenNORD -0.0243 0.004123 *** -0.00282 0.001392 **
Year1 7.40882 5.73655 2.36694 4.59944
Year2 4.16959 3.03267 0.030868 4.69919
Peak 1.80447 1.75201 0.379382 2.63725
Weekdays -4.39007 2.4928 * 0.636519 1.52775
Oil 0.675137 0.203645 *** 0.104235 0.165127
Adjusted R-squared 0.170115 0.161819
P-value(F) 5.70E-31 3.46E-10
Akaike criterion 7964.892 2659.745
Hannan-Quinn 7996.194 2686.061
Sum squared resid 296190.3 29436.25
R-squared 0.184548 0.198865
Log-likelihood -3965.45 -1312.87
Schwarz criterion 8046.925 2725.95
Table E.3: Linear Estimation CNOR-CSUD, 2010-2012
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E.2 CNOR-CSUD
First Model
2010-2011 CNORCSUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const 11.4287 11.263 -135.119 94.0483
FabSUD 0.002546 0.004493 -0.014 0.013842
FabSARD 0.000409 0.007212 0.132243 0.035526 ***
FabCSUD -0.01077 0.002946 *** -0.00383 0.011898
FabNORD -0.00095 0.000626 0.001633 0.002922
FabCNOR 0.015598 0.004558 *** -0.01647 0.016292
Gas -0.05121 0.04712 0.09371 0.324229
CO2 -0.26763 0.172181 0.604806 1.02952
HydCNOR 0.00097 0.004487 -0.03741 0.027692
HydCSUD -0.00824 0.006728 0.093768 0.029074 ***
HydNORD 0.000508 0.000931 -0.00092 0.003697
HydSARD -0.01852 0.021862 -0.03769 0.066541
HydSUD 0.015382 0.003325 *** -0.09722 0.013655 ***
RenCNOR 0.053518 0.02082 ** 0.094154 0.067938
RenCSUD -0.00066 0.010844 -0.04628 0.063059
RenNORD -0.01004 0.004238 ** -0.04429 0.020581 **
RenSARD -0.00534 0.006853 0.083652 0.035869 **
RenSUD -0.00543 0.004291 0.039469 0.023592 *
Year1 6.5575 2.58695 ** 32.4323 20.5942
Peak 2.1138 1.97054 8.43676 4.46268 *
Weekdays 2.55585 1.16029 ** 3.84187 5.42873
Oil 0.217992 0.147453 0.313638 0.884829
Adjusted R-squared 0.118598 0.431907
P-value(F) 9.67E-15 1.14E-25
Akaike criterion 5553.314 2491.151
Hannan-Quinn 5592.461 2523.226
Sum squared resid 69211.25 102409.9
R-squared 0.143376 0.474667
Log-likelihood -2754.66 -1223.58
Schwarz criterion 5654.897 2571.117
Table E.4: Linear Estimation CNOR-CSUD, 2010-2011
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2012 CNORCSUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const 29.0083 18.0466 148.049 79.4501 *
FabSUD 0.002836 0.002566 -0.02858 0.010282 ***
FabSARD 0.024219 0.003957 *** -0.02333 0.011021 **
FabCSUD -0.00858 0.002876 *** 0.013178 0.007602 *
FabNORD -0.00061 0.000509 0.002235 0.001536
FabCNOR 0.012026 0.004174 *** -0.01257 0.010325
Gas 0.373279 0.069571 *** 0.42512 0.35453
CO2 -1.84258 0.254221 *** 0.141636 1.17284
HydCNOR 0.029201 0.006095 *** -0.00261 0.016935
HydCSUD -0.04037 0.011499 *** -0.01152 0.02548
HydNORD -0.00231 0.000767 *** -0.00176 0.002706
HydSARD -0.04518 0.034167 0.098217 0.069999
HydSUD 0.018498 0.007913 ** -0.00431 0.015995
RenCNOR -0.00582 0.005601 -0.00417 0.042287
RenCSUD 0.010133 0.003448 *** 0.011245 0.015235
RenNORD 0.000482 0.001482 -0.01015 0.009446
RenSARD 0.003078 0.002712 0.002161 0.008331
RenSUD -0.00167 0.001934 0.016611 0.007784 **
Peak -2.85427 2.15104 4.6468 2.64635 *
Weekdays -4.75412 1.40252 *** 13.5433 4.67862 ***
Oil -0.29869 0.190901 -1.62454 0.792955 **
Adjusted R-squared 0.181852 0.450924
P-value(F) 1.28E-22 1.29E-09
Akaike criterion 5139.577 864.4433
Hannan-Quinn 5176.316 888.0678
Sum squared resid 73117.31 7351.545
R-squared 0.206022 0.544783
Log-likelihood -2548.79 -411.222
Schwarz criterion 5234.479 922.6277
Table E.5: Linear Estimation CNOR-CSUD, 2012
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Second Model
2010-2012 CNORCSUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const 25.3462 9.25695 *** -79.1816 56.7243
FabSUD 0.002031 0.001988 -0.0052 0.008357
FabSARD 0.007495 0.002637 *** 0.029535 0.01323 **
FabCSUD -0.0092 0.001936 *** 0.009532 0.007217
FabNORD -0.00045 0.000367 0.000518 0.00158
FabCNOR 0.01204 0.002855 *** -0.0272 0.009572 ***
Gas 0.018494 0.034433 0.630431 0.228072 ***
CO2 -0.61665 0.130534 *** 0.341399 0.584647
HydCNOR 0.005491 0.003501 -0.02491 0.01657
HydCSUD -0.00684 0.005185 0.056484 0.019295 ***
HydNORD -0.00078 0.000494 0.001985 0.002376
HydSARD -0.0197 0.015731 -0.02772 0.049935
HydSUD 0.01599 0.00296 *** -0.07567 0.010013 ***
RenCNOR -0.00628 0.005068 0.058662 0.041459
RenCSUD 0.014849 0.002969 *** -0.00339 0.02417
RenNORD -0.00184 0.001339 -0.02367 0.011664 **
RenSARD 0.002143 0.002356 0.019839 0.012641
RenSUD -0.00238 0.001622 0.01267 0.011208
Year1 -2.17942 2.73675 4.52643 14.0381
Year2 -6.61951 2.1461 *** -4.12488 9.53934
Peak 1.42388 1.34686 13.9704 3.84791 ***
Weekdays -0.58969 0.887042 5.49759 2.61102 **
Oil -0.06873 0.098145 0.492688 0.567889
Adjusted R-squared 0.099136 0.446261
P-value(F) 9.35E-25 2.15E-40
Akaike criterion 10766.95 3458.541
Hannan-Quinn 10812.16 3494.857
Sum squared resid 153729.5 123352
R-squared 0.113044 0.476947
Log-likelihood -5360.48 -1706.27
Schwarz criterion 10887.99 3550.229
Table E.6: Linear Estimation CNOR-CSUD, 2010-2012
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E.3 SARD-CSUD
First Model
2010-2011 SARDCSUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const -106.066 14.7778 *** 107.188 80.1661
FabSUD 0.0023 0.003706 -0.03724 0.012135 ***
FabSARD -0.00179 0.006576 0.122611 0.036536 ***
FabCSUD -0.00179 0.0029 0.01223 0.009392
FabCNOR 0.005472 0.0026 ** -0.02215 0.008962 **
Gas -0.02893 0.04155 -0.43311 0.214385 **
CO2 1.55011 0.212479 *** 1.83403 0.784801 **
HydCNOR -0.01417 0.006524 ** 0.026161 0.027112
HydCSUD -0.05734 0.007687 *** 0.080913 0.03226 **
HydSARD 0.449126 0.019079 *** 0.01721 0.076699
HydSUD -0.00717 0.004496 -0.05313 0.012573 ***
RenCNOR -0.00952 0.012006 -0.26485 0.061574 ***
RenCSUD 0.114766 0.014622 *** 0.220767 0.050564 ***
RenSARD -0.10793 0.010664 *** 0.03669 0.021849 *
RenSUD -0.02667 0.005008 *** -0.03889 0.019054 **
Year1 33.2103 3.15566 *** -11.7863 22.1737
Peak -1.30111 1.50322 12.9128 4.93664 ***
Weekdays -1.55929 1.4699 -3.14968 2.78317
Oil 1.07491 0.148725 *** -2.91432 0.961966 ***
Adjusted R-squared 0.174074 0.433626
P-value(F) 5.80E-195 1.97E-26
Akaike criterion 49347.49 2314.981
Hannan-Quinn 49390.89 2342.584
Sum squared resid 5606532 61849.16
R-squared 0.177048 0.470698
Log-likelihood -24654.8 -1138.49
Schwarz criterion 49471.32 2383.768
Table E.7: Linear Estimation SARD-CSUD, 2010-2011
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2012 SARDCSUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const 190.206 94.0801 ** -152.242 71.9765 **
FabSUD 0.051788 0.012204 *** 0.006254 0.014087
FabSARD 0.022408 0.022386 0.10334 0.025252 ***
FabCSUD -0.01257 0.013594 -0.01755 0.009084 *
FabCNOR 0.012621 0.013094 0.005418 0.009386
Gas -1.15255 0.79688 1.74941 0.332551 ***
CO2 0.215303 2.04476 -6.69076 1.33744 ***
HydCNOR -0.13969 0.031709 *** 0.005539 0.01494
HydCSUD -0.0968 0.05675 * 0.048173 0.034161
HydSARD 0.640113 0.06752 *** -0.00908 0.103721
HydSUD -0.01209 0.019081 0.016676 0.030002
RenCNOR -0.06775 0.029354 ** 0.004303 0.008924
RenCSUD 0.054848 0.033235 * -0.01248 0.010171
RenSARD 0.01995 0.042005 -0.10155 0.01442 ***
RenSUD -0.0179 0.015099 0.015306 0.005575 ***
Peak -0.16927 7.38995 -0.22956 5.01286
Weekdays -27.721 6.12614 *** 1.2864 4.1859
Oil -1.50624 0.604982 ** 1.19009 0.832033
Adjusted R-squared 0.436401 0.325482
P-value(F) 2.53E-69 2.94E-11
Akaike criterion 6747.21 1571.649
Hannan-Quinn 6778.346 1595.215
Sum squared resid 1424795 40346.4
R-squared 0.451489 0.387132
Log-likelihood -3355.61 -767.824
Schwarz criterion 6827.404 1629.809
Table E.8: Linear Estimation SARD-CSUD, 2012
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Second Model
2010-2012 SARDCSUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const -32.4062 16.1247 ** 59.8778 50.732
FabSUD 0.019383 0.002888 *** 0.000693 0.007503
FabSARD -0.0272 0.005053 *** 0.035921 0.014255 **
FabCSUD -0.00635 0.002889 ** 0.00048 0.005919
FabCNOR 0.009434 0.002657 *** -0.01174 0.005916 **
Gas -0.04665 0.0433 0.019417 0.14267
CO2 1.79988 0.221066 *** 1.14259 0.400018 ***
HydCNOR -0.00783 0.006588 0.016469 0.013389
HydCSUD -0.08786 0.007232 *** 0.054329 0.017476 ***
HydSARD 0.51847 0.018738 *** -0.01758 0.060432
HydSUD -0.0063 0.00458 -0.05824 0.009525 ***
RenCNOR -0.03193 0.010694 *** -0.02432 0.008679 ***
RenCSUD 0.095852 0.013071 *** -0.00755 0.010462
RenSARD -0.07625 0.010748 *** -0.02491 0.01049 **
RenSUD -0.02685 0.004793 *** 0.011825 0.005726 **
Year1 -32.9608 4.71063 *** -30.2176 13.5796 **
Year2 -60.174 2.83514 *** -10.5831 13.9483
Peak 0.344932 1.49748 6.655 3.18854 **
Weekdays -4.50211 1.49255 *** 1.1017 2.25109
Oil 1.0098 0.139861 *** -1.38611 0.628554 **
Adjusted R-squared 0.420471 0.286495
P-value(F) 0 1.61E-26
Akaike criterion 56567.49 3962.436
Hannan-Quinn 56613.73 3995.014
Sum squared resid 7475703 129525.7
R-squared 0.422425 0.315839
Log-likelihood -28263.7 -1961.22
Schwarz criterion 56700.23 4045.191
Table E.9: Linear Estimation SARD-CSUD, 2010-2012
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E.4 CSUD-SUD
First Model
2010-2011 CSUDSUD
Positive price difference (yp)
Coeff Std. Error
const -77.7882 7.215508 ***
FabSUD 0.012146 0.002156 ***
FabSARD -0.00878 0.003936 **
FabCSUD -0.00517 0.001535 ***
FabCNOR 0.012595 0.001348 ***
Gas -0.00277 0.021616
CO2 0.104264 0.088591
HydCNOR -0.01102 0.003422 ***
HydCSUD 0.006628 0.004168
HydSARD -0.02259 0.009371 **
HydSUD 0.002902 0.002183
RenCNOR 0.039329 0.00573 ***
RenCSUD -0.01897 0.006605 ***
RenSARD 0.02093 0.004346 ***
RenSUD 0.000879 0.002377
Year1 12.84661 1.531869 ***
Peak -2.78087 1.0693 ***
Weekdays -8.10048 1.246711 ***
Oil 0.54434 0.079658 ***
Adjusted R-squared 0.142186
P-value(F) 4.24E-99
Akaike criterion 27023.8
Hannan-Quinn 27065.29
Sum squared resid 703017.4
R-squared 0.146881
Log-likelihood -13492.9
Schwarz criterion 27139.68
Table E.10: Linear Estimation CSUD-SUD, 2010-2011
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2012 CSUDSUD
Positive price difference (yp)
Coeff Std. Error
const 7.014216 14.94742
FabSUD -0.01089 0.002424 ***
FabSARD 0.00238 0.003113
FabCSUD 0.004342 0.002562 *
FabCNOR 0.004014 0.002508
Gas -0.03129 0.07512
CO2 -0.0931 0.284713
HydCNOR 0.022125 0.006408 ***
HydCSUD 0.003919 0.012194
HydSARD 0.042981 0.02433 *
HydSUD -0.0055 0.005814
RenCNOR -0.00691 0.004047 *
RenCSUD 0.012364 0.004286 ***
RenSARD -0.00196 0.004071
RenSUD -0.00268 0.002238
Peak -1.31066 2.143382
Weekdays -3.43917 1.917842 *
Oil -0.00458 0.110413
Adjusted R-squared 0.094336
P-value(F) 1.74E-24
Akaike criterion 12069.44
Hannan-Quinn 12104.77
Sum squared resid 415463
R-squared 0.105247
Log-likelihood -6016.72
Schwarz criterion 12163.99
Table E.11: Linear Estimation CSUD-SUD, 2012
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Second Model
2010-2012 CSUDSUD
Positive price difference (yp)
Coeff Std. Error
const -43.3696 6.657628 ***
FabSUD -0.00319 0.001297 **
FabSARD 0.004788 0.001805 ***
FabCSUD 0.000494 0.001267
FabCNOR 0.009553 0.001204 ***
Gas -0.0077 0.019678
CO2 0.067581 0.084902
HydCNOR -0.00215 0.002961
HydCSUD 0.007906 0.003608 **
HydSARD -0.03015 0.008824 ***
HydSUD 0.004006 0.002108 *
RenCNOR 0.003386 0.002757
RenCSUD -0.00172 0.00318
RenSARD 0.004288 0.002777
RenSUD -0.00089 0.001484
Year1 1.406733 1.91164
Year2 -7.71569 1.148135 ***
Peak -2.03508 0.942151 **
Weekdays -7.43198 1.055157 ***
Oil 0.291852 0.059012 ***
Adjusted R-squared 0.098789
P-value(F) 2.02E-95
Akaike criterion 39308.45
Hannan-Quinn 39353.85
Sum squared resid 1166248
R-squared 0.102431
Log-likelihood -19634.2
Schwarz criterion 39437.57
Table E.12: Linear Estimation CSUD-SUD, 2010-2012
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E.5 SICI-SUD
First Model
2010-2011 SICISUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const 41.4661 7.95082 *** -45.8691 9.14187 ***
FabSUD 0.022684 0.00257 *** 0.013078 0.003507 ***
FabCSUD 0.011014 0.001033 *** -0.00476 0.001568 ***
FabSICI -0.03413 0.003323 *** 0.007324 0.004561
Gas -0.10318 0.022692 *** 0.033857 0.022676
CO2 1.96832 0.103243 *** 1.06765 0.1018 ***
HydCSUD 0.013371 0.00289 *** -0.00153 0.00418
HydSICI -0.20602 0.028502 *** -0.0864 0.035851 **
HydSUD 0.016696 0.002604 *** 0.015508 0.004079 ***
RenCSUD 0.012544 0.006111 ** -0.03415 0.008871 ***
RenSICI -0.04142 0.003619 *** -0.0481 0.003276 ***
RenSUD -0.00188 0.002874 0.018612 0.003614 ***
Year1 -13.396 1.6488 *** -2.39197 1.80728
Peak 1.124 0.905348 -10.5394 1.8243 ***
Weekdays -7.40694 0.955249 *** -2.26615 0.710987 ***
Oil -1.08498 0.084332 *** -0.05009 0.097038
Adjusted R-squared 0.185905 0.314189
P-value(F) 0 1.00E-125
Akaike criterion 109127.7 13208.52
Hannan-Quinn 109167.1 13240.61
Sum squared resid 11544791 277984.4
R-squared 0.186999 0.320408
Log-likelihood -54547.8 -6588.26
Schwarz criterion 109244.8 13295.1
Table E.13: Linear Estimation on SICI-SUD, 2010-2011
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2012 SICISUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const -39.7379 15.423 ** -43.0884 13.8655 ***
FabSUD 0.005483 0.003182 * -0.01218 0.00336 ***
FabCSUD -0.00113 0.001629 -0.00508 0.001359 ***
FabSICI 0.018483 0.005795 *** 0.033954 0.005117 ***
Gas 0.342177 0.068666 *** 0.290501 0.078592 ***
CO2 -0.91314 0.230068 *** -0.47916 0.210271 **
HydCSUD 0.029999 0.010003 *** 0.058613 0.012271 ***
HydSICI -0.06339 0.042086 0.00648 0.030516
HydSUD 0.039096 0.005541 *** -0.02193 0.006931 ***
RenCSUD 0.008568 0.004586 * 0.009126 0.00531 *
RenSICI -0.02118 0.003566 *** -0.02578 0.002614 ***
RenSUD 0.000759 0.002839 -0.00498 0.002799 *
Weekdays 1.79684 1.61159 3.64514 0.905771 ***
Peak -1.38187 1.4093 6.72795 2.21974 ***
Oil 0.069533 0.12065 0.073844 0.092853
Adjusted R-squared 0.081371 0.323976
P-value(F) 1.40E-111 2.39E-55
Akaike criterion 66998.67 5631.375
Hannan-Quinn 67033.84 5657.993
Sum squared resid 11315573 87022.09
R-squared 0.083349 0.336852
Log-likelihood -33484.3 -2800.69
Schwarz criterion 67100.36 5700.394
Table E.14: Linear Estimation SICI-SUD, 2012
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Second Model
2010-2012 SICISUD
Positive price difference (yp) Negative price difference (yp)
Coeff Std Error Coeff Std Error
const 20.9375 7.24692 *** -21.9647 7.61544 ***
FabSUD 0.017104 0.001755 *** -0.00064 0.002314
FabCSUD 0.00663 0.000861 *** -0.00403 0.001048 ***
FabSICI -0.01711 0.002785 *** 0.018733 0.003595 ***
Gas -0.05507 0.0219 ** -0.03764 0.020357 *
CO2 1.12952 0.096238 *** 0.464584 0.09006 ***
HydCSUD 0.023218 0.002914 *** -0.00541 0.003737
HydSICI -0.20809 0.023785 *** -0.03104 0.025421
HydSUD 0.018547 0.002448 *** 0.010458 0.003637 ***
RenCSUD 0.012095 0.003148 *** 0.011921 0.004869 **
RenSICI -0.02547 0.002373 *** -0.02298 0.001845 ***
RenSUD -0.00307 0.001918 0.000731 0.002353
Year1 -14.8212 2.05517 *** -7.1683 2.06619 ***
Year2 -9.71652 1.26476 *** -7.21856 1.23268 ***
Peak 1.81654 0.786928 ** -5.43981 1.51215 ***
Weekdays -4.60026 0.801173 *** -1.26494 0.599809 **
Oil -0.59366 0.066949 *** -0.09177 0.068487
Adjusted R-squared 0.130857 0.227101
P-value(F) 0 1.40E-123
Akaike criterion 177375.3 19217.74
Hannan-Quinn 177418.8 19253.49
Sum squared resid 23449867 427154.4
R-squared 0.131643 0.232275
Log-likelihood -88670.7 -9591.87
Schwarz criterion 177507.6 19315.99
Table E.15: Linear Estimation SICI-SUD, 2010-2012
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